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7ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACP:7KH$IULFDQ&DULEEHDQ3DFLÀF*URXSRI6WDWHV
ACRULAC: Association of Councils of Rectors of Universities in Latin America  
and the Caribbean 
AECID: Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
ALBA-TCP: %ROLYDULDQ$OOLDQFHIRUWKH3HRSOHVRI2XU$PHULFD3HRSOHV·7UDGH7UHDW\
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AST: $JUHHPHQWIRU6FLHQWLÀFDQG7HFKQRORJLFDO&RRSHUDWLRQ
BNDES: 1DWLRQDO%DQNIRU(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO'HYHORSPHQW
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CABEI: &HQWUDO$PHULFDQ%DQNIRU(FRQRPLF,QWHJUDWLRQ
CAF: 'HYHORSPHQW%DQNRI/DWLQ$PHULFD
CAN: Andean Community 
CARICOM: Caribbean Community
CELAC: Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CIF: &DULEEHDQ,QYHVWPHQW)DFLOLW\
CYTED: Iberoamerican Programme for Science and Technology for Development
DAC: Development Assistance Committee 
DCI: Development Cooperation Instrument
EBA : Everything but Arms 
ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
EEAS: European External Action Service
EHEA: European Higher Education Area 
ENLACES: Latin American and Caribbean Higher Education Area
ERA: European Research Area
EU: European Union
FDI: )RUHLJQ'LUHFW,QYHVWPHQW
FOCEM:0HUFRVXU6WUXFWXUDO&RQYHUJHQFH)XQG
FONCICyT: (80H[LFR,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RRSHUDWLRQ)XQGLQ6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\
8FPRD: )UDPHZRUN3URJUDPPHIRU5HVHDUFKDQG'HYHORSPHQW
G24: Group of 24
G20: Group of 20
G7: Group of Seven
GPEDC: Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
GSP: Generalised System of Preferences
GTZ: German Agency for International Cooperation
HDI: Human Development Index 
HE: Higher Education
HEI: Higher Education Institutions 
HLF:+LJK/HYHO)RUXP
IADB:,QWHU$PHULFDQ'HYHORSPHQW%DQN
IAPSSC: Ibero-American Programme for Strengthening South-South Cooperation
IATI: International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICT: Information and Communications Technology
I+D+i: Research, Development and Innovation
IMF: QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG
ISAGS: South American Institute of Government in Health
JIRI: Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation 
KfW: Credit Institute for Reconstruction
LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
LAIF: /DWLQ$PHULFDQ,QYHVWPHQW)DFLOLW\
LIC: Low Income Countries
LMIC: Lower Middle Income Countries
MDG: Millennium Development Goals
Mercosur: 6RXWKHUQ&RPPRQ0DUNHW
MIC: Middle Income Countries
MIP: Multiannual Indicative Programme 
MMP: Mercosur Mobility Programme
9NSC: North–South Cooperation
ODA: 2IÀFLDO'HYHORSPHQW$LG
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OEI: The Organization of Ibero-American States
OWG:2SHQ:RUNLQJ*URXS
PAHO: Pan American Health Organization
PAF: 3HUPDQHQW$FDGHPLF)RUXP
RCHE: Regional Conference on Higher Education
SCTUC: Southern Cone Trade Unions Coordinator
SDG: Sustainable Development Goals 
SDSN: 6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW6ROXWLRQV1HWZRUN
SEGIB: Ibero-American General Secretariat
SICA: Central American Integration System
SISCA: Central American Social Integration Secretariat 
SSC: South–South Cooperation
STI: Science, Technology and Innovation
TrC: Triangular Cooperation
TTIP: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UMIC: Upper Middle Income Countries
UN: United Nations 
Unasur: Union of South American Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
WTO: World Trade Organisation
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1   INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) share a long his-
tory of political dialogue and bi-regional cooperation in which development has always 
SOD\HGDNH\UROH%RWKUHJLRQVDOVRVKDUHDFRPPLWPHQWWRPXOWLODWHUDOLVPDQGFRRSHUD-
tion and have collaborated at the regional and global level towards the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by September 2015.
,Q  ERWK UHJLRQVZLOO QHHG WRZRUN MRLQWO\ WR GHWHUPLQHQHZJRDOV DQG WDUJHWV IRU
VXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW LQ WKHSRVWIUDPHZRUN7KLVZLOO UDLVHFRQVLGHUDEOHFKDO-
lenges for development cooperation between these two regions as well as for coopera-
tion with other countries and regions. Given the changes that have occurred since the 
establishment of the MDG both within the two regions and on a global scale, the present 
situation as well as the capacities, responsibilities and aspirations of both regions within 
a post-MDG context need to be analysed. Both regions have to understand how global 
and regional developments have affected their strategic partnership and and how they can 
cooperate so as to effectively shape the new global governance of development. 
%DVHGRQDQDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH(8/$&)RXQGDWLRQWKLVVWXG\DLPVWRDGGUHVVWRWZR
PDMRUREMHFWLYHVÀUVWO\WKHVWXG\H[DPLQHVWKHQHZIUDPHZRUNIRUSRVWFRRSHUDWLRQ
DQGWKHDJHQGDIRUWKH6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV6'*WDNLQJLQWRDFFRQWWKHQHZ
SULRULWLHVHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHPXOWLODWHUDOIUDPHZRUNWKHELUHJLRQDOUHODWLRQDQGWKHQHZ(8
IUDPHZRUNRIFRRSHUDWLRQIRUGHYHORSPHQW LQLWLDWHGZLWKWKH´$JHQGDIRU&KDQJHµ6HF-
RQGO\WKHVWXG\DLPVWRDQDO\VHWKHUROHVRIWKH(8DQG/$&ZLWKLQWKLVQHZIUDPHZRUN
based on their Strategic Partnership and the inter-governmental EU-CELAC process and 
to identify how the two regions could continue to cooperate within this context. 
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,QRUGHUWRUZRUNWRZDUGVWKHVHREMHFWLYHVWKH&RPSOXWHQVH,QVWLWXWHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WXG-
ies (ICEI) of the Complutense University of Madrid and the Chair of International and 
Ibero-American Cooperation of the University of Cantabria (COIBA) have collaborated in 
organising a multidisciplinary team of specialists from both regions. Its members include 
as joint directors and researchers, professors José Antonio Sanahuja (Complutense Uni-
versity of Madrid, Spain) and Sergio Tezanos Vázquez (University of Cantabria, Spain), 
and as researchers, professors Alejandra Kern (San Martin University, Argentina) and 
'DQLHOD3HUURWWD%XHQRV$LUHV8QLYHUVLW\-RUJH+HUQiQGH]0RUHQR)LRUHOOD:HUQLFNH
DQG'pERUD)DJDEXUXKDYHFROODERUDWHGDVUHVHDUFKDVVLVWDQWVRQWKLVSURMHFW
7KHUHVHDUFKWHDPZLVKHVWRWKDQNWKH(8/$&)RXQGDWLRQIRULWVVXSSRUWDQGLQSDUWLFX-
lar the guidance and assistance received throughout the different stages of compiling this 
VWXG\IURPWKH$PEDVVDGRU-RUJH9DOGH]([HFXWLYH'LUHFWRURIWKH(8/$&)RXQGDWLRQ
%HWWLQD7UE$UWXUR(VTXLYHODQG$QQD%DUUHUDZKRZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH)RXQGDWLRQ·V
Explore Programme during distinct stages of the elaboration of this study. The gratitude 
also extends to the participants of a seminar in April 2015 in which a preliminary version 
of the study was discussed, as well as to the experts who shared their views with the 
researchers, in writing or during the interviews conducted for the study, all of whom are 
PHQWLRQHGLQWKHÀQDODQQH[
7KHRSLQLRQVDQGLGHDVH[SUHVVHGKHUHLQDUHH[FOXVLYHO\WKRVHRIWKHVWXG\·VDXWKRUVDQG
LQQRZD\GRWKH\UHSUHVHQWWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH(8/$&)RXQGDWLRQRILWVPHPEHUVRURI
the consulted experts. 
 
 Somosaguas, Pozuelo de Alarcón (Madrid), July 2015 
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The EU and LAC are currently facing important changes in the sources, nature and 
Z[HUKHYKZ MVY [OL KPZ[YPI\[PVU VM WV^LY PU [OL PU[LYUH[PVUHS Z`Z[LT ^OPJO HɈLJ[ [OL
NV]LYUHUJLVMNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[;OPZWYVJLZZOHZHK\HSK`UHTPJÄYZ[S`I`HɈLJ[PUN
interstate relations and implying the rise of emerging countries, and the apparent transition, 
as both fact and narrative, from a unipolar to a multipolar international system. Secondly, 
I`WV^LYZOPM[Z[V^HYKZUVUZ[H[LHJ[VYZHUK[VTHYRL[Z^P[OV\[LɈLJ[P]LW\ISPJJVU[YVS
shaping thereby a globalised world that requires wider frameworks of cooperation and 
regional or global governance. 
These processes of change have imbued the 21st JLU[\Y` ^P[O OPZ[VYPJ ZPNUPÄJHUJL
which appears to be emerging as a post-Western or post hegemonic period, while at the 
same time witnessing the creation of a more globalised and interdependent world. This 
century has seen the emergence of new power constellations which challenge traditional 
OPLYHYJOPLZHUKIHSHUJLZVMWV^LYHUK^OPJOH[[OLZHTL[PTLOH]LYLKLÄULKNSVIHS
challenges and responsibilities implied by the agenda of international cooperation and 
development. Thus, not only are there new challenges but also new responsibilities for 
LAC in terms of global governance, requiring changes in the way foreign policy is viewed 
and implemented, and in the operation of regional and multilateral bodies, all of which 
WVPU[PUN[V[OLYLNPVU»ZYLKLÄUP[PVUHZHNSVIHSWSH`LY-VY[OL,<[OLZLKL]LSVWTLU[Z
WYLZLU[IV[OHKPɉJ\S[ ZJLUHYPVVM HK]LYZP[` HUK [OLULLK MVY JOHUNL HZ [OLJ\YYLU[
ZP[\H[PVU JOHSSLUNLZ P[Z WV^LY HUK PUÅ\LUJL P[Z SLNP[PTHJ ` P[Z ]HS\LZ HUK PKLU[P[ ` P[Z
institutions and policies, partnerships and relations —in particular the partnership with 
LAC—, while putting its performance as a global player to the test (EEAS 2015).
2   NEW CONSTELLATIONS OF  
POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
IN DEVELOPMENT:  
A SCENARIO OF CHANGE FOR THE 
EU AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN
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>P[OPU[OLZJVWLVMNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[HUK[OLWVZ[MYHTL^VYRZWLJPÄJJOHSSLUNLZ
have arisen in the following areas:
2.1. The rise of emerging countries and new geographies of 
poverty and development
Since the nineteen nineties, alongside the processes of globalisation, emerging countries 
have undergone an extended cycle of economic growth which has accelerated their 
convergence with developed countries. As a result, some emerging countries have 
begun to see themselves as new powers and their membership of G20 is seen as a (late) 
recognition of this new status (Barbé 2010). 
;OLYPZLVM[OLZLLTLYNPUNJV\U[YPLZOHZHSZVSLK[VHWYVJLZZVMPUJYLHZPUNKPɈLYLU[PH[PVUPU
the developing world. On one hand some countries are beginning to address development 
challenges that coincide with richer countries, and the “global risks” deriving from their 
greater exposure to transnational dynamics. At the other extreme, some countries remain 
trapped in vicious circles of poverty, institutional fragility, economic dependence, and in 
ZVTLJHZLZ]PVSLUJLHUKHYTLKJVUÅPJ[;OPZ[YHUZMVYTZ[OLNLVNYHWO`VMKL]LSVWTLU[
questioning the traditional North-South divide and the concept of the “Global South”. In 
general terms, by 2010 the MDG’s main goal was achieved, namely, to reduce extreme 
poverty rate by half. However, poverty is distributed more homogenously today, and a 
ZPNUPÄJHU[WYVWVY[PVUVMWV]LY[`PZUV^JVUJLU[YH[LKPUTPKKSLPUJVTLJV\U[YPLZ40*
It is also clear that while inequality between emerging and more advanced countries has 
ILLUYLK\JLKPU[LYTZVMWLYZVUHS^ LHS[O[OLKPɈLYLUJLZOH]LPUJYLHZLKH[IV[OUH[PVUHS
and global levels (Milanovic 2012; Sumner 2012; Sanahuja 2013).     
2.2. Deployment of South-South Cooperation (SSC)
On various grounds, SSC has challenged the relations of power, legitimacy, regulatory 
standards and governance of North–South Cooperation (NSC), wherein the visions of 
the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have been predominant, 
and whose coalition with the EU and its member states has played a relevant role in this 
YLZWLJ[;OPZHɈLJ[Z[OL,<PU[OL[OYLLKPTLUZPVUZVMP[ZPU[LYUH[PVUHSV\[YLHJO!TH[LYPHS
JHWHJP[PLZPUZ[P[\[PVUZHUKPKLHZ0UQ\Z[HML^`LHYZ::*OHZILLUHTWSPÄLK^P[OUL^
participants and measures and increased resources within a framework of more assertive 
MVYLPNUWVSPJPLZ::*HSZVYLKLÄULZ[OLPU[LYLZ[ZPKLU[P[`HUK]HS\LZVMJV\U[YPLZ^OPJO
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have included this instrument in their external actions. The more or less explicitly conveyed 
motives of SSC are related to domestic or international legitimacy, political solidarity and/
or strategic and economic interests of emerging countries (Quadir 2013). Although still 
limited and on a small scale, SSC has renewed the practices and modes of cooperation, 
integrating funding, trade, technology transfer and monetary cooperation based on a 
double dividendSVNPJ<5"<5+7;OLPUZ[Y\TLU[OHZHSZVKPZWSH`LKKLÄJP[Z
PUYLNPZ[YH[PVUHUK PUMVYTH[PVU^OPJOHɈLJ[[YHUZWHYLUJ`HUKHJJV\U[HIPSP[ `LZWLJPHSS`
in some SSC donor countries which are not particularly disposed, if at all, to inform their 
citizens about the resources employed and the criteria for their allocation. However, given 
the similarity of contexts and development issues, it is claimed that the instrument can 
more adequately to respond to the needs of the partners. SSC is also frequently involved 
in narratives of self-legitimisation, which question NSC and respective external policy 
PU[LYLZ[Z(S[OV\NO[OPZYOL[VYPJKVLZUV[YLÅLJ[[OLHJ[\HSWYHJ[PJLZP[[LUKZ[VLYVKL[OL
UVSLZZSLNP[PTPZPUNKPZJV\YZLVM[OL,<HUKP[ZH[[YHJ[P]P[`HUKPUÅ\LUJLHZH¸YLN\SH[VY`
power”. 
2.3. Diversification and privatisation of development funding
The EU and its member states continue to contribute most of the world ODA, however 
the development funding portfolio has been extended and become more fragmented: 
there are more options for access to public resources —emerging countries and the 
ODA granted by non-central governments and decentralised cooperation— and in many 
developing countries, especially the emerging ones, private agents and resources (such 
HZ YLTP[[HUJLZ MV\UKH[PVUZHUK MVYLPNUKPYLJ[ PU]LZ[TLU["-+0OH]L [HRLUVUNYLH[LY
importance. In some cases, considerable trade surpluses have been created as a result 
of export “bonanzas” and improved tax situations, which to a considerable extent enable 
ÄUHUJPUNPUKVTLZ[PJHZ^LSSHZPU[LYUH[PVUHSTHYRL[Z0U[LYTZVMKL]LSVWTLU[M\UKPUN
ODA seems to only be a relevant instrument in the poorest countries and/or in situations 
of state fragility, whereas in many upper middle income countries (UMIC) its absence 
^V\SK OH]L SP[[SL LɈLJ[ VU H NV]LYUTLU[»Z M\UKPUN JHWHJP[ ` /V^L]LY L]LU PU [OLZL
JV\U[YPLZ6+(JVU[PU\LZ[VILTVYLPTWVY[HU[PUTVYLZWLJPÄJHYLHZZ\JOHZRUV^SLKNL
transfer and support for institutional changes.
Therefore, as noted in the agenda of Addis Ababa, adopted at the Third UN Conference 
VU-PUHUJPUNMVY+L]LSVWTLU[1\S`[OLTVIPSPaH[PVUHUKHWVZP[P]LPTWHJ[PU[OL
development of all types of resources, involving domestic and international, public and 
private, traditional and innovative ones, will be necessary to ensure the achievement of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
16
2.4. Beyond North-South relations: development as a global problem 
The axiomatic link between development and aid policies has been broken: in order to 
create an environment which will broaden the development options, there is a need to 
address issues beyond aid policies, such as trade regulations and investment, access to 
technology, the role of migrations and conservation of the biosphere. Again, there is a need 
to improve coherence in development polices, and to discuss the role of development 
policies in the external action of donors and recipients, abandoning the deep-rooted 
tendency to subordinate such action to foreign policy and the donor’s interests —a trend 
which also appears with some force with new SSC actors, who are acting with a marked 
“Southphalian” logic (Tokatlian 2014)—, converting development into a core component 
of comprehensive external action.
/V^L]LY [OL TVZ[ YLSL]HU[ HZWLJ[ PZ [OL YLKLÄUP[PVU VM KL]LSVWTLU[ HZ H NSVIHS
problem and a universal transformative agenda, instead of a North-South agenda based 
on aid policies. Traditional challenges of reducing extreme poverty have been now 
complemented by other challenges derived from globalisation processes. As illustrated 
I`JSPTH[PJJOHUNLHUK[OLYLJLU[ÄUHUJPHSJYPZLZ[OLZLJOHSSLUNLZHɈLJ[HSSJV\U[YPLZ
by (re)situating development processes onto the transnational arena, rather than merely 
in a national context. This presupposes common responsibilities, although these may be 
KPɈLYLU[PH[LKHJJVYKPUN[V[OLWVZP[PVUHUK[OLJHWHJP[PLZVMLHJOHNLU[HUKKLWHY[PUN
from this principle, it is necessary to place the former North-South cooperation and aid 
in a new context of global governance of development with a universal scope and with 
an agenda relevant for all countries. Thus, the post-2015 framework is has to recognise 
[OLKPɈLYLU[WYVISLTZHUKZP[\H[PVUZMHJLKI`LHJOZVJPL[`HUK:[H[LZMYVT[OLV\[ZL[
involve distinct development priorities, strategies and approaches, in order to establish 
KPɈLYLU[PH[LK YLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZ HUK JSHPTZ HUK H[ [OL ZHTL [PTLWSHJPUN [OLT^P[OPU H
framework of global development governance with a shared horizon of a set of universal 
rights available to every human being. 
2.5. Latin America and the Caribbean: 
rise, di!erentiation, consensus and autonomy 
(K]HUJLTLU[ HUK KPɈLYLU[PH[PVU HYL WYVJLZZLZ ^OPJO HɈLJ[ 3(* IV[O PU [LYTZ VM
economic and social development and in their political models of regional integration 
and international insertion. More assertive foreign policies are deployed, along with 
UL^ MVYTZVM YLNPVUHSPZTHUKT\S[PSH[LYPHSPZT^OPJOZLLR [VL_[LUK [OL PUÅ\LUJLHUK
the margins of autonomy in a world perceived as multipolar. Along with claims for the 
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reform of multilateral bodies, new geopolitical alignments are also being sought, either 
to converge with rich countries or to align with BRICS and other emerging countries. 
Varying views of economic development and regionalism exist within the region: on 
VUL OHUK [OH[ YLWYLZLU[LK I` [OL ¸7HJPÄJ (SSPHUJL¹^P[O HTHYRLK SPILYHS ]PZPVU6U
[OLV[OLYOHUKV[OLYJV\U[YPLZILSVUNPUN [VHUHTWSPÄLK4LYJVZ\YVY [OL(3)(;*7
promote politics of “developmentalism” and are centred on domestic markets. Within this 
context, Central American and Caribbean countries together with Mexico, have a greater 
economic connection with the United States, whereas South America is characterised by 
an increased export orientation towards Asia, focused on raw materials. 
+LZWP[L[OLZLKLIH[LZHUK[OLKP]LYZP[`VMVW[PVUZ3(*OHZHSZVKPZWSH`LKQVPU[LɈVY[Z
to achieve more political consensus and the strengthening of regional autonomy, at least 
at the political level, as revealed both by the post-liberal regionalism strategies of the 
Union of South American Nations (Unasur; see Sanahuja 2012, 2014) and the emergence 
of the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC). The latter can be 
considered an instance of consensus for promoting greater participation of the region in 
the governance of development either at the regional or at the global level (Nolte 2014). 
In particular, CELAC aims to promote sectorial cooperation in a multidimensional agenda 
PULJVUVTPJZVJPHSHUKLU]PYVUTLU[HSHYLHZPU[OLÄLSKZVMZJPLUJLHUK[LJOUVSVN`HUK
disaster risk management, as well as in SSC strategies.
2.6. Global governance of development: the role of G20
The rise of emerging countries and globalisation processes have subjected the multilateral 
system to considerable tensions by questioning their representativeness, legitimacy and 
LɉJHJ`PU[OLHKVW[PVUVMNSVIHSWVSPJPLZHUKVY[OLJVVYKPUH[PVUVMUH[PVUHSWVSPJPLZPU
order to guarantee the adequate provision of global public assets. These problems and 
[OLKPɉJ\S[PLZPUOLYLU[PU[OLYLMVYTVMPU[LYUH[PVUHSIVKPLZOLSWL_WSHPUPUN[OLYLJV\YZL
to informal or “G” groups, based on their alleged advantages in terms of speed and 
ÅL_PIPSP[ `
The traumatic emergence of the crisis in September 2008 led to the replacement of G7 
by G20 as the main forum for macroeconomic coordination at the global level. While 
the EU participates in this forum in a unitary role, the three participating Latin American 
countries —Argentina, Brazil and Mexico— are not acting on behalf of the region. This 
forum cannot resolve, but strives to mitigate, some of the problems of the group that 
it replaced: despite the fact that emerging countries joined the G20, serious problems 
of representativeness and legitimacy remain (Ocampo and Stiglitz 2012), and once the 
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acute phase of the crisis had been overcome, in which the G20 had a prominent role in 
TVIPSPZPUN QVPU[ PU[LYUH[PVUHS HJ[PVU ZVTLKV\I[Z YLNHYKPUN P[Z LɈLJ[P]LULZZ JVU[PU\L
caracterising this group. 
The G20 has acquired a prominent role in one of the dimensions of the global agenda for 
KL]LSVWTLU[UHTLS`[OH[VM[OLHYJOP[LJ[\YLVMPU[LYUH[PVUHSÄUHUJLPU^OPJOKLZWP[LHSS
LɈVY[ZSP[[SLWYVNYLZZOHZILLUTHKL:PUJLTVYLV]LYP[OHZILLUHWWHYLU[[OH[[OL
.OHZL_WLYPLUJLKZVTLKPɉJ\S[PLZPULUZ\YPUNHKLX\H[LPU[LYUH[PVUHSTHJYVLJVUVTPJ
coordination, to which the Eurozone crisis contributed (Sanahuja 2014b). At the same 
time an extensive agenda of global development has arisen with issues relating to 
infrastructure, trade, climate change and “green” development. Subsequently issues 
such as employment as well as food and nutrition security and the volatile agricultural 
prices were included in the agenda. The prominence of this “developmentalist” agenda 
raises an important question with respect to the nature and scope of the G20: is it a crisis 
management mechanism or a forum for wider global governance which extends to world 
development?
2.7. New coordination instances in the global governance of development
Emerging countries have not yet proposed their own or an alternative institutional 
architecture to the DAC (Stuenkel 2013). The majority —in particular BRICS— do not 
seem interested in joining this club which they consider as distanced from their identity 
as leaders of the “Global South”. Rather reluctantly emerging countries have taken part 
in the initiatives to create links with emerging donors, which in some occasions they 
have interpreted as a means of co-optation or as an instance of free-riding. Within the 
multilateral sphere, and in the framework of the G20 or the G24, emerging countries are 
calling for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, while simultaneously establishing 
UL^PUZ[HUJLZVMÄUHUJPUNMVYKL]LSVWTLU[Z\JOHZ[OL5L^+L]LSVWTLU[)HURHUK[OL
Contingent Reserve Arrangement of the BRICS created in 2014. These initiatives respond 
to the major funding needs of emerging countries and also to the reluctance of advanced 
JV\U[YPLZPUJS\KPUN[OL,<[VYLMVYT[OLNV]LYUHUJLVM[OL04-HUK[OL>VYSK)HUR
However, the most relevant area of consensus in terms of the governance of development 
cooperation has been the ad hoc and non-institutionalised instance promoted by the 
+(*[OL/PNO3L]LS-VY\T/3-^ OPJOOHZTL[VUZL]LYHSVJJHZPVUZIL[^LLUHUK
2011 with the participation of donor and recipient countries, and which since 2008 has 
PUJS\KLKUVUZ[H[LHJ[VYZHUKJP]PSZVJPL[`VYNHUPZH[PVUZ;OPZ-VY\TSLK[V[OL7HYPZ
+LJSHYH[PVU^ P[OHUHNLUKH^ OPJOPUP[PHSS`MVJ\ZLKVUHPKLɈLJ[P]LULZZHUK[OLYLMVYLTVYL
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YLSH[LK[V+(*JVUJLYUZ;OL+LJSHYH[PVULZ[HISPZOLKÄ]LNV]LYUPUNWYPUJPWSLZMVYHPK·
ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability— 
initiating a process of adapting aid policies with an approach which, in retrospect, 
was markedly technocratic (Sanahuja 2007) and with some extremely ambitious goals 
regarding ownership and alignment, which ultimately have only been partially achieved, 
something which has further eroded the legitimacy of traditional donors.  
;OL YK /3- PU (JJYH .OHUH  SLK [V ZL]LYL X\LZ[PVUPUN VM [OPZ HNLUKH HUK
developing countries and social organisations managed to re-politicise the discussion, 
introducing the wider issue of global governance for development beyond ODA and 
P[ZLɉJHJ` SPURLK[V[OL[LJOUVJYH[PJL]HS\H[PVUIHZLKVU PUKPJH[VYZ;OLHNLUKH^HZ
YLKLÄULK HZ H WVSP[PJHS KLIH[L PU ^OPJO PUJYLHZPUNS` HZZLY[P]L KL]LSVWPUN JV\U[YPLZ
questioned the traditional coalitions and claimed greater participation. Accra also called 
for increased participation and “democratic ownership” of development policies. 
Except for Colombia and Chile, LAC as a region was not actively participating in the 
KLÄUP[PVUVM[OLHPKLɈLJ[P]LULZZHNLUKH;OPZ^HZK\L[V[OLSHJRVMJVUZLUZ\ZI\PSKPUN
mechanisms in this area; the rejection or the reluctance of other countries such as Brazil 
to accept that this agenda was set in a North–South context and was largely an initiative 
of traditional donors; and also because as it was an agenda of particular relevance for 
extremely poor countries which were more dependent on aid, rather than for middle 
income countries (MIC).
;OL[O0=/3-)\ZHU:V\[O2VYLH^HZ[OLTVZ[ZPNUPÄJHU[MVY\TMVYNSVIHS
NV]LYUHUJLVMKL]LSVWTLU[PU[OH[P[YLKLÄULK[OLTHPUWSH`LYZWYPUJPWSLZHUKZJVWL
(BRICS Policy Center 2011). The main result of Busan was the proposal for a new 
¸.SVIHS 7HY[ULYZOPW MVY ,ɈLJ[P]L +L]LSVWTLU[ *VVWLYH[PVU¹ .7,+* PUJVYWVY[HPUN
::* HZ H UL^ MVY\T MVY TVUP[VYPUN [OL JVTTP[TLU[Z HKVW[LK PU )\ZHU ;OL ÄYZ[
reunion took place in Mexico in April 2014. The GPEDC has a more plural executive 
committee, it therefore is more representative and has raised higher expectations 
in terms of legitimacy, and it works with the support of the OECD / DAC and UNDP. 
Although the GPEDC’s future is not clear yet, its existence represents a change in the 
KVTPUHU[JVHSP[PVUPU[OLYLHSTVMKL]LSVWTLU[JVVWLYH[PVUYLKLÄUPUN[OLYLI`HSZV[OL
framework within which EU and LAC countries are required to design their development 
policies on a global, bi-regional and bilateral level, both along the North-South and the 
:V\[O¶:V\[OH_LZ2OHYHZ
)\ZHU THKL HU PTWVY[HU[ ÄUHS KLJSHYH[PVU LU[P[SLK ¸)\ZHU 7HY[ULYZOPW MVY ,ɈLJ[P]L
+L]LSVWTLU[*VVWLYH[PVU¹^OPJO YLKLÄULZ HUK YLHɉYTZ [OL NV]LYUPUN WYPUJPWSLZ VM
Paris and Accra: ownership, managing for results, partnership for inclusive development, 
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transparency, shared responsibility and accountability. One of the most strongly endorsed 
principles in Busan was transparency —an issue on which the EU took a tougher 
position— by supporting the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) set up in 2008.
/V^L]LY)\ZHUNVLZL]LUM\Y[OLYI`JVUÄYTPUNZL]LYHSRL`LSLTLU[ZPU[OLUL^NSVIHS
governance of development (Costafreda 2011; Van Rompaey 2012):  
- Recognition of SSC and triangular cooperation as a complementary —and not 
 H Z\IZ[P[\[L· JVU[YPI\[PVU [V 5VY[O:V\[O ÄUHUJPHS JVVWLYH[PVU JVUZPKLYPUN 
 that this  might better respond to the contexts and development needs of some 
 partner countries. Busan called for greater support of this mode of cooperation, 
 as well as the strengthening of local and national capacities to become engaged 
 in South-South and triangular cooperation.
- The traditional vertical relation between donors and recipients was called into 
question, challenged by the rhetoric of SSC horizontality and the need for new 
forms of partnership, based on transparency and mutual accountability and not 
VUJVUKP[PVUZKLÄULKI`KVUVYZ
- It acknowledged the diversity of cooperation modalities, strategies, policies, 
instruments and practices, and in particular SSC and cooperation protagonized 
by the private sector, civil society and decentralised actors, assuming that 
[OVZLKLÄULKI`+(*HYLQ\Z[VULTVYLTVKHSP[`HUKUV[ULJLZZHYPS`[OLTHPU
reference to be emulated. 
- It underlined the limitations of the “club” structure of the dominant coalition in 
development since the nineteen seventies pointing to the DAC, its claims of 
homogenisation on a global scale of principles, policies and practices and its 
shortcomings in terms of representativeness and legitimacy.
- ;OLHYN\TLU[^HZZOPM[LK[V[OLZJVWLVM¸LɈLJ[P]LKL]LSVWTLU[¹;OH[PZ[OL
VU\ZPZVUKL]LSVWTLU[WVSPJPLZHUKUV[VUS`PU[LYTZVMLɈLJ[P]LULZZVM6+(
claiming greater coherence of development policies in areas such as trade, 
investment and the role of the private sector, migration, the environment, climate 
JOHUNLYLN\SH[PVUVMNSVIHSÄUHUJLPSSPJP[ÄUHUJPHSÅV^ZHUK[YHUZWHYLUJ `
;OL,<RLW[ H SV^WYVÄSL H[)\ZHU PUTHYRLK JVU[YHZ[ [V P[Z LULYNL[PJ SLHKLYZOPW PU
the Monterrey Summit in 2002 on development funding, ill at ease with a scenario 
that was distanced from the traditional North–South approach. However, Busan has 
also demonstrated a reluctant attitude towards BRICS, unwilling to fully accept the 
requirements of the “Global Partnership” which was seen by them as a DAC-imposed 
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agenda. It was therefore agreed that the proposals put forward in Busan with respect to 
SSC would only be assumed on a voluntary basis, vis-à-vis the EU and DAC’s objectives 
towards a joint programming, transparency and shared accountability in each country. 
Within this context, the EU has maintained a consistent position with regard to the 
aforementioned requirements, both in terms of its own cooperation and that of the 
member states and emerging SSC. In the latter case the resistance manifested at Busan 
points both to the weaknesses inherent in this mode of cooperation, and their self 
legitimating discourses, often based on a strong counter-hegemonic rhetoric of claims 
MVY [OL.SVIHS:V\[O/V^L]LY [OPZHSZVYLÅLJ[Z [OLZ[Y\NNSLVM [YHKP[PVUHSKVUVYZHUK
the EU to recognize the advancement and particularities of the SSC, as well as a certain 
reservation to participate in triangular cooperation (TrC) mechanisms which even so have 
been already furthered successfully by some of the member states. As a whole, this 
YL]LHSZHTHQVY PZZ\L^P[OHKHW[PUN [V [OLJOHUNLZHUK PUZVTLJHZLZKPɉJ\S[PLZ [V
KL[HJO MYVTH Ä_LK JVUJLW[ VM5:*^OPJO UV SVUNLY JVYYLZWVUKZ [V [OL UL^NSVIHS
development scenario and the post-2015 agenda as proposed by the UN.
0UHU`JHZLUVZWLJPÄJPUKPJH[VYZVYNVHSZ^LYLLZ[HISPZOLKMVY[OL)\ZHUHNYLLTLU[Z
beyond a call to continue working on those previously established in Paris and Accra. This 
could be explained in part by a reluctance to assume once again extremely demanding 
requirements, such as those included in the Paris Declaration of 2005, which were halfway 
implemented and which later ran out of steam due to a lack of political will.
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3   FROM MILLENNIUM TO  
SUSTAINABILITY: LATIN AMERICA  
AND THE CARIBBEAN FACING  
THE UNIVERSAL POST-2015  
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
3.1. From Millennium Development Goals to 
Sustainable Development Goals
The MDG were unquestionably a milestone in the history of the international cooperation 
system insofar as they provided a clear and measureable armoury of goals by way of a 
¸YVHKTHW¹MVY^VYSKWYVNYLZZ;OLL_WLYPLUJLVM[OL SHZ[ÄM[LLU`LHYZVMJVVWLYH[PVU
under the aegis of these goals has demonstrated considerable progress at a global 
level, as shown by achievements in reducing poverty and mortality rates, children’s 
education, service of foreign debt, vaccination against measles and prevention of 
THSHYPH 5V[^P[OZ[HUKPUN [OLYL OHZ HSZV ILLU ÅHNYHU[ UVUJVTWSPHUJL PU YLZWLJ[ VM
other indicators —precarious labour conditions, maternal mortality, poor housing and 
living conditions and use of improved water sources in rural areas—, and improvements 
OH]LILLUKPZ[YPI\[LK PUH^VYY`PUNS`\ULX\HS^H`HTVUN [OLKPɈLYLU[ YLNPVUZVM [OL
“developing world” (UN 2014a). Thus, although none of the 10 geographic areas comply 
^P[OHSS [OL4+.VUS`3(*HUKLHZ[LYUHUKZV\[OLHZ[LYU(ZPHÄUHSS`JHTLJSVZL [V
achieving them. The remaining regions have met in a disparate manner a handful of goals, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa scarcely achieved any.
0U:LW[LTILY  [OL4+.^PSS YLHJO [OL ÄUPZO SPUL HUKNP]L [OL NV HOLHK [V [OLPY
Z\JJLZZVYZ[OL:+.+\YPUN[OLÄYZ[` LHYZVM[OLst century the international context 
has changed enormously, thus the post-2015 development agenda is in need to adapt to 
this new context in order to take a truly transformative shape. Thus, the world has passed 
from a period economic bonanza to a phase of turmoil involving multiple problems of 
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H NSVIHS UH[\YL Z\JO HZ [OL ÄUHUJPHS HUK LJVUVTPJ JYPZPZ [OL ZLYPV\Z LU]PYVUTLU[HS
crisis, the rise of inequality, volatile food and energy prices, and transnational problems 
of insecurity and terrorism. At the same time a new global geopolitical scenario has been 
HYPZLU PU^OPJO LTLYNPUN JV\U[YPLZ OH]L WSH`LK HTVYL ZPNUPÄJHU[ YVSL HUK PU^OPJO
technological change has been accelerating at an unprecedented rate, but where the 
opportunities for progress have been distributed in an very unbalanced manner. 
;OLKLIH[LKLÄUPUN[OLWVZ[HNLUKHOHZILLUNVPUNVUMVYZVTL`LHYZHUKPUYLJLU[
decades entire “rivers of ink” have been expended on this issue, well exceeding —in intensity 
and pluralism —the MDG debate. To coordinate this strategy, the UN has been directing the 
¸VɉJPHS¹KLIH[L^ OPSLH[[OLZHTL[PTL^ VYRPUN[V^HYKZ[OLJVTWSL[PVUVM[OLZ[PSS]HSPK4+.
And in order to stimulate the discussion, the Secretary General of the UN has commissioned 
a number of contributions by means of the “Reports for the Secretary General”.1
;OPZJVUZ\S[H[PVUWYVJLZZÄUHSS`YLZ\S[LKPUHYLWVY[PZZ\LKI`[OL<5.LULYHS:LJYL[HYPH[
entitled A life of dignity for all, which proposed a universal post-2015 agenda based on 
goals which consider the three dimensions of sustainable development that arose from the 
Earth Summits: economic development, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. 
-VY [OPZ [VIL MLHZPISL HUK PU HJJVYKHUJL^P[O9xV [OLYL ZOV\SKIL H MH]V\YHISL
environment which should include good governance, although, as some developing 
countries have indicated, this should not imply conditionality of any kind. In accordance 
with this vision, “sustainable development is the path to the future” (UN 2013a: 4) and 
the MDG “represent only the halfway mark towards the aim of tackling poverty in all 
its forms” (UN 2013a: 14). In a constructive exercise synthesising the “Reports for the 
Secretary General” (in which the “common ground in these contributions far outweighs 
HU` KPɈLYLUJL¹ <5 H!   ¸[YHUZMVYTH[P]L HJ[PVUZ¹ ^LYL WYVWVZLK ^OPJO PU
VYKLY[VILLɈLJ[P]L¸ULLK[VILSPTP[LKPUU\TILYTLHZ\YHISLLHZ`[VJVTT\UPJH[L
and adaptable to both global and local settings.” It was also stated that in order for 
this agenda to become viable an international agreement based four components was 
required: i) a vision of the future entrenched in human rights and universally accepted 
values and principles ii) a set of concise goals and targets emphasising the priorities 
of the agenda; (iii) a global partnership for development to mobilize the necessary 
means for its implementation; and (iv) a participatory monitoring framework for tracking 
progress and mutual accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders. This UN General 
 
 ;OL ZP_ TVZ[ PUÅ\LU[PHS YLWVY[Z ^LYL ! ;OL M\[\YL ^L ^HU[ LSHIVYH[LK I` [OL <5 >VYRPUN .YV\W MVY [OL 7VZ[ 
  +L]LSVWTLU[ (NLUKH <5 H" ( UL^ NSVIHS WHY[ULYZOPW! LYHKPJH[L WV]LY[` HUK [YHUZMVYT 
 LJVUVTPLZ [OYV\NO Z\Z[HPUHISL KL]LSVWTLU[ JVTWPSLK I` [OL /PNO 3L]LS .YV\W VU [OL WVZ[  
 +L]LSVWTLU[ (NLUKH <5 I" (U HJ[PVU HNLUKH MVY Z\Z[HPUHISL KL]LSVWTLU[ ^YP[[LU I` [OL :\Z[HPUHISL 
 +L]LSVWTLU[ :VS\[PVUZ 5L[^VYR :+:5 " *VYWVYH[L :\Z[HPUHIPSP[` HUK [OL <UP[LK 5H[PVUZ 7VZ[ 
 +L]LSVWTLU[ (NLUKH KYH^U \W I` [OL <5 .SVIHS *VTWHJ[ " ( 9LNPVUHS 7LYZWLJ[P]L VU [OL 7VZ[ 
 <UP[LK 5H[PVUZ +L]LSVWTLU[ (NLUKH H QVPU[ JVSSHIVYH[PVU VM [OL Ä]L <5 9LNPVUHS *VTTPZZPVUZ " HUK ( 
 TPSSPVU]VPJLZ![OL^VYSK^L^HU[KYH^U\WVU[OLIHZPZVM[OL4`>VYSKNSVIHSZ\Y]L `
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Secretary’s report obtained the support of the General Assembly in September 2013, 
which determined to “craft a strong post-2015 development agenda, which will build on 
[OLMV\UKH[PVUZSHPKI`[OL4+.JVTWSL[L[OL\UÄUPZOLKI\ZPULZZHUKYLZWVUK[VUL^
challenges” (UN 2013c: 2).
In order to comply with this resolution, in September 2014 the General Assembly Open 
Working Group on the SDG (OWG) presented its proposal and the UN General Assembly 
Table 1. Seventeen Sustainable Development Goals proposed by the OWG
1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
2 End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable  
agriculture
3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning  
opportunities for all
5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
7 Ensure access to a!ordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive  
employment and decent work for all
9 Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization  
and foster innovation
10 Reduce inequality within and among countries
11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
14 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development
15 Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt 
biodiversity loss
16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build e!ective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
17 Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for  
sustainable development
Source: UN (2014c). See the Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals (pages 12-27) 
for a detailed list of the 169 targets attached to these 17 goals.
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decided that “sustainable development goals should be coherent with and integrated 
into the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015” (UN 2014c: 1). The report 
HɉYTZ[OH[[OL:+.ZOV\SKWYPVYP[PZL[OLLYHKPJH[PVUVMWV]LY[`HUKO\UNLYHUKHTLUK
unsustainable production and consumption guidelines and sustainable management of 
natural resources. However it also expressed that achieving the goal of putting “people at 
the core of sustainable development” would depend on the capacity of the international 
community to provide the impetus for a real “global partnership for sustainable 
development”.
At a practical level the OWG proposed an SDG agenda with a structure similar to that used 
for the MDG ranging from the general (17 goals) to the particular (169 goals which can be 
assessed using indicators; see Table 1). The goals proposed are universally applicable 
and global in nature, and constitute an integrated and indissoluble set of priorities for 
sustainable development. In addition, the proposal is based on “foundations” provided 
I`[OL4+.HUKW\YZ\LZ[OL[^VWYVUNLKHPTVM¸JVTWSL[PUN[OL\UÄUPZOLK[HZR¹HUK
responding to new challenges. Despite its universal nature, the proposal aims to respect 
[OLWVSPJPLZHUKWYPVYP[PLZVMLHJOJV\U[Y`"[OLYLMVYL[OLNVHSZHYLKLÄULKHZHTIP[PV\Z
global goals, without precluding that each government sets out its own national targets. 
In short, “the goals and targets integrate economic, social and environmental aspects and 
recognize their interlinkages in achieving sustainable development in all its dimensions” 
(UN 2014c: 10).
-PUHSS ` PU +LJLTILY  [OL <5 :LJYL[HY` .LULYHS WYV]PKLK H ZLJVUK YLWVY[
summarising the various contributions to the post-2015 agenda. The Road to Dignity 
by 2030 (UN 2014d) outlines a universal rights-based sustainable development agenda 
^OPJOWSHJLZWLVWSLHUK[OLWSHUL[H[[OLJVYLVMP[ZZ[YH[LN `-\Y[OLYTVYLZP_LZZLU[PHS
elements were proposed in order to strengthen and making the agenda operable: i) 
KPNUP[ `[VLUKWV]LY[`HUKÄNO[PULX\HSP[`"PP[VLUZ\YLHOLHS[O`SPMLRUV^SLKNLHUK
inclusion of women and children; iii) prosperity to develop a robust, inclusive and 
transformative economy; iv) planet, which demands to protect our ecosystems for 
the sake of the future generations; v) justice, to promote safe and peaceful societies 
and strong institutions; and vi) partnership, to catalyse global solidarity for sustainable 
development. 
;OL.LULYHS:LJYL[HY`HSZVWYVWVZLKKLÄUP[PVUVMHU¸PU[LNYH[LK¹HNLUKH^OPJO^V\SK
not only enumerate goals but also identify the resources needed for their implementation 
–funding, technology and investments– and which would employ an adequate monitoring 
and evaluation system, which would require improved statistical capacities and the 
creation of new information sources. 
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3.2.Record of the Millennium Development Goals in Latin America and 
the Caribbean
How has the overall performance of the MDG with regard to Latin America and the 
Caribbean looked like? And which have been the main limitations of this agenda as a 
reference in the regional development process?
>P[OYLZWLJ[[V[OLV]LYHSSYLZ\S[·HUKZ[PSS^P[OV\[[OLÄUHSKH[HH[[OLJSVZ\YLVM[OL
MDG—, LAC appears to have achieved most of the goals.2 The UN considers that the 
region has complied with 10 of the 16 targets, while in six of them the progress was 
PUZ\ɉJPLU[<5H0M[OLWYVQLJ[PVUZMVYJVTWSPHUJL^P[O4+.PU3(*HYLJVTWHYLK
with those of the other nine regions evaluated by the UN, only East and Southeast Asia 
show similar, albeit partial, expectations of compliance. 
4VYLZWLJPÄJHSS `PM^ LJVUZPKLY[OLPUKPJH[VYZJVYYLZWVUKPUN[V[OLÄYZ[ZL]LU4+.·
precisely those indicators that permit an assessment of the result of the development 
WVSPJPLZPTWSLTLU[LKI`[OLJV\U[YPLZ·3(*VɈLYZHNLULYHSIHSHUJLVMWYVNYLZZZLL
Annex 1). On an aggregate level, the region has managed to complete 29 indicators and 
[OLYL^LYLZL[IHJRZPUVUS`ZP_"VULYLSH[PUN[VNLUKLYLX\HSP[ `[^VJVUJLYUPUN[OLÄNO[
against major pandemics and a further three related to sustainability of the environment. 
Progress was almost non-existent in three further indicators —consumption of the 
poorest quintile of the population, self-employed workers, and the relation between boys 
and girls in secondary education. In the case of six other indicators the progress cannot 
be assessed due to a lack of information. In addition, with respect to those indicators for 
[OLLPNO[O4+.^OPJOKPYLJ[S`HɈLJ[3(*·[OPZNVHSYLMLYZ[V[OLLɈVY[Z[OLPU[LYUH[PVUHS
community was expected to make in order to reform the system of international relations—, 
three additional setbacks were recorded, due to the reduction of ODA from donors of the 
DAC destined for basic social services, such as the aid disbursed to landlocked countries 
and small LAC island states. Moreover, information on the sustainable access to essential 
medicines at accessible prices was inavailable.
It is important to take into account that LAC was one of the most advanced regions 
in terms of compliance with MDG. Additionally, LAC constitutes a mainly middle 
income area— 61% of countries are located within this income bracket, and within 
these, 72% belong to the middle to high income group—, wich tends to obscure the 
ZPNUPÄJHU[OL[LYVNLULP[PLZHUKPULX\HSP[PLZL_PZ[PUNPU[OLJV\U[YPLZHUKPU[OLPYKVTLZ[PJ
LU]PYVUTLU[Z;O\Z[OLZ[\K`SLKI`;LaHUVZPKLU[PÄLKHNYV\WVMJV\U[YPLZ^ OPJO 
 
 6US` I` [OL [PTL [OH[ [OL ÄUHS Z[H[PZ[PJZ VM [OL  PUKPJH[VYZ ^PSS ILJVTL H]HPSHISL ^OPJO JV\SK [HRL ZL]LYHS 
 TVYL`LHYZ[OLKLÄUP[P]LYLZ\S[ZJHUILHJ[\HSS`HZZLZZLK
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lagged behind, particularly in terms of millennium goals. These were the countries of the 
Central American isthmus, the Andean region and the Caribbean with the lowest income 
per capital and high rates of extreme poverty— most of these over 10%— and low results 
in most of the millennium goals. At the opposite extreme, the countries with lower rates 
of poverty and malnutrition —in particular, those with poverty rates below 9%—, and 
better rates in social indicators comprise more than two thirds of the Latin American and 
Caribbean population, which largely explains the aggregated compliance with MDG in 
the region.
As a result, the performance of LAC in the MDG agenda provides a balance with both 
lights and shadows, with a promising result in terms of the overall progress in most of 
the targets and an unequal division of progress among the region’s countries and within 
these countries. To a considerable extent, these contrasts are due to limitations and risks 
inherent in the goals agenda. Among others, it is possible to highlight six relevant aspects 
which have hindered the pertinence of the MDG for LAC:
-PYZ[S `ZVTLVM[OL4+.[HYNL[ZNP]LU[OLPYJVUZ[Y\J[PVUOH]LILLUTVYLMLHZPISL·HUK
[OLYLMVYL SLZZHTIP[PV\Z·MVY3(*;OPZ PZ [OLJHZLVM [OL [HYNL[Z [OH[Ä_LK\UP]LYZHS
coverage  —that is, 100% of the target population, as in the goals of primary education, 
reproductive health, and HIV and AIDS— with LAC being one of the world regions that 
started with rates closest to 100%, which determined smaller gaps to close and less 
ambition.
:LJVUKS `[OLKLÄUP[PVUVM4+.KPKUV[JVUZPKLY[OLHK]LYZLLɈLJ[JH\ZLKI`ZLYPV\Z
multidimensional inequalities within Latin American and Caribbean countries, and nor 
did they properly acknowledge the political dimension of social exclusion, especially 
with regard to the importance of participation and empowerment of the most vulnerable 
individuals. This has meant that progress in achieving millennium goals was distributed 
throughout LAC in a worryingly unequal manner, generating groups “excluded from 
development “ on grounds of sex, ethnicity, age, disability and/or income. 
;OPYKS ` [OL Z\JJLZZ VM 3(* PU M\SÄSSPUN [OL4+. HNLUKH^HZ ZLJVUKLK I` P[Z SV^LY
population growth rate compared to other developing regions. In this regard, those 
indicators that evaluate progress in percentage terms with regard to target population 
·^OPJO PZ [OLTHQVYP[`·OH]LILLUHɈLJ[LKI`[OLKPɈLYLU[WVW\SH[PVUNYV^[OYH[LZ
The LAC population grew by 39.3% between 1990 and 2013, compared to 47.2% of 
southern Asia, 52.7% or the near East and north Africa and 84.7% of sub-Saharan Africa, 
facilitating its advancement.3
 ,Z[PTH[PVUZ IHZLK VU >VYSK )HUR ÄN\YLZ  6US` [OL WVW\SH[PVU VM KL]LSVWPUN JV\U[YPLZ PU LHJO YLNPVU 
 ^HZ[HRLUPU[VHJJV\U[OLYL
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-V\Y[OS `[OLYLNPVUOHZILLUULNH[P]LS`HɈLJ[LKI`[OLZJHU[Z\JJLZZVM[OL[^V<UP[LK
5H[PVUZ*VUMLYLUJLZVU+L]LSVWTLU[-\UKPUN4VU[LYYL`HUK+VOH^OPJO
KPKUV[THUHNL[VTVIPSPZL6+(Z\ɉJPLU[S`[VJV]LY\UP]LYZHSJVTWSPHUJL^ P[O4+.;OL
prolonged international economic recession has also undermined the willingness of DAC 
KVUVYZ[VÄUHUJL[OPZ[`WLVMW\ISPJWVSPJPLZ0U[OPZZJLUHYPVVMTVKLYH[LPUJYLHZLPUHPK
ÄN\YLZZPUJL·^LSSILSV^[OLM\UKPUN\UKLY[HRPUNZVMKVUVYZ·HUK\UKLYM\UKPUN
of the system, the countries with the highest levels of development have faced a gradual 
reduction in their share of global ODA. In particular, the LAC share of global aid payments 
has been reduced from an average of 12% in the decade prior to application of the 
MDG (1991-2000), to 9.5% in the era of MDG (2001-2013). And, as a result of this 
process of reallocation of aid, there was a notable rise in volatility of resources paid out 
to LAC, placing the region among those areas with more variable ODA.4 In any case, this 
reduction in ODA has been more than compensated in the region —and particularly in 
some emerging Latin American countries— by a considerable increase both in domestic 
resources and other international sources of development funding. 
0UÄM[OWSHJL[OLJOVPJLVM  HZILUJOTHYR`LHYMVY4+.^HZHSZVUV[ILULÄJPHS
for LAC. Basically, because the nineties were characterised in the region by a slow 
and volatile rate of growth following the crisis of the decade of the eighties, due to 
increased unemployment and lack of formality, deterioration of the trade balance, the 
fall of capital incomes and an increase in service of the debt. All this contributed to a 
virtual stagnation of development indicators during the nineteen nineties and therefore, 
when the strategy was properly initiated in 2001, LAC had barely advanced since the 
year of reference.
-PUHSS `[OL[HYNL[ZMVYWLYJLU[HNLYLK\J[PVUZVM[OLPUKPJH[VYJOVZLUPUJVTWHYPZVU^ P[O
the base year —among others, the targets of poverty and hunger— implied extremely 
disparate dimensions for each country, and in particular, they resulted in being less 
HTIP[PV\Z MVY JV\U[YPLZ^OPJO^LYL IHZLK VU SV^LY Z\ɉJPLUJ` SL]LSZ H[ [OL V\[ZL[
-VYL_HTWSLPU[LYTZVM[OLNVHSVMYLK\JPUNWV]LY[`I`OHSM3(*MHJLK[OLJOHSSLUNL
of reducing the poverty rate registered in 1990 by around six percent, which rose by 
12.5%. This challenge is not comparable to the drop of more than 22% which was 
proposed for the sub-Saharan region of Africa, with a poverty rate of 44.6% in 1990. 
And although the disparities were further aggravated, if the poverty rates per LAC 
country are compared: Haiti has —unsuccessfully— addressed the goal of reducing 
its poverty rate by over 26%, whereas, Uruguay has faced a less demanding challenge 
equivalent to 0.28 points.
 (JJVYKPUN [V [OL ;LaHUVZ Z[\K` !  [OL ]VSH[PSP[` VM 6+( YLJLP]LK I` 3(* PUJYLHZLK I` V]LY   
 IL[^LLU    HUK [OL WLYPVK  5V[^P[OZ[HUKPUN [OPZ MHJ[ [OPZ SL]LS VM ]HYPHIPSP[` ^HZ SLZZ [OHU 
 [OH[ YLNPZ[LYLK PU :\IZOHYHU (MYPJH ^OLYL [OL ]VSH[PSP[` ^HZ HJJLU[\H[LK HZ H YLZ\S[ VM Z\JJLZZP]L HPK PUJYLHZLZ 
 ¶PUJVU[YHZ[[V[OLYLK\J[PVUZL_WLYPLUJLKPU3(*
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3.3. Latin American and Caribbean proposals for 
the post-2015 development agenda
LAC countries have been trying for several years to reach a consensus on a common 
WVZP[PVU ^OPJO ^V\SK LUHISL [OLT [V L_LY[ TVYL PUÅ\LUJL HZ JVTWHYLK [V [OL WHZ[
HNLUKHVU [OLKLÄUP[PVUVM [OLWVZ[4+.Z[YH[LN ` 0UVYKLY [VZ[LLY [OPZKLIH[L [OL
ECLAC has drawn up three reports —the “equality trilogy”— in which it proposes a 
sustainable development agenda designed to reduce inequalities (ECLAC 2010, 2012, 
2014a). The “ECLACist” vision was synthesised in 2013 in the report jointly drafted by 
[OLÄ]L<59LNPVUHS*VTTPZZPVUZ0UWHY[PJ\SHY[OLYLWVY[PKLU[PÄLKYLNPVUHSWYPVYP[PLZ
for the post-2015 agenda which can be framed within four dimensions of sustainable 
development, with particular emphasis on reducing socio-economic inequalities (Table 2).
In a more detailed manner, in 2014, ECLAC presented its vision of the post-2015 
agenda in the report Latin America and the Caribbean post 2015 agenda for 
development (ECLAC 2014b), which synthesises the contributions of its “trilogy of 
equality”. In this report ECLAC proposes the promotion of a “a global compact for 
Table 2. Eleven LAC priorities for the post-2015 agenda according to ECLAC
Economic 
sustainability 
Social sustainability Environmental 
sustainability 
Governance 
and institutions 
1. Intensify the 
diversification of 
production
2. Create produc-
tive and decent 
employment and 
facilitate job op-
portunities for all
3. Close productiv-
ity gaps between 
di!erent sectors 
and strata of the 
economy and, 
and in the area of 
social protection.
4. Close gaps in 
wellbeing and 
inequities which 
perpetuate the 
inter-generational 
transmission of 
inequality
5. Address extre-
me poverty and 
hunger
6. Promote inclu-
sion and e!ective 
participation of 
citizens in eco-
nomic and social 
development, in 
particular promot-
ing gender equality 
and respect for 
ethnic and racial 
diversity
7. Incorporate sus-
tainable develop-
ment principles 
into national poli-
cies and develop-
ment strategies
8. Address climate 
change and reduce 
the loss of biodi-
versity
9. Promote a global 
partnership for 
development, esp. 
in the aftermath of 
the global crisis
10. Promote inter-
national develop-
ment cooperation 
and fulfil the ODA 
target of 0.7% of 
gross nat. income 
Identify innovative 
sources of ad-
ditional funding for 
development (e.g., 
taxes on financial 
transactions and 
tax havens) 
11. Identify innova-
tive sources of ad-
ditional funding for 
development (e.g., 
taxes on financial 
transactions and 
tax havens)
Source: authors’ adaptation of priorities outlined in UN Regional Commissions 2013: 69-70.
31
sustainable development based on rights and with equality as its ultimate goal and 
ethical guiding principle and economic, social and environmental inclusion as the 
process for promoting equality” (ECLAC 2014b: 29). This logic requires a rights- based 
approach to equality and in order to achieve this, LAC needs to address three clear 
JOHSSLUNLZ!PHJOPL]PUNZ\Z[HPUHISLYH[LZVMNYV^[OZ\ɉJPLU[[VJSVZLZ[Y\J[\YHSNHWZ
and generating quality employment; ii) provide the impetus for a “technical revolution” 
which will bring about changes in consumption and production patterns; and iii) ensure 
TVYLLɈLJ[P]LKPZ[YPI\[PVUVMWYVK\J[P]P[`[OYV\NO[H_HUKZVJPHSWVSPJPLZ PTWYV]LK
KPZ[YPI\[PVUVMWYVÄ[ZIL[^LLUJHWP[HSHUK^VYRHUKZL[\W\UP]LYZHSZVJPHSWYV[LJ[PVU
systems. 
The challenge of equality is even more ambitious as it is part of an integral strategy 
MVYZ\Z[HPUHISLKL]LSVWTLU[^OPJO,*3(*KLÄULZHZH¸]PY[\V\ZJPYJSLVMNYV^[O
productivity and environmental sustainability”. Given this challenge, CEPAL calls for 
the strengthening of the state’s role in promoting a process of three-dimensional 
inclusion (economic, social and environmental) which will help to close the three 
Z[Y\J[\YHS NHWZ Z\ɈLYLK I` 3(* WYVK\J[P]P[ ` LK\JH[PVUHS JHWHJP[PLZ HUK SHIV\Y
conditions). 
ECLAC also highlights seven cross-cutting issues to be incorporated into the post-
 HNLUKH ZV HZ [V YLÅLJ[ H 3H[PU (TLYPJHU HUK *HYPIILHU WLYZWLJ[P]L! P [OL
eradication of poverty (as there are still 30 million Latin American and Caribbean 
citizens living on less than 1.25 dollars a day); ii) achieving gender equality in order 
to mitigate the worrying fact that in LAC women constitute the majority of the poor, 
and this trend has worsened throughout the MDG years; iii) achieve environmental 
sustainability; iv) improve urban development and build sustainable cities; encourage 
sustainable consumption and production; v) improve the sustainability of consumption 
and production; vi) address issues of particular interest for the Caribbean (vulnerability 
in confronting external shocks and climate change and access to international funding); 
and vii) address issues of particular interest for landlocked countries considered in 
the Almaty Action Programme (transit policies, modernisation of infrastructures and 
promotion of international trade).
In addition to the debate encouraged in the region by the UN, CELAC’s vision has acquired 
considerable relevance. In its 2nd Summit held in Cuba in 2014, the LAC leaders proposed 
an integrated development agenda which would promote “solidarity, cooperation and 
mutual responsibility, based on ample inclusion” and in which “people were at the core 
of its concerns, which promoted sustained and inclusive economic growth, participatory 
social development, the protection of the environment and human dignity” (CELAC 2014: 
1). In addition, leaders proposed the construction of a post-2015 development agenda 
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based on the positive experience of the MDG, while recognising the Latin American and 
*HYPIILHUWYPVYP[PLZVMLYHKPJH[PUNWV]LY[`HUKZPNUPÄJHU[S`YLK\JPUNPULX\HSP[`HUKZVJPHS
exclusion. 
In short, CELAC advocates for an agenda characterised by the following six features:
i. <UP]LYZHSUH[\YLI\[^P[OZ\ɉJPLU[ÅL_PIPSP[`[VHKKYLZZ[OLZWLJPÄJP[PLZVMLHJO
country 
ii. Promotion of a “structural change for equality”— in line with the ECLACist vision 
– in order to eradicate the gaps (international, regional and national) in terms of 
wellbeing and in order to ensure respect for human rights 
iii. 0UJS\ZP]LULZZHUKW\[[PUNWLVWSLÄYZ[LZWLJPHSS`^P[OYLNHYK[V[OLLYHKPJH[PVUVM
poverty and the achievement of sustainable development
iv. Advancement towards the construction of a genuine “global partnership for 
development” to consolidate the funding committments for development reached 
in Monterrey and Doha, and which would include the means and resources required 
[V PTWSLTLU[ H Z\Z[HPUHISL KL]LSVWTLU[ HNLUKH UL^ ÄUHUJPUN TLJOHUPZTZ
ODA, external debt, South-South cooperation and international trade).
v. Contribution to achieving peace, security, democratic governance (including of 
multilateral bodies), the Rule of Law —on both national and international planes— 
gender equality and human rights (in particular the right to development).
vi. 0UJS\ZPVUVMZWLJPÄJNVHSZ PUKPJH[VYZHUK [PTL MYHTLZVUKLSP]LY`VM YLZV\YJLZ
which would guarantee their compliance, which should include additional and 
MVYLZLLHISLÄUHUJPHSYLZV\YJLZ[LJOUVSVN`[YHUZMLYHUKWYVTV[PVUVMPUUV]H[PVU
capacity
The III CELAC Summit held in 2015 in Costa Rica, the Political Declaration of Belén 
(CELAC 2015a) and the Special Declaration on the post-2015 development agenda 
*,3(*IYLHɉYTLK[OL3(*JVTTP[TLU[[V¸JVU[PU\LZ[YLUN[OLUPUN*,3(*HUK
its role in the global agenda, in a manner that will also promote the interests of the Latin 
American and the Caribbean region” (CELAC 2015a: 8). At the same time, the Community 
JHSSLK MVY WYVNYLZZ PU [^V RL` Z[YH[LNPLZ [V JYLH[L HU LɈLJ[P]L NSVIHS WHY[ULYZOPW MVY
sustainable development: on the one hand, the international strategy for development 
funding, which was to be concretized during the UN Third International Conference on 
-PUHUJPUNMVY+L]LSVWTLU[VM1\S`PU(KKPZ(IHIH,[OPVWPH"HUKVU[OLV[OLYOHUK
the Compherensive Action Plan for Cooperation with Middle Income Countries, linked to 
the SDG, which seeks to prevent this group of countries from being sidelined in the future 
post-2015 agenda, as occurred with the MDG which focused on countries with lower 
incomes.
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In this context, it is also important to keep in mind that the Pro-Tempore Ecuadorian 
7YLZPKLUJ`VM*,3(*OHZPU[LUZPÄLK[OLIPKMVY[OLYLNPVUHSKL]LSVWTLU[HNLUKH
HSVUNÄ]LTHQVYHYLHZ!WV]LY[`HUKPULX\HSP[`YLK\J[PVU"LK\JH[PVUZJPLUJL[LJOUVSVN`
and innovation; environment and climate change, infrastructure and connectivity; and 
ÄUHUJPUNMVYKL]LSVWTLU[
It is important to point out that beyond the regional consensus reached on the post-
HNLUKH [OLYLHYLHSZV PTWVY[HU[KPɈLYLUJLZ[OH[ULLK[VILJVUZPKLYLK3(* PZ
a region of countries which are extremely heterogeneous in development terms and in 
^OPJO [OLYLHYLJVUZPKLYHISLWVSP[PJHSKPɈLYLUJLZ^OPJOHYL YLÅLJ[LK PU [OLcollage of 
regionalist projects, directed towards integration, cooperation or political consensus-
I\PSKPUN 4LYJVZ\Y (3)(;*7 :0*( *(5 *(90*64 <UHZ\Y [OL 7HJPÄJ (SSPHUJL
and CELAC). The diversity of countries has translated into a variety of visions on how 
to address regional development challenges, particularly in respect to the question of 
how to deal with inequality, problems of security and (intra-national and cross-border) 
JVUÅPJ[Z HUK OV^ [V Z[YPRL H IHSHUJL IL[^LLU UH[PVUHS HUK YLNPVUHS VISPNH[PVUZ HUK
KPɈLYLU[PH[LKYLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZPU[OLMYHTL^VYRVMHNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[HNLUKHIHZLKVU
the principle of universality.
;OL3(*KL]LSVWTLU[WYVJLZZ^PSSULP[OLYILÄUHSPZLK^P[O[OL4+.UVY^PSS[OPZVJJ\Y
^P[O[OL:+.0U[OLYLNPVUPZMHJPUNZWLJPÄJKL]LSVWTLU[JOHSSLUNLZHTVUNV[OLYZ
equality —in a multidimensional sense, including gender— security, respect for human 
rights and cultural diversity, health, the strengthening of institutions and democracy. In 
VYKLY [V M\SÄS [OLZLJOHSSLUNLZ^OPJOOH]LILLUWHY[PHSS`JVUZPKLYLK PU [OL:+.3(*
ZOV\SKÄYZ[KLJPKL^P[O^OPJORPUKVM¸HTIP[PVU¹P[WYVWVZLZ[VHKKYLZZ[OLJOHSSLUNLZ
of the SDG agenda and, second, how it proposes to interpret and adapt them to its own 
reality. 
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4   EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY  
FACING THE POST-2015 SCENARIO
4.1. The European Union, a global development player
The EU has designed a development cooperation policy in accordance with its interests, 
identity and values as a global player, within the framework of its external action services 
and based on decision making procedures, capacities and policy instruments which 
HYLKPɈLYPUNMYVT[OVZLVM P[ZTLTILYZ[H[LZ0U[OPZWYVJLZZ[OL,<OHZH[[LTW[LK[V
combine, not always harmoniously, the preferences of the member states which derive 
from political options and economic, political and security interests, or from post-
colonial links, with the requirements of a distinctively “European” global policy which is 
JOHYHJ[LYPZLKI`HUHɉYTH[PVUVMT\S[PSH[LYHSPZTHUK[OLWVSPJPLZHUKNVHSZVM+(*HUK
of the UN, in particular the MDG.
)LJH\ZL [OL ,<»Z KL]LSVWTLU[ WVSPJ` JVUZ[P[\[LZ H ÄLSK VM ZOHYLK JVTWL[LUJLZ P[
coexists alongside those of its member states, which presupposes coordinated action 
based on complementarity of all agents involved. With a considerable number of donors 
involved, and accounting for around two thirds of global ODA, the EU is at the same 
time part of the problem and part of the solution for the fragmentation of aid which 
JVTWYVTPZLZ[OLLɉJHJ`VM[OLPU[LYUH[PVUHSJVVWLYH[PVUMVYKL]LSVWTLU[(KKYLZZPUN
those problems requires a more coordinated and “europeanised” action which should 
also be consistent with multilateral frameworks. 
As protagonist of global development, the EU is a, “model”, a “player” and an “implementer”at 
the same time (Barbé, Herranz and Natorski 2012), - a “model” by providing a “European 
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vision of development; a “player” whilst participating in the global governance of develop-
ment and negotiating its rules, goals and procedures; and an “implementer” through the 
design of EU policies and those of 28 member states. The success of the global develop-
TLU[[HYNL[ZHUK[OLLɈLJ[P]LULZZVM[OLJVVWLYH[PVUWVSPJPLZKLWLUKSHYNLS`VU[OL,<»Z
capacity to coordinate its member states as well as to enhance coherence between devel-
opment and other policies such as those governing trade, agriculture, migration, environ-
TLU[L[J^OPJOHɈLJ[ZV\[OLYUJV\U[YPLZHUKJVUKP[PVU[OLPYWVSP[PJHSZWHJL
4.2. The EU  and development policy: identity, values, 
capacities and interests 
This section examines the EU’s activity in development cooperation considering its 
evolution during the past decades, with a special focus on the reform of its development 
policy based on the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the so-called “Agenda for Change” (2011), 
followed by its positioning towards the post-2015 goals, and taking a closer look at the 
problems of policy coherence that condition its action and leadership. 
The EU development activities were established several decades ago in the framework 
of the classic paradigm of North-South aid and post-colonial relations; they were 
gradually transformed in order to respond to the global challenges and multilateral 
rules introduced in the 21st century, among them the MDG. Nevertheless, the rise of 
emerging powers, globalisation processes and changes in poverty and international 
inequality have required even further policy adaptation to this new global scenario. In 
addition, there other endogenous challenges related to the coherence of its policies have 
arisen which have tended to weaken the EU’s role as player in the global development 
scenario. Given these problems, the EU’s responses have oscillated between change 
and continuity, along with a problematic and contradictory adaptation and still 
“entrenched” views and practices which in some occasions may turn out dysfunctional. 
;OPZH[[P[\KLJVTWYVTPZLZ[OL,<»ZSLNP[PTHJ`HZHTVKLSHUKP[ZPUÅ\LUJLHZHWSH`LY
and implementer and tends to weaken its leadership in global development. However, 
the singular nature of the identity, values, interests and capacity of the EU still convert 
the EU into a unique actor which can and should continue to play a prominent role 
in the arena of international development, seeking new partnerships with emerging 
HUKKL]LSVWPUNJV\U[YPLZHUKPUWHY[PJ\SHY^P[O3(*ZVHZ[VKLÄULHUKZ\IZLX\LU[S`
achieve post-2015 global goals. 
Since the nineteen eighties, alongside increased ODA from European institutions, the 
,<»Z PUÅ\LUJL PU KLÄUPUN [OL HNLUKH Z[YH[LNPLZ HUK WVSPJPLZ VM NSVIHS KL]LSVWTLU[
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OHZ PUJYLHZLK 0U [OL ÄUHS Z[HNLVM [OL*VSK>HY JVUMYVU[PUNHUV]LYYPKPUNIPWVSHYP[ `
European cooperation promoted the goals of peace, democracy and development in 
WSHJLZSPRL*LU[YHS(TLYPJH^OPJOKLÄULK[OL,<HZH¸UVYTH[P]L¹HJ[VYPUPU[LYUH[PVUHS
relations. In the Post Cold War era the EU reformed its development policy, extending it 
to all geographical areas and aligning it with multilateral consensus, both in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in matters of trade preferences and within the framework of 
+(*HUK[OL<5I`TLHUZVM[OL4+.HUK[OLHPKLɈLJ[P]LULZZHNLUKH(ZHYLZ\S[[OL
WVZ[JVSVUPHSSPURYLÅLJ[LKPUP[ZNLVNYHWOPJHSWYLMLYLUJLZOHZSVZ[^LPNO[PUJVTWHYPZVU
to other criteria like the levels of income and proximity which gained importance as of 
KPɈLYLU[PH[PVU
Although the EU has been part of the dominant coalitions of governance in global 
development with the DAC and the World Bank, it has also attempted to cast a 
¸,\YVWLHU¸]PZPVU^OLUKLÄUPUNNSVIHS[HYNL[Z^OPJO^LYLKPZ[PUJ[P]LHSILP[UV[JVU[YHY`
to, the “Washington Consensus”. The EU has thereby attempted to counterbalance or 
complement the more openly neoliberal views of the globalisation process, or more 
“securitised” visions of aid in the context of the “Global War against Terror”. The MDG, 
in turn have provided a legitimatising discourse and a framework of reference for the 
design of the EU’s own development policy and that of its member states. As a result, 
EU cooperation has become “multi-lateralised” and became part of the international 
consensus for development and reduction of poverty.  
The EU has been a particularly active supporter of the multilateral development consensus. 
It was assumed that promoting the MDG, and placing the development policy of the EU 
within this framework, would contribute to broader goals of an external action focused on 
regionalism and multilateralism. It was also expected that this strategy would enhance the 
international cooperation and the promotion of a “better world”, increasing the prosperity 
and security of the EU itself, as claimed the European Security Strategy of 2003 A Secure 
Europe in a Better World. Both member states and the EU institutions have endorsed 
the MDGs and subsequent commitments: the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, with the 
committment from the EU and some other countries to enhance ODA, and other policies 
promoting greater mobilization of internal and external resources for development, like the 
support for tax reform or the combination or blending of funding resources. Secondly, the 
HNLUKHVMHPKLɈLJ[P]LULZZHUKPUWHY[PJ\SHY[OLJVTTP[TLU[ZHYPZPUNMYVT[OLWYPUJPWSLZ
of ownership and alignment. The EU institutions, in particular, are pioneers and leaders in 
the use of instruments that respond the most to those principles (e.g., budget support). 
In some LAC countries up to 40% of bilateral ODA of the Commission is channeled 
through this instrument, which has also been used in situations of particular fragility such 
as Haiti. The new Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIP), which replace the previous 
Country Strategy Programs (CSP) as a new programming framework based on alignment 
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with national policies and development plans, follow this logic. Third, with respect to the 
coordination, and assuming a decisive role in terms of joint programming and a enhanced 
PU[LNYP[`HUKKP]PZPVUVM SHIVYHTVUN [OLTLTILYZ[H[LZ-PUHSS `LUOHUJPUN [OLWVSPJ`
coherence, although, as argued below, this issue stil poses a considerable challenge for 
the EU.
In this context, EU development policy and its goals of reducing poverty have contributed 
to shaping its international identity, in contrast to other less “benevolent” or “disinterested” 
players, and also in relation to other EU policies or instruments —trade policy, agricultural 
HUK JVTTVU ÄZOPUN WVSPJPLZ L[J· PU ^OPJO LUKVNLUV\Z PU[LYLZ[Z VM LJVUVTPJ
political or strategic nature are present. These perspectives have brought the EU closer 
to developing countries, in particular to a LAC with which values and visions coincide, 
and which, independent from the unevenness and divergences among both regions, has 
come to see the EU as an alternative or counterweight to traditional hegemonies, and as 
a partner more likely to heed their demands and expectations. 
In the process of the construction an identity as a “civil power” through development policy, 
the Lisbon Treaty (2009) constitutes an essential reference. It aims to strengthen the 
role and identity of the EU as “global player”, through a more integrated design of its 
external action, including both community policies —trade, development…— and 
P[Z-VYLPNUHUK*VTTVU:LJ\YP[`7VSPJ `HUKHTVYLL_WSPJP[PTWSLTLU[H[PVUVM[OL
aforementioned policies in the values and objectives of the Union in a policy matrix 
VMH¸JVZTVWVSP[HUUH[\YL¹;OPZ;YLH[`LZ[HISPZOLZ [OLÄNO[HNHPUZ[WV]LY[`HZH
general goal of all components of the EU’s foreign action, including foreign and 
security policy, common trade policy, and others, instead of an exclusive goal of 
external aid. This presupposes a greater coherence of its policies. However, this 
coherence may not serve the interests of development but rather other goals of 
foreign action which may go hand in hand with the risk of a more “politicised” and 
“securitised” cooperation for development, subordinated to a realpolitik matrix 
contrary to the principles and values of the EU (Guerrero 2014). This question has 
been raised in practice with the emergence of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) —one of the results of the Treaty of Lisbon— and its participation in the 
planning of EU cooperation, which has generated some tensions between the more 
“political“ and security orientated vision of the EEAS in alignment to the Union’s 
external policy, and the “developmentalist” view of the European Commission and 
Devco in particular. The reorganisation of external action undertaken in November 
2014 by the High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission, 
-LKLYPJH4VNOLYPUPZOV\SKJVU[YPI\[L[VHTVYLPU[LNYH[LK]PZPVUHUKHJ[P]P[ `^ OPJO
is particularly important in 2015 in which negotiations on climate and the post-2015 
framework are taking place (Helwig 2015).   
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The rise of the EU is also a consequence of its growing importance as an ODA donor. 
-YVT  VU^HYKZ[OL,\YVWLHUPUZ[P[\[PVUZHUK[OLTLTILYZ[H[LZOH]LWYV]PKLKVU
H]LYHNLV]LYVM[OL6+(VM+(*-\Y[OLYTVYL,\YVWLHUPUZ[P[\[PVUZOH]LYHURLK
second and third in the world ranking of donors according to the year, only behind the 
<UP[LK:[H[LZHUK[OL<UP[LK2PUNKVT6M[OLV]LYHSSHPKVYPNPUH[PUNPU[OL,<IL[^LLU
2012-13 European institutions contributed an annual average of 22%. LAC only receives 
7% of the ODA from European institutions, with the bulk going to Europe (31%), sub-
Saharan Africa (24%) and North Africa and the Near East (14%). And except for Spain, 
it is not a priority region for any of the DAC donors. Despite this fact, overall, the EU and 
the member states constitute the main source of aid for the region. European institutions 
are one of the main donors in all LAC countries and the ODA granted by the member 
states and European institutions overall represents over 50% of the total aid, and in some 
countries such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba or Ecuador, even between 75% and 100%. 
However, this European ODA is only important in less developed countries which do not 
receive much external funding from private sources, and it is not particularly relevant 
MVY [OVZL JV\U[YPLZ ^OPJO JHW[\YL TVYL -VYLPNU +PYLJ[ 0U]LZ[TLU[Z -+0 WVY[MVSPV
investments and remittances (see Table 3).
-PUHSS `Z[YLUN[OLUPUN[OL,<PZHYLZ\S[VM[OLNYHK\HSL\YVWLHUPZH[PVUVMTLTILYZ[H[L
WVSPJPLZ YLHɉYTPUN H JVTTVU ]PZPVU HUK Z[YH[LN` HUK NYLH[LY JVTWSLTLU[HYP[` HUK
coordination and joint programming initiatives. 
Table 3. O#cial Development Assistance to LAC 2012
Country ODA EU/
Total 
flows
ODA/
GDP
Country ODA EU/
Total 
flows
ODA/
GDP
Argentina 9.6% 0.01% Honduras 106.5% 3.64%
Bolivia 77.6% 2.44% Jamaica 10.1% 0.51%
Brazil 4.0% 0.05% Mexico 1.0% 0.05%
Chile 0.6% 0.03% Nicaragua 54.2% 4.54%
Colombia 5.3% 0.23% Panama 1.1% 0.02%
Costa Rica 13.0% 0.08% Paraguay 38.4% 0.46%
Ecuador 27.3% 0.17% Peru 7.7% 0.19%
El Salvador 23.8% 0.73% Dominican Republic 38.0% 0.26%
Guatemala 37.4% 0.94% Surinam 77.9% 0.58%
Guyana 61.0% 3.31% Uruguay 2.4% 0.07%
Haiti 36.1% 13.74% Venezuela 0.5% 0.01%
Source: Development Aid Committee 2015. Net ODA as proportion of the GDP and EU ODA 
and as proportion of the total external funding, both public and private. 
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In 2002 the EU adopted the so-called “European Consensus on Development” which 
was subject to a substantial revision in 2005 (European Union 2006). This consensus 
KLÄULZ[OLJVTTVUMYHTL^VYRMVYKL]LSVWTLU[NVHSZHUKZ[YH[LNPLZIHZLKVU4+." 
and in alignment with the terms of the “Monterrey Consensus” of 2002 and the 
“Paris Declaration” of 2005, it proposed the promotion of improved coordination and 
complementarity between donors through joint planning, calling for every member state 
to specialise in areas and regions where they would have comparative advantages. 
With the adoption and implementation of the “Division of Labour Code of Conduct” 
(European Commission 2007), complementarity and coordination become processes 
and instruments for Europeanisation and multilateralisation of EU and member state 
cooperation policies. Nevertheless, these criteria have not been easy to implement, as 
they question the preferences and interests of the member states which do not always 
coincide with the former. Examples of the “uneasiness” of this process of Europeanisation 
could be seen, for istance, when the MDG and their poverty eradication goals would 
contradict the priorities of the neighbourhood policy of the EU, or when member states 
such as Spain would priviledge middle income countries in Latin America as recipients of 
ODA. In any case, this process has already given rise to joint programme frameworks for 
the Commission and member states which began to be applied in 11 countries in 2012, 
and were extended to further 40 countries in 2014,5 with the aim of carrying out between 
60% and 70% of the Commission’s bilateral programmes by 2017 within this common 
framework. 
4.3. EU development policy: di#cult adaptation to the post-2015 scenario
4.3.1. The Agenda for Change: di!erentiation and “graduation” 
Given the changes in global development, the EU has deployed reform initiatives which 
YLÅLJ[IV[OP[Z^PSSPUNULZZ[VHKHW[[VJOHUNLHUKP[ZYLZPZ[HUJLKLYP]PUNMYVTWVSP[PJHS
positions, normative entrenchement, and institutional obstacles. This became observable 
in two relevant processes: i) the reform of development policy through the “Agenda for 
*OHUNL¹,\YVWLHU*VTTPZZPVUHHUK[OLWYVWVZHSZMVYÄUHUJPHSPUZ[Y\TLU[ZMVY
that period (European Commission 2011b); and ii) the positioning of the EU towards the 
post-2015 targets.
The Agenda for Change, which coincides with the new budgetary cycle 2014-2020, 
responds above all to the evolution of the developing world, the North-South relations 
 0U3H[PU(TLYPJH^P[OKPќLYLU[KLNYLLZVMWYVNYLZZ[OLZLHYL)VSP]PH.\H[LTHSH/VUK\YHZ5PJHYHN\HHUK7HYHN\H `
 HUKSH\UJOWSHUULKMVY,S:HS]HKVYI`^P[O/HP[PJ\YYLU[S`\UKLYZ[\K `
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HUK [OL ¸THW¹VM NSVIHS WV]LY[ `)HZLKVU [OLWYPUJPWSL VM ¸KPɈLYLU[PH[PVU¹ P[ HPTZ [V
concentrate aid from the EU on a reduced number of political and geographical priorities 
(Table 4) as well as on the poorest and “fragile States”, with emerging countries as potential 
“partners” in respect to the global challenges, rather than recipients of classic ODA. Other 
goals address global risks, the improvement of the link between security and state fragility, 
the improvement of complementarity and division of labour, and a greater coherence 
IL[^LLU[OLÄNO[HNHPUZ[WV]LY[`HUKV[OLY¸NLULYHSPU[LYLZ[Z¹VML_[LYUHSHJ[PVU
-VSSV^PUN[OLWYPUJPWSLVMKPɈLYLU[PH[PVU[OLWYVWVZHSMVYHUL^+L]LSVWTLU[*VVWLYH[PVU
Instrument (DCI; see European Commission 2011c) implied cancelling bilateral aid to 19 
middle income countries,6 which would only be eligible for the DCI thematic regional 
programmes “public assets and global risks” and “local authorities and civil society”; 
HUKL]LU[\HSS` MVYUL^YLNPVUHSWYVNYHTTLZ [VILKLÄULK)` [OLZHTL[VRLU [OLZL
states could access funds from the EU Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. 
 
“Graduation“ was measured by income per capita, but the list of countries was rejected 
I`[OL,\YVWLHU7HYSPHTLU[^OPJOPZ^O`[OLÄUHS9LN\SH[PVULZ[HISPZOLKHUL_JLW[PVU
clause, and in the cases of Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru and South Africa, bilateral 
aid would be retained for a transitory period during which resources would be gradually 
reduced. As will be shown below, the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) of the 
,<OHZHSZVPU]VS]LKHZPNUPÄJHU[YLK\J[PVUVM[OLU\TILYVMZ[H[LZ^OPJO^V\SKILULÄ[
from this instrument.
The new Partnership Instrument for higher income countries —industrialised and emerging 
states— provides a mechanism for adapting to the rise of the South. Considered as the 
 ;OL MVSSV^PUN JV\U[YPLZ ^V\SK ¸NYHK\H[L¹! H  OPNO [V TPKKSL PUJVTL JV\U[YPLZ! (YNLU[PUH )YHaPS *OPSL 
 *OPUH *VSVTIPH *VZ[H 9PJH ,J\HKVY 0YHU 2HaHROZ[HU 4HSH`ZPH 4HSKP]LZ 4L_PJV 7HUHTH 7LY\ 
 ;OHPSHUK <Y\N\H` HUK =LULa\LSH" ` I [^V SV^LY TPKKSL PUJVTL JV\U[YPLZ ^P[O H .+7 ILSV^  VM [OL NSVIHS 
 .+7UHTLS `0UKPHHUK0UKVULZPH
Table 4. EU’s  “Agenda for Change”: political priorities
Democracy, human rights and governance Inclusive and sustainable growth for human 
development  
• Democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law 
• Gender equality and women’s empower-
ment 
• Public sector management
• Tax policy and administration
• Corruption
• Civil society and local authorities
• Natural resources
• Development-security nexus
• Social protection, education, health and  
decent work 
• Business environment, regional integra-
tion and access to world markets 
• Sustainable agriculture and energy
Source: European Commission 2011a: 6-11.
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main innovation for the 2014-2020 period, it is as “a key instrument for external policy” 
in order to “advance and promote EU interests (…) and by addressing major global 
challenges” (European Commission 2011c: 7). However, it only represents 1.1% of the 
M\UKZMVYL_[LYUHSHJ[PVUZVM[OL4\S[PHUU\HS-PUHUJPHS-YHTL^VYRPUJVU[YHZ[
[V[OLKLZ[PULKMVY[OL(MYPJH*HYPIILHU7HJPÄJ.YV\W(*7HUKVM[OL+*0
([ ÄYZ[ ZPNO[ [OPZ UL^ JVVWLYH[PVU HWWYVHJO HWWLHYZ JVU]PUJPUN 0[ HKVW[Z H TVYL
selective and focused aid concentrating on the poorest countries, while at the same 
time responding to the rise of emerging countries and the growing heterogeneity of the 
developing world. However, by obviating the already existing asymmetries with these 
countries, it somehow releases the EU from the obligations assumed in the framework 
of its development policy —aid, trade preferences— and its democratic conditionality, 
facilitating thereby that those member states interested in boosting national businesses 
and trade, could proceed and promote their economic interests through free trade 
agreements, competing in better conditions with those countries which, like China, do 
not apply policies of conditionality. This scenario would stand in line with member states’ 
policies to promote national companies, which in some cases include the positioning 
of “national brands” and which are characterized by an economic nationalism and an 
essentially geo-economic vision (Martinigui and Youngs 2012). Indeed, according to 
this logic, these member states would only have to coordinate their policies and subject 
them to EU’s exigencies of coherence of policies or of joint progamming in the poorest 
countries, in which development cooperation would still have to be maintained, but this 
would no longer be the case with the emerging countries.
However, precisely in these countries areas such as infrastructure, renewable energies 
and environmental technologies, science and technology, higher education and the 
strengthening of institutions are in need of further development, - and in all of these areas 
the EU has comparative advantages. Here, instruments of an advanced cooperation would 
ILYLX\PYLK`L[HJJVYKPUN[V[OL*VTTPZZPVU»ZWYVWVZHSZ[OPZ[`WLVM¸KPɈLYLU[PH[PVU¹
would rather lead to the gradual termination of aid, rather than the opening of new and 
more advanced modes of biltateal cooperation, given the scant resources for “graduate” 
countries of the new Association Instrument. While it is true that in case of Latin America 
[OLZPNUPÄJHU[PUJYLHZLPU[OLYLZV\YJLZVM[OLYLNPVUHSWYVNYHTZMVYZLLUMVY
^PSS JVTWLUZH[L [V H ZPNUPÄJHU[ KLNYLL [OL YLK\J[PVU VM IPSH[LYHS HPK MVY ¸NYHK\H[L¹
countries, it still appears that it would not meet the strong demand for an advanced 
cooperation by the EU —including joint TrC actions towards third parties— that have 
been articulated by these countries and regional organisations like ECLAC. Some of 
these “graduate” countries, in fact, have displayed a somewhat ambivalent attitude which 
included satisfaction to becoming an emerging and “graduate” country on the one hand, 
whilst continuing to demand foreign aid from the EU on the other hand.
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;OPZ^V\SKPUKPJH[L[OH[[OLJYP[LYPVUMVYNYHK\H[PVU·JSHZZPÄJH[PVUZHJJVYKPUN[VPUJVTL
levels— is not the most appropriate one, as the European Parliament has highlighted 
(2012a and 2012b): it does not consider problems of poverty in MIC, it conceals the 
issue of internal inequality, and it does not take into account the vulnerability of these 
countries to adverse shocks. It would appear to indicate that the EU has adopted a 
minimal approach towards MIC that leaves the development agenda and social cohesion 
HZPKL-\YULZZHUK5LNYL;OPZHWWYVHJOJV\SKHɈLJ[[OLJYLKPIPSP[`VM[OL,<HZH
“normative power”.
At least until 2015, this new policy design has not considered new forms of partnership for 
the EU with SSC through mechanisms of triangular or trilateral cooperation, as claimed 
by the “Global partnership“ established in 2011 in Busan, and as already practised by 
some member states in order to improve the impact of their cooperation and to maintain 
their relationship with the MIC. However, the Commission has been somewhat passive, if 
not reluctant, in respect to SSC. It has recognised the “importance of SSC”; asked for “a 
greater comprehension” of this phenomenon for the EU; inquired about its “added value”;7 
HUK PUZPZ[LK[OH[::*ZOV\SKYLZWVUK[V[OLWYPUJPWSLZVMLɈLJ[P]LULZZ [YHUZWHYLUJ `
accountability and joint planning which the EU has adopted within the framework of 
DAC and Busan (European Commission 2014a; European Union Council 2014). The 
Commission signalled that the short history of SSC in LAC, the limited scale of its actions, 
[OL SHJRPUNKLÄUP[PVUVM P[ZTVKLZVMJVVWLYH[PVUHUK P[Z SV^LY [LJOUPJHSHUKWVSP[PJHS
Z[HUKHYKZHZJVTWHYLK[V[OVZLHWWSPLKI`[OL,<^V\SKPTWS`JVUZPKLYHISLKPɉJ\S[PLZ
for cooperation. Within LAC there are also varying perspectives on SSC and TrC with the 
EU: Mexico and Chile have displayed rather favourable views towards these instruments 
HUK[OLVIZ[HJSLZ[OL`OH]LPKLU[PÄLKHYLZL[VUHYH[OLY[LJOUPJHSSL]LS"TLHU^OPSLMVY
distinct political reasons Brasil and Argentina have adopted rather renitent standpoints. 
/V^L]LY[OPZYLZPZ[HUJLHWWLHYZ[VILHSZVYLSH[LK[VI\YLH\JYH[PJHUKÄUHUJPHSVIZ[HJSLZ
in the EU institutions, to a defensive administrative culture, and a reluctance of these 
institutions to accept current changes in the classic paradigm of aid and North-South 
relations. All of this has not impeded, however, that some regional programmes such as 
EUROSocial have promoted the exchange of experiences and good practices between 
Latin American experts and institutions, which, according to the Commission, would 
constitute an example of an established practice of triangular cooperation, albeit until the 
beginning of 2015 this practice was not formally presented in this way. A gradual change in 
attitude towards these instruments could be observed during the II EU-CELAC Summit in 
1\UL^ OLYLHUL^TVKLMVYÄUHUJPUNPUUV]H[P]L;Y*PUP[PH[P]LZPU[OLYLNPVU^ P[O[OL
support of national aid agencies and an inicial amount of 12 Mio. Euros, was announced.8 
 :LL[OL,<»ZWVZP[PVUMVY[OLÄYZ[.7,+**V\UJPSVM[OL,\YVWLHU<UPVU
 :LLP[LT VM[OL)Y\ZZLSZ+LJSHYH[PVULSHIVYH[LKH[[OPZ:\TTP[
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The “Strategic Partnerships” that the EU has established with emerging countries such 
as Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa could serve as a framework in order to 
LZ[HISPZOUL^MVYT\SHZIL[^LLU::*HUK,<JVVWLYH[PVU-LQLYZRV]! :V
far, the EU–Brazil case has been the only concrete one which has implemented triangular 
cooperation actions in distinct African countries through their Action Plan 2012-14 
(Lazarou 2013). Still, the ambivalence of both parties in respect of this undertaking, the 
“Southphalian” positioning of Brazil in the North–South issue, the Commission’s doubts 
with respect to the added value of these formulas vis-à-vis the traditional modes of aid, 
and the rigidity of their procedures, explain why those commitments have been diluted 
without concrete actions being taken (Cabral 2014: 6).
4.3.2. The link between other financing sources and blending
;OL (NLUKH MVY *OHUNL HSZV HPTZ [V LUJV\YHNL PUUV]H[P]L ÄUHUJPUN TLJOHUPZTZ
departing from the assumption that the resources of the Commission do not permit 
addressing required investments in crucial areas of development, regional integration 
and international competitiveness of MIC, such as transport, energy and environment. 
Therefore the combination or blendingVMWYP]H[LHUKW\ISPJÄUHUJPUNOHZILLUWYVTV[LK
[OL SH[[LY [OYV\NO SVHUZ YPZR JHWP[HS ÄUHUJPUN VM WYLPU]LZ[TLU[ JVZ[Z N\HYHU[LLZ VY
PU[LYLZ[YH[LZ\IZPKPLZ0U[OPZ^H`HKKP[PVUHSÄUHUJPUNPZSL]LYHNLKHUKV[OLYWSH`LYZHUK
resources are aligned with the EU policy. BlendingOHZJVUZ[P[\[LKHULɈLJ[P]LTLJOHUPZT
of risk management which is meant to enhance the appropriation of the recipients, to 
reinforce these countries’ reforms and to encourage participation of the private sector. The 
operations of blending JVTIPULÄUHUJPUNMYVT[OL,<HUKMYVTW\ISPJPUZ[P[\[PVUZVM[OL
member states, the only ones that can lead proyects, once their suitability is assessed by 
means of the so-called pillar assessment, securing thereby the standards of management 
which should be comparable to the standards of the Comission. This procedure allows 
for the complementation and coordination with the Commission and with the regional 
development banks. The latter are not only relevant players for this mechanism as 
providers of resources, but also as providers of  technical know-how and expertise. 
Blending ^HZ PU[YVK\JLKK\YPUN [OLT\S[PHUU\HSÄUHUJPHS MYHTL^VYR^OLU
[OL ,\YVWLHU PUZ[P[\[PVUZ LZ[HISPZOLK ZL]LU YLNPVUHS ÄUHUJPHS MHJPSP[PLZ KLZPNUH[PUN
1,600 Mio. Euros for 200 projects, of which 60% were realted to energy and transport 
infrastructure. These investment funds have mobilized 40,000 Mio. Euros, with a ratio 
VM  [V  (TVUN [OVZL MHJPSP[PLZ HYL [OL 3H[PU (TLYPJHU 0U]LZ[TLU[ -HJPSP[` 40(3
HUK [OL *HYPIILHU 0U]LZ[TLU[ -HJPSP[` *0- 40(3 ^HZ JYLH[LK PU +LJLTILY  
^P[O [OYLLZ[YH[LNPJVIQLJ[P]LZW\YZ\LKK\YPUN [OLWHZ[Ä]L`LHYZ! YLNPVUHS PU[LNYH[PVU
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and improved interconnectivity by the provision of transport and energy infrastructure; 
environmental protection and support for adaptation projects and mitigation of climate 
change following the “green growth” logic (Hernandez and Sandell 2013); and socio-
economic development through support to SMEs and infrastructure for social services, 
complementing regional programs as EUROSOCIAL or EuroClima. In that period, 197.7 
million Euros were invested in 25 projects, mobilizing around additional 5,000 Mio. Euros, 
with 45% destined for water and sanitation, 25% for energy, 10.5% for environment, 9.5% 
for transport, and the remaining 10% for other sectors. These projects have been involved 
IPSH[LYHS HNLUJPLZ Z\JO HZ (NLUJL -YHUsHPZL KL +t]LSVWWLTLU[ (-+ [OL .LYTHU
2YLKP[HUZ[HS[MY>PLKLYH\MIH\2M>VY[OL:WHUPZO(NLUJ`MVY0U[LYUH[PVUHS*VVWLYH[PVU
for Development (AECID), and in some cases the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
*(-+L]LSVWTLU[)HURVM3H[PU(TLYPJHHUK[OL*LU[YHS(TLYPJHU)HURMVY,JVUVTPJ
0U[LNYH[PVU*(),0OH]LWHY[PJPWH[LK4LHU^OPSL*0-^HZLZ[HISPZOLKPUHUKOHZ
granted 35 Mio. Euros to four projects, which involved the mobilisation of  additional 
66 Mio. Euros, and in some cases also the participation of IDB and CABEI (European 
Commission 2014b: 4; 2015c: 10).
Blending, however, also responds to “mutual interests” as well as to economic and 
V[OLYPU[LYLZ[ZVM[OL,<PU[OLZLJV\U[YPLZ2Yp[RL(JJVYKPUN[V[OL*VTTPZZPVU
(2014b: 1) it is “an instrument for achieving EU external policy objectives”. These include 
[OLKL]LSVWTLU[NVHSZ [OH[HYLWYLZLU[ PU [OL,<WVSPJ` PU [OPZÄLSKWHY[PJ\SHYS` PU P[Z
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which is the legal basis of this instrument, but 
also include objectives which form part of other areas of its external action. Among those 
economic interests of the EU are, in particular, those to generate business opportunities for 
European companies involved in the construction of  infrastructure in emerging countries, 
with blending operating as a subsidy for those interests. In this context, criticism has 
been raised for the bias of this instrument towards UMIC, to the detriment of poorer 
countries which are in need other types of assistance. Taking into account the current 
IVVTVML_[YHJ[P]LPUK\Z[YPLZ[OPZPUZ[Y\TLU[TPNO[ÄUHUJLPU]LZ[TLU[WYVQLJ[Z^P[OV\[
providing adequate social and environmental guarantees. Therefore, arising problems of 
coherence of development policies would have to be addressed (Eurodad 2013; Tovar et 
HS")PSHSHUK2Yp[RL",\YVWLHU7HYSPHTLU[I!
;OL*VTTPZZPVUMVYP[ZWHY[OHZPUKPJH[LK[OH[[OLÄUHUJLKWYVQLJ[Z^ LYLM\SS`HSPNULK^ P[O
the host country’s development strategy. And while blending tried to respond to the particular 
ULLKZVMKL]LSVWTLU[ÄUHUJPUNVM40*LZWLJPHSS`<40*^P[OPU[OL40(3PUP[PH[P]L340*
were given more weight. During the period 2010-14, 30% of the funds were designated 
for Nicaragua. Tendering procedures for the projects were open and competitive and in 
accordance to international standards, so no bias towards European companies existed. 
(UKI`[OLPU]VS]LTLU[VMIPSH[LYHSVYT\S[PSH[LYHSÄUHUJPHSPUZ[P[\[PVUZTLHZ\YLZZ\JOHZ
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social consultations, environmental impact assessments, or eventual displacements of the 
population, would comply to standards comparable to those prevailing in the EU.
Doubts exist not only in respect to the capacity of blending to mobilize additional 
resources, but also due to the presence of other interests in this instrument which 
TPNO[SLHK[V[OLJVUKP[PVUPUNVMKL]LSVWTLU[HUK[OLÄNO[HNHPUZ[WV]LY[ `;OLZLJHSS
PU[VX\LZ[PVU [OLLɈLJ[P]P[`VM [OPZ PUZ[Y\TLU[HUK MYVTH^PKLYWLYZWLJ[P]LHSZV [OL
normativity and legitimacy of the EU as an agent of development. 
4.3.3. Di!erentiation and “graduation” in the trade-development axis 
The EU cooperation policy has an important trade dimension, and the “graduation” logic is 
also present in this dimension (European Commission 2012a). In 2012, a new Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) was approved; it is considered the main mechanism of 
preferential access to the EU market for developing countries and entered into force on 1 
1HU\HY`0UVYKLY[VMVJ\Z[OLILULÄ[ZVM[OPZ:`Z[LTVUJV\U[YPLZRUV^UHZ[OVZL
TVZ[ PUULLK<40*HYLUV^JVUZPKLYLKHZ¸NYHK\H[L¹ILULÄJPHYPLZ(ZHYLZ\S[[OL
[V[HSU\TILYVMILULÄJPHYPLZVM[OH[ZJOLTLOHZILLUYLK\JLKMYVT[V JV\U[YPLZ
HUK VM[OLTJSHZZPÄLKHZ3LHZ[+L]LSVWLK*V\U[YPLZ3+*^PSSILSVUN[V[OLTVZ[
extensive scheme known as Everything but Arms (EBA). It is important to note that the 
GSP list of “graduate” countries does not coincide with the terms established by the 
UL^+*0^OPJOHNHPUZOV^Z [OH[ PUJVTLJSHZZPÄJH[PVUZHYLUV[ [OLTVZ[HWWYVWYPH[L
guide for development policy decisions. The GSP graduation thus appears to express a 
defensive or protectionist stance of the EU towards emerging countries, which becomes 
TVYL]PZPISL PU [OLHM[LYTH[OVM [OLLJVUVTPJJYPZPZ^OPSLZPT\S[HULV\ZS` YLÅLJ[PUNH
liberal stance towards emerging countries. 
As proposed by Stevens (2012) the elimination of preferences appears to respond to EU’s 
intention to push these countries towards the signing of an agreement in Doha or reciprocal 
free trade agreements, thus leaving space for member states to deploy their national 
policies and promote their own economic interests (Stevens 2012). In this way, the EU was 
attempting to bilaterally or multilaterally achieve what was unachievable during the WTO 
Doha Round; a negotiation that the EU, despite its multilateralist discourse, appears to 
have abandoned in favour of bilateral, plurilateral or “megaregional” negotiations such as 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. Studies 
HZZLZZPUN [OL PTWHJ[ VM [OPZ SH[[LY HYN\L [OH[ P[^V\SK KP]LY[ [YHKL ÅV^Z" WYLZ\WWVZL
the imposition of “de facto” rules and standards outside of the multilateral framework 
of the WTO, and by covering aspects such as environmental and labour regulations of 
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LHJOJV\U[Y ` [OLWYV[LJ[PVUVM JVW`YPNO[ HUKWLYZVUHSKH[H PU [OLKPNP[HS ÄLSKW\ISPJ
JVTWHUPLZVYJVU[YVSZ[VJHWP[HSÅV^Z;;07^ V\SKPTWS`HJVUZPKLYHISLSVZZVMH\[VUVT`
and space for development policy both for participating countries and for third parties, 
HUKPUWHY[PJ\SHYMVY3(*-LYILSTH`Y"9VZHSLZet al. 2013).
-PUHSS `ULP[OLY [OLUL^MVJ\ZVU[YHKLHUKKL]LSVWTLU[UVY [OLUL^.:7THUHNL[V
resolve the deeply entrenched problem of (in)coherence of policies by failing to address 
the common agricultural policy, the complex relation between trade, environment and 
O\THUYPNO[ZVY[OLZLJ\SHYVIZ[HJSLVM,<UVU[HYPɈIHYYPLYZ
4.4. The EU and post-2015 goals: vision, positioning and influence
Apart from the climate negotiations which are played out at a distinct forum, the EU has 
developed its position with respect to the post-2015 framework parallel to the work of the 
UN system and the OWA.9 Since the EU did not have its own representation in this group, 
P[ZPUÅ\LUJLOHZILLUTLKPH[LKI`[OVZLTLTILYZ[H[LZ^OPJO^LYLYLWYLZLU[LKPU[OPZ 
MVY\T^OPJOPZ^O`[OPZYLWYLZLU[H[PVUYLÅLJ[LK]HY`PUNKLNYLLZVM¸L\YVWLHUPZH[PVU¹
The EU has also sought to coordinate its position within the regional groups so as to 
promote a more active participation of emerging countries and to achieve previous 
agreements related to the post-2015 agenda.
The EU has aligned with the UN vision of goals focusing on the eradication of extreme 
poverty, which should be at the same time capable to integrate in a balanced manner 
the economic, social and environmental dimension of development. It has emphatically 
advocated for the incorporation of democracy, good governance, the rule of law, 
transparency and accountability as well as human rights in the post-2015 framework.10 
The latter, however, are elements that other emerging and developing countries have 
questioned, as they consider that these issues were not covered by the OWG mandate, 
that these would go against the principle of state sovereignty, and that these could give 
rise to some forms or mechanisms of political conditionality in the SDG or development 
cooperation. The EU has also pronounced itself, albeit in less concrete terms, in favour 
of incorporating the issues of security and peace, although some member states have 
  :LL [OL [^V JVTT\UPJH[PVUZ VM [OL .YV\W <5 H HUK <5 J HUK P[Z JVUJS\ZPVUZ VM [OL *V\UJPS 
 MYVT  1\UL  ¸;OL 6]LYHYJOPUN 7VZ[ (NLUKH¹" +VJ   HUK MYVT  +LJLTILY  ¸( 
 [YHUZMVYTH[P]L WVZ[ HNLUKH¹" +VJ   ;OL ,\YVWHU *VTTPZZPVU OHZ PZZ\LK H [L_[ VU [OL 
 YVSL VM [OL WYP]H[L ZLJ[VY ,\YVWLHU *VTTPZZPVU K HUK [OL ,\YVWHU 7HYSPHTLU[ [OL PUMVYTZ WYV]PKLK 
 I` 9HWWVY[L\Y *VY[tZ 3HZ[YH ,\YVWLHU 7HYSPHTLU[ H .VLYLUZ ,\YVWLHU 7HYSPHTLU[ I HUK :[PLY 
 ,\YVWLHU 7HYSPHTLU[ J 6U ÄUHUJPUN MVY KL]LSVWTLU[ ZLL ,\YVWLHU *VTPZP}U I HUK [OL 
 JVUJS\ZPVUZVM[OL*V\UJPSMYVTKL+LJLTILYKL+VJ
10 ;OLZL HYL JVUZPKLYLK ¸LZZLU[PHS¹ LSLTLU[Z MVY Z\Z[HPUHISL KL]LSVWTLU[ HJJVYKPUN [V [OL [LYTZ VM 9xV 
 HUK[OLYLZVS\[PVUThe future we want, HUKZWLJPÄJHSS`PUWHYHNYHWOVM[OPZKVJ\TLU[
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been disinclined to do so considering the risk of “securitisation” of the SDG. The EU has 
HSZVYLHɉYTLK[OLULLKMVYHNLULYHSMYHTL^VYR^OPJOZOV\SKYLÅLJ[Z[H[LZ»HZWPYH[PVUZ
and be universally applicable to all countries; this framework should be based on national 
contributions and take into account the distinct contexts, capacities and levels of 
KL]LSVWTLU[VMLHJOJV\U[Y`HUKHSSV^MVYKPɈLYLU[HWWYVHJOLZHUK[OL\ZLVMKPɈLYLU[
indicators to measure progress, in order to ensure ownership and pertinence of the goals. 
0UWHY[PJ\SHY P[OHZKYH^UH[[LU[PVU [V Q\Z[PJLHUKLX\P[`¶^P[OHZWLJPÄJLTWOHZPZVU
gender—, as well as to the peace and security agendas. It has also claimed for the post-
2015 framework to cover all human rights and to incorporate justice, equality, equity, 
good governance, democracy and the rule of law, in order to promote peaceful societies 
^P[OV\[]PVSLUJL;OL,<MV\UK[OH[[OLNVHSZ[VILKLÄULKZOV\SKILSPTP[LKPUU\TILY
-PUHSS `P[OHZPUZPZ[LK[OH[UH[PVUHSYLZWVUZPIPSP[`^ HZWHYHTV\U[[VHJOPL]PUN[OLZLNVHSZ
independent from the fact that international cooperation was required to achieving them 
in many places, and it also emphasised the importance of accountability in accordance 
with the proposals of the synthesis report of the UN Secretary-General of December 2014 
(UN 2014b).
;OLJVTTP[TLU[[VÄUHUJPUN[YHKLV[OLY¸TLHUZVMPTWSLTLU[H[PVU¹HUK[OL¸LUHISPUN
LU]PYVUTLU[¹HYLHSZVYLSL]HU[HZWLJ[ZVM,<»ZWVZP[PVU;OL,<JVUÄYTZP[ZJVTTP[TLU[
to coherent development policies, and it expects developing countries to adopt this 
WYPUJPWSL HZ^LSS ;OL,< PUZ[P[\[PVUZ YLJHSS [OL LɈVY[ZTHKL [OYV\NO [OLPY [YHKLHUK
development policy by means of trade preferences —GSP, EBA etc.— and ODA, 
reiterating the committment to achieve 0.7% by 2015, and refer to advances achieved 
in the area of science and technology. However, the central role of the private sector 
PZ YLHɉYTLKHUK[OLTHPUYLZWVUZPIPSP[` [VTVIPSPZPUNYLZV\YJLZZOV\SKILWSHJLKH[
the national level. This leads to a policy agenda focusing on tax reform and combating 
JVYY\W[PVUHUKPSSLNHSJHZOÅV^Z,_[LYUHSÄUHUJPUNVU[OLV[OLYOHUKZOV\SKYH[OLY
be complementary in nature and contribute to mobilising private investment through the 
instrument of blending.
;OLWYVWVZHSZYHPZLKI`[OL,<MVYKL]LSVWTLU[ÄUHUJPUNHYLTVYLL_[LUZP]LHUK
HTIP[PV\Z[OHU[OVZLWYVWVZLKI`[OL6>.^OPJOJVUÄULKP[ZLSM[VYLP[LYH[PUN[OL
issues considered in the previous MDG, and these proposals involve an integral 
WLYZWLJ[P]L JV]LYPUN UH[PVUHS YLZV\YJLZ [OL YLMVYT VM PU[LYUH[PVUHS ÄUHUJPHS
architecture, ODA, international taxation and, in particular, the tax on international 
ÄUHUJPHS [YHUZHJ[PVUZ WYP]H[L PU]LZ[TLU[ HUK YLTP[[HUJLZ ;OLZL WYVWVZHSZ OH]L
JVUZ[P[\[LK [OLIHZPZVM [OL,<»ZWVZP[PVUH[ [OLYK<5*VUMLYLUJLVU-PUHUJPUN
MVY+L]LSVWTLU[ PU1\S` PU(KKPZ(IHIHHUK^PSSILHU PTWVY[HU[ PUW\[ PU[OL
KLÄUP[PVUVM[OLWVZ[HNLUKH
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5.1. South–South and Triangular Cooperation: definitions and approaches
5.1.1. SSC as a political field
Within the framework of profound changes in the international system, development 
cooperation is currently undergoing a process of transformation which has opened up a 
debate on its nature, forms and its governance. In this context, SSC and TrC have gained 
UL^PTWL[\ZHUKHTWSPÄLK[OLH]HPSHISLVW[PVUZMVY QVPU[KL]LSVWTLU[LɈVY[Z([[OLZHTL
[PTL[OLZLPUZ[Y\TLU[ZHSZVYLÅLJ[L_PZ[PUN[LUZPVUZHUKU\Y[\YLKLIH[LZHIV\[[OL[YHKP[PVUHS
TVKLSVM6+(^OPJOPZIHZLKVUPKLHZHUKPUZ[P[\[PVUZ^OPJOL_PZ[LKMVYTVYL[OHUÄM[``LHYZ
In this context, it is necessary to understand SSC in LAC as a political concept which 
M\SÄSZ[^VM\UJ[PVUZH[[OLZHTL[PTL6UVULOHUKP[Z[YLUN[OLUZIVUKZ^P[OPUHZWHJL
in which states also pursue national political goals. On the other hand, it constitutes 
a vehicle to articulate demands and claims toward traditional cooperation as practised 
by DAC donors. In this respect SSC is perceived as part of the foreign policy of Latin 
American countries —and in an incipient manner also of the Caribbean countries—, 
designed both to protect their progress and to promote changes in a highly unequal 
international system, where their development needs are conditioned by the global and 
regional environment. This perspective has not been as evident in Caribbean countries 
which began to share and debate these issues more recently within the context of the 
CELAC Working Group on International Cooperation. 
5   SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION  
AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION  
IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE  
EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN  
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
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Gradually, a political consensus among political leaders of LAC has emerged which 
KLÄULZ::*HJJVYKPUN[VZL]LYHSYLN\SH[VY`HZWLJ[Z^OPJOZLLR[VKPɈLYLU[PH[LP[MYVT
5:*IHZLKVU[OLWYPUJPWSLZVMOVYPaVU[HSP[ `ZVSPKHYP[ `T\[\HSPU[LYLZ[HUKILULÄ[UVU
conditionality, reciprocity and respect of sovereignty. These principles have also gained 
relevance at the international level and have been highlighted as guiding principles of 
::*H[[OL;OPYK*VUMLYLUJLVU-PUHUJPUNMVY+L]LSVWTLU[OLSKPU(KKPZ(IHIHPU1\S`
2015.11([[OLZHTL[PTL[OLKLÄUP[PVUVM*::PZJVTWSL[LKI`TLHUZVMSLHYUPUNHUK
the observation of practices with which it also distinguishes between particular modes 
VMHJ[PVU;VZ\TTHYPZL[OLJVUZ[Y\J[PVUVM[OPZKLÄUP[PVUPZLZZLU[PHSS`WVSP[PJHSHUKP[PZ
shaped by a normative discourse which seeks to generate consensus, identity and group 
cohesion, and also by incipient practices which are shared, registered and systematised, 
HUK^OPJO^PSSL]LU[\HSS`WYV]PKLL]PKLUJLVMKPɈLYLU[PH[LKTVKLSZHUKHWWYVHJOLZ
5.1.2. Triangular Cooperation: concept and approaches
(ZPKL MYVT [OL KPɈLYLU[ ZWLJPÄJ JVUJLW[Z VM ;Y* JVUZLUZ\Z L_PZ[Z PU YLZWLJ[ [V [OL
advantages that this cooperation modus seeks to contribute by integrating the 
WHY[PJPWH[PVUHUKJVU[YPI\[PVUZMYVTKPɈLYLU[HJ[VYZ PU[OLZHTLWYVQLJ[VYHJ[PVU 0[ PZ
OLSK [OH[;Y*  MHJPSP[H[LZ [OLJVTIPUH[PVUVMKPɈLYLU[ [LJOUPJHS ÄUHUJPHSHUKZ`TIVSPJ
capacities —such as the prestige of a cooperating entity or recognition of the identity of 
[OL:V\[O·^OPJOTH`JVTWSLTLU[LHJOV[OLYHUKNLULYH[LT\[\HSILULÄ[ZIHZLKVU
diverse interests. 
;OL;Y*JVUJLW[ZKPɈLYPU[OLWLYJLW[PVUVM[OLPYMVYTZHUKHWWYVHJOLZ:VTLKLÄUP[PVUZ
are based on the nature of the players involved (developed, MIC, developing) or on the 
YLZV\YJLZ [OH[LHJOWSH`LYJVU[YPI\[LZ ÄUHUJPHSVY [LJOUPJHS(TVUN [OLHWWYVHJOLZ
are those which perceive TrC as “instrument” of NSC, or else as a support to SSC. This 
SH[[LYHWWYVHJOOHZNHPULKWYVTPULUJLPU3(*^P[OZWLJPÄJPTWVY[HUJLZOPM[LK[V[OL
“roles” of the involved partners of a TrC project. With its own language, the ÄYZ[WYV]PKLY
and recipient —which may be one or several developing countries in each case—, and 
second provider, which may be a developing country, a developed country, a regional 
or multilateral body or a partnership between these. In this triangle, “the distinguishing 
MLH[\YLPZKL[LYTPULKI`[OLYVSLVM[OLÄYZ[WYV]PKLY^OVHJ[ZHZ[OLTHPUYLZWVUZPISL
WHY[`MVYJHWHJP[`I\PSKPUN¹:,.0)! 0UHJJVYKHUJL^P[O[OPZKLÄUP[PVU;Y*»Z
approach as support to SSC would be guaranteed in the role performed by a country of 
the “South” as primarily responsible for the technical support. 
11 :LLLZWLJPHSS`P[LTZ`VM[OL(J[PVU7SHUVM(KKPZ(ILIH(*VUM3
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5.1.3. Regional coordination platforms for SSC and TrC in LAC
At this moment, there are two spaces where functionaries responsible for international 
cooperation in the region gather and where exchange and agreements on SSC and TrC are 
promoted:12 the Ibero-American Programme for Strengthening South–South cooperation 
(IAPSSC) has been a key instrument for political discussion and the development of 
SLHYUPUNHUKRUV^OV^"IHZLKVU[OPZRUV^OV^[OLJ\YYLU[S`WYLKVTPUH[PUNKLÄUP[PVUZ 
of these instruments have been developed. This programme has also aerved as an 
PTWVY[HU[IHZLMVY[OL[LJOUPJHS[YHPUPUNVMWLYZVUULS^VYRPUNPU[OLÄLSKVMJVVWLYH[PVU
More recently, the creation of the Working Group on International Cooperation of CELAC 
provided a new forum for dialogue and exchange for the entire LAC region. In 2014, 
[OPZNYV\WHWWYV]LKH¸*VUJLW[\HS-YHTL^VYR MVY 0U[LYUH[PVUHS*VVWLYH[PVU¹ *,3(*
H^OPJOYL]PL^ZOPZ[VY `YLHɉYTZWYPUJPWSLZHUKWYVWVZLZHJVUZLUZ\HS]PZPVUVM
cooperation in the region, based on agreements and previous organisations. 
As a result, in LAC two very similar concepts of SSC coexist, each one with particular 
nuances. On one hand, a SSC concept restricted to the mode of technical cooperation 
which was set up within the framework of IAPSSC and which facilitates the sistematisation 
of statistical information which is limited to SSC actions and projects in the region. It is 
a programme set up by the Ibero-American cooperation which addresses cooperation 
as a policy –in the sense of a public policy– and which seeks to strengthen capacities 
of systemisation and management. On the other hand, there is a wider concept related 
to integration and regional political consensus, which is being consolidated within the 
framework of CELAC. The conceptual framework of CELAC addresses SSC from a wider 
WVSP[PJHSWLYZWLJ[P]LPU[OLZLUZLVMWVSP[PJZJVUZPKLYPUNKPɈLYLU[MVYTZHUKHPTZ^OPJO
could contribute to consolidating the integration of the region under the umbrella of a Latin 
American and Caribbean identity. While including technical cooperation in a substantive 
manner, this concept also extends in scope of goals to processes and mechanisms of 
Z\IYLNPVUHS PU[LNYH[PVU 0UHKKP[PVU P[LZ[HISPZOLZ [OH[ [OLWYPVYP[`K\YPUNHÄYZ[Z[HNL
be focused on the region and that the two areas “cooperation between regional and 
sub-regional integration mechanisms” and “cooperation at the intra-regional level” be 
promoted. Still, we can exect that the establishment of a global development agenda and 
the bi-regional relations EU-ECLAC which have acquired more weight, will nurture this 
ÄLSKVMJVVWLYH[PVU^P[OUL^PTW\SZLZ
12 0[ PZ PTWVY[HU[ [V RLLW PU TPUK [OH[ IHZLK VU H TVYL [LJOUPJHS WYVÄSL ,*3(* OHZ HSZV KL]LSVWLK PUP[PH[P]LZ 
 HUK KVJ\TLU[Z ^P[OPU [OL :V\[O:V\[O *VVWLYH[PVU *VTTP[[LL 0[ OHZ HSZV WYV]PKLK Z\WWVY[ MVY [OL 
 YLZWLJ[P]LPUP[PH[P]LZVM[OL,J\HKVYPHU7YV;LTWVYL7YLZPKLUJ`VM*,3(*
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5.2. National institutional frameworks for international cooperation 
Regulatory frameworks and the forms of organisation are the two pillars which shape 
the institutions of development cooperation. In order to devise a “map” of these 
institutions in LAC, information on both aspects is provided in 31 countries.13 It starts 
VɈI`KPZ[PUN\PZOPUN [OLKPɈLYLU[ YVSLZWSH`LKI` JV\U[YPLZ PU YLZWLJ[ VM PU[LYUH[PVUHS
JVVWLYH[PVUHUKPKLU[PÄLZH¸THW¹^OPJOZOV^Z[OH[[OLJV\U[YPLZ·PUKLWLUKLU[MYVT
their heterogeneity— do share some common characteristics. As a general observation 
on SSC in the region, taking as a basis the IAPSSC report 2013-2014 on SSC in Ibero-
America,14 most countries assume the role of recipients, whereas nine countries play a 
dual role (recipients and providers), and two are mainly providers. It should be noted that 
[OLVɈLYVM JVVWLYH[PVUOHZJVUJLU[YH[LKVU [OYLLVM [OL SHYNLZ[ HUKTVZ[ PUÅ\LU[PHS 
 
countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), which were responsible for 
approximately 70% of that cooperation. This picture is altered if DAC data are taken into 
HJJV\U[HZ[OLZLNP]LL]PKLUJLVM[OLÅV^Z[V^HYKZ4L_PJVHUK)YHaPS^OPJOOH]LH
dual role within this extended framework (see Table 5).
In terms of regulatory frameworks for development cooperation, Mexico, Peru and 
=LULa\LSHOH]LLUHJ[LKNLULYHSSH^ZHS[OV\NO[OLZLKPɈLY^PKLS`PUVYPNPUZJVWLHUK
content.15 In the absence of a general law, countries such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic dispose of laws regulating 
ZWLJPÄJHZWLJ[ZVMPU[LYUH[PVUHSJVVWLYH[PVU16 In a third group, general state regulations 
on administrative functions and procedures are applied to international cooperation.
In half of the countries the institutional structures for development cooperation are linked 
[VTPUPZ[YPLZVMMVYLPNUHɈHPYZ;OPZPZ[OLJHZLVM(YNLU[PUH=LULa\LSH7HUHTH7HYHN\H`
and El Salvador, these institutions dispose of several layers of hierarchy within ministries 
·]PJL TPUPZ[YPLZ ZLJYL[HYPH[Z VY NV]LYUTLU[ KLWHY[TLU[Z· ^OPJO HYL ZWLJPÄJHSS`
YLZWVUZPISL MVY JVVYKPUH[PUN PU[LYUH[PVUHS JVVWLYH[PVU YLJLP]LK HUKVY VɈLYLK I` [OL
country. In other cases, particularly in the Caribbean, cooperation is not coordinated 
 
 ;OLYL PZ H JVUZPKLYHISL ZJHYJP[` VM KH[H LZWLJPHSS` MVY ZTHSS *HYPIILHU JV\U[YPLZ ;OL KPѝJ\S[` [V VI[HPU 
 PUMVYTH[PVUVU7\LY[V9PJVWYVTW[LK[OLH\[OVYZ[VL_JS\KL[OPZJV\U[Y`MYVT[OPZHUHS`ZPZ
14 0[ PZ PTWVY[HU[ [V ILHY PU TPUK [OH[ [OPZ YLWVY[ VUS` JVUZPKLYZ WYVQLJ[Z HUK HJ[PVUZ IHZLK VU PUMVYTH[PVU WYV]PKLK 
 I` Z[H[LZ ;OLZL OH]L ILLU [OL JVTTVU PUKPJH[VYZ HNYLLK \WVU I` JV\U[YPLZ WHY[PJPWH[PUN PU [OL 0(7::* ;OPZ 
 WYVJLK\YL JHUUV[ M\SS` HJJV\U[ MVY [OL LU[PYL HTV\U[ VM YLZV\YJLZ TVIPSPZLK I` LHJO JV\U[Y` HUK [OL KH[H 
 JHUUV[ IL JVTWHYLK [V [OL PUMVYTH[PVU WYV]PKLK I` [OL *(+ :[PSS [OPZ WYVJLK\YL JHU WYV]PKL \Z ^P[O HU PKLH 
 VU[OLTHPUYVSLVMLHJOJV\U[Y`PU3(*
15 4L_PJV»Z 3H^ VU 0U[LYUH[PVUHS *VVWLYH[PVU MVY +L]LSVWTLU[ PZ [OL TVZ[ PUUV]H[P]L PU [OPZ YLNHYK 0[ OHZ ILLU 
 KLZPNULK [HRPUN PU[V HJJV\U[ 4L_PJV»Z K\HS YVSL PU PU[LYUH[PVUHS JVVWLYH[PVU HUK LZ[HISPZOLZ [OL PUZ[P[\[PVUHS 
 HYJOP[LJ[\YL MVY JVVYKPUH[PVU VWLYH[PVU YLNPZ[YH[PVU HUK KPќ\ZPVU PU HKKP[PVU [V [OL HKTPUPZ[YH[PVU HUK 
 ÄZJHSPZH[PVUVMYLZV\YJLZKLZ[PULKMVYJVVWLYH[PVUHJ[PVUZ
 0U ]HYPV\Z JHZLZ HWWSPJHISL SLNPZSH[PVU KLYP]LZ MYVT YLN\SH[PVUZ JYLH[LK I` [OL HNLUJ` VY IVK` VM [OL JV\U[Y` 
 YLZWVUZPISLMVYPU[LYUH[PVUHSJVVWLYH[PVU
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^P[OPUHZWLJPÄJVYNHUPZH[PVUHSHYLHL]LU[OV\NOP[PZHKZJYPILK[V[OLTPUPZ[Y`VMMVYLPNU
relations. Six other countries —Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay— 
dispose of their own international cooperation agencies with variable degrees of hierarchy, 
functional dependence and autonomy,17 but which share the same original design of 
managing cooperation received by the country, and which have incorporated SSC with 
varying degrees of intensity. 
The institutional outlook is therefore heterogeneous and this has practical implications in 
the moment in which all those responsible for cooperation sit down together at the table. 
At the same time, there is evidence of an institutional set up in transition which is still 
not well equipped to address the current transformations of an international cooperation 
system in which the velocity of change of its organisational structures has lagged behind 
the changes at the discursive level.
 ;OL HNLUJPLZ VM )YHaPS4L_PJV HUK 7LY\ HYL KLWLUKLU[ VU VY H[[HJOLK [V [OL4PUPZ[Y` VM -VYLPNU (ќHPYZ ^OLYLHZ 
 <Y\N\H` HUK *VSVTIPH HYL KLJLU[YHSPZLK IVKPLZ SPURLK [V [OL WYLZPKLUJ`" PU *OPSL [OL (.*0 PZ H KLJLU[YHSPZLK 
 W\ISPJZLY]PJL
Table 5. Categorisation of countries according to their role  
in LAC South-South Cooperation
Dual Recipient Provider
Argentina
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Honduras
Panama
Uruguay
Venezuela
Antigua y Barbuda
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Dominica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Granada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Dominican Republic
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Vincent and the Gre-
nadines 
Saint Lucia
Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil
Mexico
Source: authors’ adaptation based on SEGIB 2014: 37-38.
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5.3. Experiences of South-South and Triangular Cooperation
According to the 2013-2014 Report on SSC in Latin America carried out by SEGIB (2014), 
Latin American countries have undertaken a total of 506 projects and 203 bilateral South–
:V\[O JVVWLYH[PVU HJ[PVUZ PU  ;OLZL ÄN\YLZ OH]L ILLUTHPU[HPULK H[ [OPZ SL]LS
with only minor variations over the last three years.18 Almost 40% of the projects were 
concerned with strengthening the economy, and most of these— 70%— were designed 
to support productive activities, and the rest were dedicated to creating infrastructures 
HUK LJVUVTPJ ZLY]PJLZ PU LULYN` HUK ZJPLU[PÄJ HUK [LJOUVSVNPJHS HWWSPJH[PVUZ ;OL
support for social policies and other activities in areas such as public management, 
security, justice and human rights accounted for the remaining 60% of projects in almost 
equal proportions. 
Aside from some limitations in terms of methods and scope, available case studies and 
systematisations of experiences with SSC and TrC (UNDP 2009; Alonso, Aguirre and 
:HU[HUKLY"2LYUHUK>LPZZ[H\I"70-*::";HZZHYH"=maX\La
have evidenced a growing and diverse spectrum of actions and projects developed in 
LAC. In this context some advantages of SSC become evident, such as the provision 
of solutions deriving from similar experiences, the type of relationship forged between 
parties based on a common identity —“the South”, “developing countries”— and the 
dynamics of complex learning which exceed the scope of a mere transfer mechanism. 
([[OLZHTL[PTL[OL`PTWS`[OLKPZZLTPUH[PVUVMRUV^SLKNL[OLHKHW[H[PVU[VHKPɈLY-
ent reality and mutual learning. The value shifted to experience is higher than that of the 
acquisition of theoretical knowledge. A particularly interesting factor concerning SSC in 
LAC is that although diverse experiences have been registered, the main actors in this 
type of cooperation have been state agencies. As sources for knowledge, experience and 
SPURZ^P[OZPTPSHYIVKPLZPU[OLYLNPVU[OL`VɈLY[OLHK]HU[HNLVM^VYRPUNPUZLJ[VYZH[ 
KPɈLYLU[SL]LSZMYVTWVSP[PJHSJVVYKPUH[PVU[V[OLKL]LSVWTLU[VMZRPSSZ19 It was also noted 
that institutions taking part in SSC processes develop management skills and consoli-
date their experience which help improving their capacities to manage programmes and 
projects.20
On the other hand, however, there do exist problems in the management of SSC.The 
abovementioned studies criticise the lack of information and transparency in respect 
 
18 0U [OL  ::* YLWVY[ VU 3H[PU (TLYPJH :,.0)   WYVQLJ[Z ^LYL YLNPZ[LYLK HUK   HJ[PVUZ MVY  
 ^OLYLHZ PU  [OLYL ^LYL   WYVQLJ[Z HUK  HJ[PVUZ ;OL KPќLYLUJL PU ÄN\YLZ MVY  HUK  JHU IL 
 WHY[S`L_WSHPULKI`[OLHIZLUJLVM*\IH^OPJOUVSVUNLYWYV]PKLKPUMVYTH[PVUMVY[OPZYLWVY[
  ;OL OLHS[O ZLJ[VY PZ HU L_JLSSLU[ L_HTWSL PU [OPZ YLNHYK ^OLYL YLNPVUHS LќVY[Z VM [OL <UHZ\Y PU ^P[O [OL 
 :V\[O(TLYPJHU 0UZ[P[\[LVM/LHS[O.V]LYUHUJL 0:(.: HUK [OL7HU(TLYPJHU/LHS[O6YNHUPZH[PVU 7(/6 ZLLR [V 
 LSPTPUH[LNSVIHSVIZ[HJSLZHUKVI[HPUZ\IZ[HU[P]LNVHSZZ\JOHZHJJLZZ[VTLKPJPULZ
20 ,_HTWSLZ PU [OPZ YLZWLJ[ HYL [OL 5H[PVUHS 0UZ[P[\[L VM (NYPJ\S[\YHS ;LJOUVSVN` 05;( PU (YNLU[PUH VY [OL )YH 
 aPSPHU(NYPJ\S[\YHS9LZLHYJO*VVWLYH[PVU,TIYHWHHUK[OL6Z^HSKV*Y\a-V\UKH[PVUPU)YHaPS
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to the resources allocated to this cooperation. These problems can be partly explained 
I`KPɉJ\S[PLZ[VX\HU[PM`[OLWHY[PJ\SHYP[`VMH[LJOUPJHSJVVWLYH[PVUIHZLKVUH]HPSHISL
JHWHJP[PLZ^ P[OPUZ[H[LHNLUJPLZ^ OPJOHYLKPɉJ\S[[VTLHZ\YLHUK[VJVTWHYL^ P[O6+(
What is more, tensions have arisen between political and technical levels, as there were 
WHY[ULYZOPWZHJJVYKLKH[[OLWVSP[PJHS SL]LS^P[OV\[[OLZ\ɉJPLU[[LJOUPJHS Q\Z[PÄJH[PVU
This fact is aggravated by the weakness of appropriate regulatory frameworks which often 
lead to ad hoc agreements. Issues also emerge at the implementation level, particularly 
K\L [V [OL SPTP[LK O\THU HUK ÄUHUJPHS YLZV\YJLZ KLZPNUH[LK MVY [OL Z`Z[LTPZH[PVU
monitoring and evaluation of actions and projects. 
(Z MVY;Y*WYVQLJ[ZHUK;Y*HJ[PVUZOH]LILLUJVUK\J[LK PU YLÅLJ[PUNH
ZPNUPÄJHU[PUJYLHZLHZJVTWHYLK[VK\YPUN^OPJOWYVQLJ[ZHUKHJ[PVUZ^LYL
registered (SEGIB, 2014). Among the results, TRc contributed to the strenghtening of 
[OLJHWHJP[PLZVU[OLWHY[VM[OLJV\U[YPLZVɈLYPUNJVVWLYH[PVU;OLYLPZHSZVL]PKLUJLVM
KPɉJ\S[PLZHUKYPZRZ^ OPJOJHUILL_WSHPULKI`ZL]LYHSMHJ[VYZ;OLOPNOS`PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPZLK
practices of traditional cooperation which are based on principles, regulations and rules 
agreed upon within the framework of DAC, are at times not particularly receptive to the 
new ways and practices of cooperation of developing countries. The strategies adopted 
by Latin American countries in respect of their acceptance of DAC criteria vary, and the 
TrC agreements seem to yield better results in cases where these criteria are accepted 
and incorporated in the cooperation policies of countries in the region. When these 
criteria are resisted, these can ensue debates and increase transaction costs. But even so 
these mechanisms provide an important channel for dialogue and for the incorporation of 
UL^TLJOHUPZTZPUZ[Y\TLU[ZHUKWYPUJPWSLZPUHJJVYKHUJL^P[O[OLWVSP[PJHSZWLJPÄJP[PLZ
VM[OLYLNPVU^OPJOVU[OLSVUN[LYTTPNO[SV^LY[OLJVZ[ZPTWSPLK-\Y[OLYTVYL[OL
weakness —or in many cases, the absence— of common frameworks for action are 
PSS\Z[YH[P]LMVY[OLKPɉJ\S[PLZ[VJVU]LY[[OPZKPHSVN\LPU[VHZL[VMJVUZLUZ\HSJYP[LYPHMVY
[OLWYHJ[PJHSPTWSLTLU[H[PVUVM[OPZTLJOHUPZT>OPSL[OLZLZWLJPÄJKPɉJ\S[PLZ[LUK[V
be resolved through negotiations, they also imply delays in the implementation of projects.
(UV[OLY ZPNUPÄJHU[KPɉJ\S[` SPLZ PU LUZ\YPUN SLHKLYZOPWVM [OLILULÄJPHY`VM H ;Y* HZ
some experiences have shown that leadership tends to be diluted in the implementation 
phase of a project. In this regard the ad hoc agreements on concrete projects might prove 
more advantageous  when compared against other mechanisms such as mixed funds, 
^OLYL[OLYLSH[PVUIL[^LLU[OLÄYZ[HUKZLJVUKVɈLYLYWYLKVTPUH[LZ·L]LU[OV\NO[OPZ
proceeding would again increase transaction costs. 
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6.1. Where are Latin America and the Caribbean situated 
in the new geography of sustainable development?
In view of initiating the SDG strategy, humankind continues to face a formidable 
challenge: almost 17% of the people on this planet live in extreme poverty, which is the 
reason why the goal to eradicate poverty by 2030 will imply the need to address the 
hardship of over one billion people. 
Which importance has been shifted to LAC in the strategy for eradicating poverty? As 
already explained above, LAC has “successfully” addressed —in aggregate terms— 
the MDG of reducing extreme poverty by half by lowering its poverty rate by almost 
8% —from 12.5% registered in 1990, to currently 4.6%— freeing almost 25 million 
Latin American and Caribbean citizens from the poverty trap. Having addressed this 
ÄYZ[JOHSSLUNL3(*UV^MHJLZ[OLWYVIHIS`TVYLJVTWSPJH[LKNVHSVMLSPTPUH[PUN[OL
YLTHPUPUNWVJRL[ZVMWV]LY[`HɈLJ[PUNHM\Y[OLYTPSSPVUWLVWSL^P[OPU[OLUL_[
years. 
>OPSL[OPZYLNPVUHSWV]LY[`ÄN\YL PZZPNUPÄJHU[^LHSZVOH]L[V[HRL PU[VHJJV\U[
the fact that “only” 3% of the poor inhabiting the planet live in. Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. Conversely, more than 80% of the world’s poor are 
concentrated in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia.In order to 
eradicate world poverty, these regions have to become a priority for international 
cooperation policies.
6   NEW GEOGRAPHY OF  
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
TOWARDS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
TAXONOMY OF SUSTAINABLE  
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
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Notwithstanding this fact, the SDG agenda is not just a strategy for combating economic 
poverty, as it also includes a wide range of universal goals for sustainable human 
KL]LSVWTLU[^ OPJOKLÄULHJVTWSL_world map of priorities. Precisely in order to facilitate 
[OLPKLU[PÄJH[PVUVM[OLZLT\S[PMHJL[LKWYPVYP[PLZHUKJOHUULSJVVWLYH[PVUWVSPJPLZKP]LYZL
T\S[PSH[LYHS IVKPLZ OH]L KYH^U \W ¸PU[LYUH[PVUHS KL]LSVWTLU[ JSHZZPÄJH[PVUZ¹ ^OPJO
NYV\W [VNL[OLYJV\U[YPLZIHZLKVUZWLJPÄJJOHSSLUNLZ MVYHK]HUJLTLU[ 0U[LYLZ[PUNS `
[OLTVZ[MYLX\LU[S`\ZLKJSHZZPÄJH[PVUPZH[[OLZHTL[PTL[OLTVZ[ZPTWSPZ[PJVUL![OL
ranking of per capita income compiled annually by the World Bank.21 While its simplicity 
PZ P[ZWYPUJPWHS]PY[\L [OPZJSHZZPÄJH[PVU MHPSZ [VL_WSHPU [OL¸NLVNYHWO`¹VMZ\Z[HPUHISL
development in the 21stJLU[\Y `0UHJJVYKHUJL^P[O[OPZJSHZZPÄJH[PVU[OLTHQVYP[`VM[OL
world’s poor no longer live in lower income countries, but rather —according to Sumner’s 
estimates (2012)— approximately three quarters of the poor live in MIC as a result of the 
pockets of poverty that continue to prevail in those countries with huge middle income 
populations, mainly China, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia and Brazil.22
LAC’s place in this new geography of development is therefore ambiguous: as a 
WYLKVTPUHU[S`TPKKSLPUJVTLYLNPVUP[KVLZUV[ÄN\YLWYVTPULU[S`PU[OL^VYSK»ZWV]LY[ `
Thus, there is a risk in that the international community will interpret, or rather, misinterpret 
·HZVJJ\YYLK^P[O[OL4+.·[OLZLÄN\YLZHUK[OH[P[HZZ\TLZ[OH[3(*PZUV[HWYPVYP[`
MVY [OLUL^:+.HNLUKH.P]LU [OH[ [OL [YHKP[PVUHSJSHZZPÄJH[PVUVM PUJVTLZWYV]PKLZ
VUS`Z\WLYÄJPHSPUMVYTH[PVUVM[OLYLNPVUHSKL]LSVWTLU[JOHSSLUNLZP[ZLLTZHWWYVWYPH[L
[V HUHS`ZL [OL WVZP[PVUZ VJJ\WPLK I` 3(* PU [OL [OYLL TVZ[ PUÅ\LU[PHS PU[LYUH[PVUHS
JSHZZPÄJH[PVUZ![OLHMVYLTLU[PVULK>VYSK)HURJSHZZPÄJH[PVUIHZLKVUPUJVTLWLYJHWP[H"
+(*»ZJSHZZPÄJH[PVU^OPJOKPZ[PUN\PZOLZIL[^LLU¸KL]LSVWLKJV\U[YPLZ¹·IHZPJHSS`OPNO
PUJVTLJV\U[YPLZHJJVYKPUN[V[OL>VYSK)HURJSHZZPÄJH[PVU·HUK¸KL]LSVWPUNJV\U[YPLZ
and territories” —low income, middle to low income and middle to high income countries 
HJJVYKPUN[V[OL>VYSK)HUR^OPJOHYLWV[LU[PHS6+(YLJPWPLU[Z·"HUK[OLJSHZZPÄJH[PVU
of the UNDP measuring levels of human development which is based on the Human 
Development Index (HDI).
By applying these three criteria to the LAC context it is possible to assess the degree 
[V ^OPJO KL]LSVWTLU[ JSHZZPÄJH[PVUZ JVPUJPKL!23 of the 41 countries in LAC, 12 are 
“developed countries”  —that is high income— and the remaining 29 are “developing 
countries and territories”, of which only one is a low income country, several are middle 
to low income, 18 are middle to high income, and three are already high income countries 
which by 2017 will no longer feature on the list of DAC recipients. In HDI terms, three 
 
21 4VYL ZWLJPÄJHSS` [OL >VYSK )HUR L]HS\H[LZ [OL .YVZZ 5H[PVUHS 7YVK\J[ .+7 per capita iU <: +VSSHYZ HWWS`PUN 
 [OL ¸([SHZ TL[OVK¹ [V JVTWLUZH[L Å\J[\H[PVUZ PU L_JOHUNL YH[LZ PU [OL JVTWHYPZVU IL[^LLU JV\U[YPLZ» 
 UH[PVUHSPUJVTLZ
22 -VYHYL]PL^VM[OLKPZJ\ZZPVUVU[OLUL^NLVNYHWO`VMWV]LY[`HUKPULX\HSP[ `ZLL:HUHO\QH
 :LL[OLM\SS[HISLVMJSHZZPÄJH[PVUZPU(UUL_
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countries account for very high levels of human development, 22 for high levels, seven 
for a medium level, and one for a low level of human development; the remaining eights 
countries are not included in the UNDP index. To summarise, LAC is a predominantly 
middle-high income region with a high rate of human development. Despite the fact 
that the indexes coincide on a general level, some discrepancies stand out between the 
JSHZZPÄJH[PVU I` PUJVTL SL]LSZ >VYSK)HUR HUK+(* HUK JSHZZPÄJH[PVU HJJVYKPUN [V
human development levels (UNDP): only one high income country (Chile) achieves high 
levels of HDI; and two UMIC (Argentina and Cuba) display a very high level of human 
development, whereas the remaining UMIC account for a high human development. It is 
also important to highlight the fact that three UMIC (Panama, Brazil and Venezuela) are 
very close to overcoming the high income threshold and so – in the foreseeable future – 
they will be the next three to join the group of developed countries, despite the fact that 
they have not achieved the highest level of human development. 
6.2. An alternative taxonomy for Latin America and the Caribbean based
on Sustainable Development Goals 
0[PZUV[LHZ`[VJSHZZPM`JV\U[YPLZIHZLKVU[OLPYKL]LSVWTLU[SL]LSZÄYZ[S `ILJH\ZL[OL
]LY`KLÄUP[PVUVM [OLJVUJLW[ ¸KL]LSVWTLU[¹ PZ H JVTWSL_HUKT\S[PKPTLUZPVUHS VUL
In addition, the socio-economic realities of the countries are very diverse and subject 
[VJOHUNLZ^OPJOTHRLZ P[KPɉJ\S[ [VJHYY`V\[\UP]LYZHSS` ]HSPKHUHS`ZLZ 0U MHJ[ HZ
Nielsen (2012) points out, there does not exist one single classifying criterion —based on 
development theory or on an objective point of reference— which would be “generally 
accepted”.
0UHKKP[PVU[V[OLZLJVUJLW[\HSKPɉJ\S[PLZ[OLYLHYLKPɈLYLU[WYVJLK\YLZMVYLZ[HISPZOPUN
JSHZZPÄJH[PVUZVMJV\U[YPLZVUJL[OLPUKPJH[P]L]HYPHISLZMVYSL]LSZVMKL]LSVWTLU[OH]L
been selected. In the cases of the World Bank and the UNDP, the groups are created by the 
use of an ordinal indicator which implies determining in an arbitrary manner the adequate 
number of groups of countries and the thresholds that separate the aforementioned 
NYV\WZ*VU]LYZLS`·HZ^PSSILZOV^UILSV^·[OLHUHS`ZPZVMJVUNSVTLYH[LZJHUVɈLYH
TVYLU\HUJLKHUKVIQLJ[P]LZ[H[PZ[PJHS[LJOUPX\LHZJVTWHYLK[V[OLÄ_PUNVMHZWLJPÄJ
development indicator.24
24 6[OLY LHYSPLY Z[\KPLZ ^OPJO OH]L LSHIVYH[LK KL]LSVWTLU[ [H_VUVTPLZ I` HUHS`ZPUN JVUNSVTLYH[LZ ^LYL 
 ;LaHUVZ HUK 8\P|VULZ  MVY [OL JHZL VM 40* PU 3(* HUK ;LaHUVZ HUK :\TULY  HUK :\TULY HUK 
 ;LaHUVZMVYHSS¸KL]LSVWPUNJV\U[YPLZ¹
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6.2.1. Classification procedure: analysis of clusters of 
sustainable development dimensions
;OL JVUZ[Y\J[PVU VM HU PU[LYUH[PVUHS JSHZZPÄJH[PVU VM KL]LSVWTLU[ OHZ [V KLWHY[ MYVT
HJSLHY PKLU[PÄJH[PVUVM [OL ¸KPTLUZPVUZ¹ [VILL]HS\H[LK.P]LU [OH[ [OL PU[LYUH[PVUHS
community has already identifyed the prioritised goals of the international development 
HNLUKH PU [OPZ Z[\K` [OL JSHZZPÄJH[PVU ZOHSS ILIHZLKVU [OLWYPUJPWHS KPTLUZPVUZVM
[OL:+. -VSSV^PUN [OL ÄUKPUNZVM [OLWYL]PV\Z ZLJ[PVUZ [OPZ Z[YH[LN` JVTIPULZ [^V
converging agendas: on one hand the human development agenda inherited from the 
MDG and on the other the sustainable development agenda resulting from the four Earth 
Summits. 
It is important to clarify that the concept of sustainable development has evolved in 
recent times, in the heat of the debate on the post-2015 agenda. The Earth Summits, and 
PUWHY[PJ\SHY¸9PV¹OH]LJ\STPUH[LKPUH[OYLLKPTLUZPVUHSKLÄUP[PVUVMZ\Z[HPUHISL
development that includes economic, social and environmental dimensions. Nevertheless, 
[OLÄUHSKLÄUP[PVUVM[OL:+.^PSSHKVW[HMV\YKPTLUZPVUHSJVUJLW[I`HKKPUN[OLPZZ\L
of good governance, in line with the proposals elaborated by the Open Working Group 
(UN 2012a), the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN 2013) and the 
European Union (European Commission 2013a). This procedure has been endorsed 
by the UN Secretary-General in his synthesis report on the SDG agenda (UN 2014b: 
11), which recommends integrating the following “four interdependent dimensions of 
sustainable development”: economic development (including the eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger); social inclusion; environmental sustainability; and good governance, 
(which includes peace and security).25
As a result, these four dimensions of sustainable human development shall constitute the 
basic pillars of the proposed taxonomy. In order to undertake an analysis of the clusters, 
each dimension is linked to one of the 169 goals proposed by the OWG Report on the 
:+.<5H-PUHSS`^LOH]LZLSLJ[LKVULPUKPJH[VY^OPJOHSSV^ZMVYHWWYVHJOPUN[V
each of these goals (see Table 6).
Selecting the most appropriate indicators for each dimension/target is not an easy task, 
among other things because the necessary information for evaluating many of the OWG 
proposals is still not available. As happened previously with the MDG, the SDG strategy 
^PSSWYVIHIS`IL PUP[PH[LK\UKLY [OL¸Z[H[PZ[PJHSÄJ[PVU¹VMH]HPSHISLKH[H ;LaHUV
even though in reality the compilation and systematisation of required data takes will take 
25 :LL PU [OPZ YLWVY[ WHYHNYHWO  ^OPJO JVU[LTWSH[LZ [OL YLZWLJ[P]L WYVWVZHSZ HUK WHYHNYHWOZ  [V  
 WYVWVZPUN H MYHTL^VYR ^OPJO PU[LNYH[LZ [OL [OYLL KPTLUZPVUZ VM Z\Z[HPUHISL KL]LSVWTLU[ ·LJVUVTPJ ZVJPHS 
 HUK LU]PYVUTLU[HS· ^P[O [OL LZZLU[PHS LSLTLU[Z MVY HJOPL]PUN [OLT! KLTVJYHJ ` O\THU YPNO[Z UL^ NV]LYUHUJL 
 WLHJLHUKZLJ\YP[ `
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Table 6. Dimensions of sustainable development and classification variables
Dimension of the 
development
SDG* Target Indicator Source Period
1. Economic  
development
By 2030, eradicate extreme 
poverty for all in the world
Poverty rate 
(less than 1.25$ 
per day, PPP) (% 
of the popula-
tion)
World 
Bank 
(2015b)
2012 or 
most 
recent year 
available  
2. Social inclusion By 2030, progressively 
achieve and sustain income 
growth of the bottom 40% 
of th epopulation at a rate 
higher than the national 
average 
Participation in 
the GNP of the 
poorest 40% of 
the population 
ECLAC 
(2015)  
World 
Bank 
(2015c)
2012 or 
most 
recent year 
available  
3. Environmental 
sustainability 
Integrate climate change 
measures into national poli-
cies, strategies and planning 
Carbon dioxide 
emissions per 
capita 
ECLAC 
(2015)
2010
4. Good  
governance
Substantially reduce corrup-
tion and bribery in all their 
forms 
Controling 
corruption 
Kaufmann 
et al. 
(2014)
2013
Note: * The SDG targets were selected from the UN Open Working Group proposals on the SDG (UN 2014a).
Source: Development Aid Committee 2015. Net ODA as proportion of the GDP and EU ODA 
and as proportion of the total external funding, both public and private. 
several years, thus leaving an initial period during which it will be virtually impossible to 
evaluate the progress of the agenda in most countries. Consequently, the selection of 
indicators has been guided by the practical -—and inevitable— criterion of availability. 
With respect to the statistical technique used, the analysis of hierarchical clusters 
allows for the construction of a “taxonomy” of countries with heterogeneous levels of 
KL]LSVWTLU[HUK[VKP]PKL[OLTPU[VHZWLJPÄJU\TILYVMNYV\WZ[VLUZ\YL[OH[!PLHJO
country belongs to one, and only one of the groups; iiHSSJV\U[YPLZJHUILJSHZZPÄLK"iii) 
the countries pertaining to the same group are to a certain degree, “homogenous”; and iv) 
JV\U[YPLZWLY[HPUPUN[VKPZ[PUJ[NYV\WZHYLJSLHYS`KPɈLYLU[PH[LK;OPZ[`WLVMHUHS`ZPZJHU
thus help us to identify both the “general” development characteristics of each cluster 
and the appropriate number of groups into which the countries are divided.26 In this case, 
the analysis includes 26 of the 41 Latin American countries, which accounts for 63.4% of 
the countries of this study, and 88.6% of the population of LAC.27
 4VYL ZWLJPÄJHSS ` ^L HUHS`ZLK [OL OPLYHYJOPJHS JS\Z[LYZ \ZPUN [OL >HYK TL[OVK JVTW\[PUN [OL ,\JSPKLHU 
 KPZ[HUJLZ [V [OL ZX\HYL IL[^LLU LHJO LSLTLU[ HUK Z[HUKHYKPZPUN [OL ]HYPHISLZ PU VYKLY [V JVYYLJ[ KPќLYLUJLZ VM 
 ZJHSL
 ;OL  JV\U[YPLZ L_JS\KLK MYVT [OL HUHS`ZPZ K\L [V SHJR VM PUMVYTH[PVU HYL HSS *HYPIILHU JV\U[YPLZ! *\IH 
 7\LY[V 9PJV HUK H M\Y[OLY  PZSHUK Z[H[LZ ^P[O WVW\SH[PVUZ ILSV^ OHSM H TPSSPVU PUOHIP[HU[Z (U[PN\H HUK 
 )HYI\KH (Y\IH )HOHTHZ )HYIHKVZ *H`THU 0ZSHUKZ *\YHsHV +VTPUPJH +\[JO :HPU[ 4HY[PU -YLUJO :HPU[ 
 4HY[PU :HPU[ 2P[[Z HUK 5L]PZ :HPU[ =PUJLU[ HUK [OL .YLUHKPULZ [OL ;\YRZ HUK *HPJVZ 0ZSHUKZ HUK [OL =PYNPU 
 0ZSHUKZ
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6.2.2.Principal results: SDG taxonomy of LAC
;OLHUHS`ZPZVMJS\Z[LYZNLULYH[LZHJSHZZPÄJH[PVUVMZP_JH[LNVYPLZ!VU[OLVULOHUK[OYLL
groups of Latin American and Caribbean countries, and on the other hand, three “singular” 
JV\U[YPLZ[OH[MVYT\UP[HY`NYV\WZ/HP[P1HTHPJHHUK;YPUPKHKHUK;VIHNV"ZLL;HISL
and Map 1). The six clusters can be characterised by means of a comparative analysis 
VM[OLH]LYHNLZVM[OLMV\YPUKPJH[VYZ^OPJO^LYLPUJS\KLKPU[OLJSHZZPÄJH[PVU;HISL!
;OLÄYZ[JS\Z[LYC1) comprises four Latin American and Caribbean countries with high 
levels of development but with considerable carbon dioxide emissions per capita. They 
present —on average— high incomes per capita and low poverty rates, as well as the 
ILZ[ PUKPJH[VYZ PU [LYTZVM ZVJPHS PUJS\ZPVUHUK [OLTVZ[LɈLJ[P]LJVU[YVSZ [VJVTIH[
corruption (in fact they are the only countries in the sample, along with Costa Rica 
and Belize, with positive values in this indicator). Their high level of development in 
comparative terms also presupposes that they constitute the third group with greater 
CO2 emissions per capita, which are especially high in Chile. At the same time, this is the 
most heterogeneous cluster; within the group, Chile and Saint Lucia (the countries with 
the highest and lowest income in the group respectively) are the most dissimilar cases. 
Chile distinguishes itself mainly by its high carbon dioxide emissions —which almost 
double that of the group average in per capita terms— and Saint Lucia has the highest 
incidence of poverty, three times the average of the group. 
The second cluster (C2) includes four Latin American countries with intermediate 
levels of development but with problems of corruption and pollution. On average these 
countries have the third highest income per capita and the third lowest poverty rate. 
Notwithstanding, this group of countries has extremely high levels of pollution and very 
negative indications of corruption. Although it is a relatively homogenous group, the most 
dissimilar country is Venezuela, which, despite having the highest income per capita of 
the group, has a high poverty rate, the highest carbon dioxide emissions and the highest 
levels of corruption. 
The third cluster (C3) is the biggest one (15 countries), and it includes Latin American 
and Caribbean countries with the lowest levels of development and problems of poverty, 
inequality and corruption. Thus, this group presents the third lowest income per capita and 
the third highest poverty rate, while at the same time ranked second in terms of elevated 
economic inequality, and with the second worst records of corruption. Conversely, these 
countries display low carbon dioxide emissions per capita;OLTHPUKPɈLYLUJLZ^P[OPU
this group refer to the poverty rates; with three Central American countries (Honduras, 
Guatemala and Belize) acconting for elevated rates (over 11%), whereas Costa Rica’s 
poverty rate is less than 2%.
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In addition to these three groups of countries, the analysis detected three “particular” 
countries which deserve a separate analysis:
1HTHPJH PZHWHY[PJ\SHYJV\U[Y`ILJH\ZLVM P[ZOPNO PUJPKLUJLVMWV]LY[`·[OLZLJVUK
OPNOLZ[HM[LY/HP[P·HUK[OPZPZWYLJPZLS`[OLYLHZVU^O`1HTHPJHPZUV[PUJS\KLKPU[OL
second conglomerate (C2), with which it shares considerable similarities.
Haiti has the worst levels of development: it is a country with a low per capita income— 
almost 63% less than the next low income country on the list, Honduras—, with the 
OPNOLZ[ WV]LY[` SL]LS·  WLYJLU[ OPNOLY [OHU 1HTHPJH·^P[O [OL SV^LZ[ LJVUVTPJ
participation of the poorest population (together with Honduras) and with the most 
negative corruption levels. At the same time, it constitutes the country with the least 
carbon dioxide emissions per person, in this case followed by Guatemala.
Conversely, Trinidad and Tobago is the country with the highest income per person and 
with the lowest incidence of poverty (after Uruguay and Chile) and economic inequality 
(after Granada and Saint Lucia). It is therefore a country similar to those in group C1, 
except for the CO2 emissions per capita which are by far the highest in LAC, converting 
it into an atypical case. 
As for the regional distribution of the poor population (Table 9), most of them (almost 
60%), live in countries pertaining to the largest cluster (C3), principally due to the region’s 
population giant, Brazil, which accounts for the largest share of the poor in this group (and 
30% of LAC). Around 20% of the poor live in the C2 countries (more than half of them in 
4L_PJV-\Y[OLYTVYL/HP[PJVU[YPI\[LZVM[OLYLNPVU»ZWVVY·[HRPUNPU[VHJJV\U[P[Z
extremely high incidence of poverty. The remaining 1% of the poor is distributed among 
the C1 countries and Trinidad and Tobago.
0UJVU[YHZ[[V[OLWYL]PV\ZKPZ[YPI\[PVU[OLJVU]LU[PVUHSJSHZZPÄJH[PVUI`PUJVTLSL]LSZ
creates a greater concentration of poverty: two thirds of the poor live in the middle to 
high income stratum —which includes Brazil and Mexico—and the remaining third is 
distributed among the high income, middle to low, and low income countries. As a result, 
PU [OL 3(* YLNPVU [OL JSHZZPÄJH[PVU VM JV\U[YPLZ I` PUJVTL SL]LS NLULYH[LZ [OL ZHTL
inconsistency as at a global level; it is not the poorest countries —in the LAC context, 
these are low income and middle to low income countries— which concentrate the 
highest numbers of the poor, but instead the UMIC. 
The here-presented LAC taxonomy provides important complementary information to 
[OLJSHZZPÄJH[PVUI`PUJVTL;OLWYVWVZLK[H_VUVT`PU[LNYH[LZ[OLMV\YKPTLUZPVUZVM
sustainable development included in the SDG strategy (economic development, social 
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Table 7. LAC countries’ membership in clusters
Country Cluster 
mem-
bership
GNP 
per 
capita
Position 
according 
to per 
capita
income
Classification ac-
cording to per capita 
income
Poverty 
rate
Partici-
pation 
poorest 
40%
CO2 
per 
capi-
ta
Cor-
ruption 
control
Chile 1 15.230 2 High income 0.83 12.4 4.22 1.52
Uruguay 1 15.180 3 High income 0.25 17.2 1.97 1.34
Granada 1 7.460 12 Middle to high income 2.4 17 2.49 0.41
St. Lucia 1 7.090 13 Middle to high income 11.75 15.1 2.31 1.17
Venezuela 2 12.550 4 Middle to high income 5.58 15.6 6.96 -1.28
Argentina 2 11.700 5 Middle to high income 1.41 14.1 4.47 -0.46
Mexico 2 9.940 8 Middle to high income 3.26 12.8 3.91 -0.48
Surinam 2 9.260 10 Middle to high income 10.52 10.4 4.54 -0.38
Brazil 3 11.690 6 Middle to high income 4.53 9.8 2.15 -0.12
Panama 3 10.700 7 Middle to high income 3.55 10.6 2.74 -0.36
Costa 
Rica
3 9.550 9 Middle to high income 1.36 11.6 1.67 0.59
Colombia 3 7.560 11 Middle to high income 4.95 10.6 1.63 -0.44
Peru 3 6.390 14 Middle to high income 2.97 13.4 1.98 -0.44
Domi-
nican 
Republic
3 5.620 15 Middle to high income 2.54 10.8 2.11 -0.85
Ecuador 3 5.510 16 Middle to high income 4.04 13.2 2.26 -0.61
Belize 3 4.660 18 Middle to high income 11.29 11 1.35 0.02
Paraguay 3 4.040 19 Middle to low income 4.43 10 0.79 -1.04
Guyana 3 3.750 20 Middle to low income 5.33 12.7 2.25 -0.64
El Salva-
dor
3 3.720 21 Middle to low income 2.82 14.6 1.01 -0.35
Guate-
mala
3 3.340 22 Middle to low income 13.7 9 0.77 -0.58
Bolivia 3 2.550 23 Middle to low income 6.97 12.2 1.56 -0.59
Honduras 3 2.180 24 Middle to low income 16.48 8.6 1.07 -0.95
Nicaragua 3 1.780 25 Middle to low income 6.83 12.8 0.79 -0.73
Jamaica 4 5.220 17 Middle to high income 32.49 14.4 2.61 -0.37
Trinidad 
and  
Tobago
5 15.760 1 High income 1.15 15.8 37.78 -0.35
Haiti 6 810 26 Low income 51.6 8.6 0.21 -1.15
The clusters are numbered in order of increasing income per capita of the countries included.
The indicators relating to the per capita income (columns three, four and five) are included as a  
reference although they are not part of the conglomerate analyses. 
Source:  authors’ elaboration, based on sources indicated in Table 6.
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PUJS\ZPVU LU]PYVUTLU[HS Z\Z[HPUHIPSP[` HUKNVVKNV]LYUHUJL HUKKPɈLYZ UV[HIS` MYVT
[OL JSHZZPÄJH[PVU HJJVYKPUN [V PUJVTL SL]LSper capita. Thus, although the two initial 
clusters, on average terms, group together the countries with the highest incomes, the 
third cluster includes two of the richest countries (Brazil and Panama) together with a 
considerable number of countries with incomes much lower than those with which they 
share similar development challenges. In short, these results reveal that beyond overtly 
ZPTWSLHUK¸LJVUVTPZ[PJ¹JSHZZPÄJH[PVUZZ\JOHZ[OVZLIHZLKVUPUJVTLper capita there 
is no “monotonically increasing” distribution of development levels, ranging from a group 
of countries with the worst records in all indicators to another group with better results in 
all]HYPHISLZ*VU]LYZLS `[OLWYLZLU[T\S[PKPTLUZPVUHS[H_VUVT`VɈLYZTVYLJVTWSL_
HUKKPɈLYLU[PH[LKNYV\WPUNZHSSV^PUN[OLYLI`[OLPKLU[PÄJH[PVUVMIV[OJOHSSLUNLZHUK
opportunities for progress in any of the clusters.
Map 1. SDG Taxonomies of LAC countries
Source: authors’ elaboration
 C1
 C2
 C3
 Jamaica
 Trinidad and Tobago
 Haiti
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Table 8. Socioeconomic characteristics of the clusters
GNP per 
capita
Poverty 
rate
Partici-
pation of 
poorest 
40% 
CO2 per 
capita
Corruption 
control 
C1 (4 
countries)
Median 11.240 3.81 15.43 2.75 1.11
Typical devia-
tion
4.581 5.37 2.23 1.01 0.49
Minimum 7.090 0.25 12.4 1.97 0.41
Maximum 15.230 11.75 17.20 4.22 1.52
C2 (4 
countries)
Median 10.863 5.19 13.23 4.97 -0.65
Typical devia-
tion
1.524 3.94 2.21 1.36 0.42
Minimum 9.260 1.41 10.4 3.91 -1.28
Maximum 12.550 10.52 15.60 6.96 -0.38
C3 (15 
countries)
Median 5.536 6.12 11.39 1.61 -0.47
Typical devia-
tion
3.095 4.37 1.73 0.63 0.41
Minimum 1.780 1.36 8.6 0.77 -1.04
Maximum 11.690 16.48 14.60 2.74 0.59
Jamaica 5.220 32,49 14.4 2.61 -0.37
Trinidad and Tobago 15.760 1,15 15.8 37.78 -0.35
Haiti 810 51,6 8.6 0.21 -1.15
Total (26 
countries)
Median 7.432 8.19 12.47 3.68 -0.27
Typical devia-
tion
4.387 11.14 2.50 7.11 0.73
Minimum 810 0.25 8.6 0.21 -1.28
Maximum 15.760 51.60 17.20 37.78 1.52
Source: authors’ elaboration, based on sources indicated in Table 6.
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Table 9. Poverty distribution in LAC clusters
Poverty 
rate (%)
Population 
(millions)
Number 
of poor 
(millions)
Participa-
tion in 
regional 
poverty (%)
C1 3.81 20.98 0.18 0.58
C2 5.19 187.44 6.06 19.89
C2 without Mexico 5.84 71.48 2.28 7.48
C3 6.12 360.17 18.17 59.68
C3 without Brazil 6.23 163.23 9.25 30.38
Jamaica 32.49 2.62 0.85 2.80
Trinidad and Tobago 1.15 1.33 0.02 0.05
Haiti 51.6 10.03 5.18 17.00
High income countries 0.74 22.02 0.17 0.55
Middle to high income countries 6.84 498.17 20.17 66.25
Middle to low income countries 8.08 52.34 4.93 16.19
Low income country (Haiti) 51.60 10.03 5.18 17.00
Not included in the analysis  (15 
countries)
n.d. 74.89 n.d. n.d.
Total LAC 4.63 657.45 30.44 100.00
Source: authors’ elaboration, based on sources indicated in Table 6. 
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7.1. The construction of the bi-regional strategic partnership: 
points of departure and sectorial agendas 
(YV\UK`LHYZHM[LY[OLÄYZ[IPYLNPVUHSZ\TTP[[OL,<HUK3(*HYLJ\YYLU[S`ÄUKPUN
themselves in a moment of stocktaking and amidst a change of a cycle (Sanahuja 2015). 
(YLÅLJ[PVUVM[OLstatus quo seems necessary in light of the global changes and other 
developments which have occurred in both regions and which will have an impact on 
[OL M\[\YL VM IPYLNPVUHS YLSH[PVUZOPW ;OL JVU[L_[ PU  JV\SK IL IYPLÅ` KLZJYPILK
HZ MVSSV^Z! IV[O YLNPVUZ OH]L L_WLYPLUJLK ZPNUPÄJHU[ JOHUNLZ HUK [OLYL OHZ ILLU H
considerable readjustment of their relations, which now tend to be more balanced and 
horizontal, independent from the fact that major asymmetries still exist. Internationally, 
NLVWVSP[PJHSHUKLJVUVTPJJOHUNLZOH]LHɈLJ[LK[OLWHY[ULYZOPW·[OLPU[LYHJ[PVUVM[OL
3H[PU(TLYPJHUJV\U[YPLZ^ P[O[OL(ZPH7HJPÄJYLNPVUHUK^ P[O)90*:HUK[OLPYYLZWLJ[P]L
initiatives, or the attempt to revive the North Atlantic region through the TTIP—, as well 
as the new post-2015 development agenda which is discussed in the present study. As 
indicated above, these developments coincide with the strengthening of Latin American 
::*HUK[OLYLKLÄUP[PVUVM,<»ZKL]LSVWTLU[WVSPJ `
The bi-regional strategic partnership between the EU and LAC may play an important role 
PUWVZ[NSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[PUZL]LYHSHZWLJ[Z0U[OLÄYZ[WSHJLI`JVU[YPI\[PUN^ P[O
their particular vision of democracy and its components of cohesion and social inclusion. 
Secondly, by promoting the establishment of a consensual political framework. The EU 
and LAC could jointly help shaping the structure of world governance of development, 
7   COOPERATION BETWEEN  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE  
CARIBBEAN AND THE FUTURE  
OF THE BI-REGIONAL STRATEGIC  
PARTNERSHIP
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setting goals and a methodology for sustainable development and incorporating the 
themes of social inclusion and cohesion. Thirdly, by means of a dialogue and bi-regional 
cooperation which at the same time would provide the partnership with a strategic 
meaning; on the basis of a “development pact” with which the two regions could jointly 
WYVTV[L [OL:+(HNLUKH PUÄ]LHYLHZ!KLTVJYHJ`HUKZVJPHSJVOLZPVU! YLNPVUHSPZT
and integration: higher education (HE) science, technology and innovation (STI); and 
climate change. 
0UJYLHZPUNJVVWLYH[PVU PU [OLZLÄ]LHYLHZJV\SKZ[YLUN[OLUHUKL_[LUKIPYLNPVUHS
dialogue on the post-2015 development agenda. These areas are crucial to the 
development debate in the following way: social cohesion involves social, labour and 
taxation policies. Cooperation in HE and STI is required to enhance social cohesion 
and is central to the improvement of productivity and international competitiveness by 
means of technical advancement. This, in turn, helps to transforming the production 
matrix in LAC which is still very dependent on the extraction of natural resources 
—and which constitutes the reason for the external dependence and the increasing 
deterioration of the terms of exchange for the region— and to directing production 
towards sectors with greater aggregated technological value. In addition, the 
strengthening of HE and STI improves the employability conditions of workers in the 
region, especially for the young generation. And all of this will result in improvements 
of equity and social development indicators. Moreover, reforms in the educational 
Z`Z[LT PUJS\KPUN OPNOLY LK\JH[PVU ^PSS HSZV OH]L H KLTVJYH[PZPUN LɈLJ[ PU [OL
construction of citizenship.
However, it must be emphasised that the results will depend on the way in which 
economic, political and social tensions are resolved in each of the regions; how some 
problems linked to the state of regionalism are addressed on either side of the Atlantic 
—the EU crises (Sanahuja, 2012a) and the multiple and overlapping regional projects of 
LAC—;how asymmetries between the regions are dealt with, and how all this plays out in 
the search of forms of partnership which will be strengthened by actions for development 
cooperation undertaken by each region through NSC and SSC, respectively. 
7.2. Democracy and social cohesion
Both regions are committed to the goal of more inclusive societies and this is a condition 
as well as the result of a democratic regime and a participating citizenry. The promotion 
of social cohesion was addressed from the start of the strategic partnership, and from the 
Guadalajara Summit (2004) onwards, it has been considered a priority. 
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:VJPHSJVOLZPVU·HKPZW\[LKHUKZVTL[PTLZ^YVUNS`KLÄULKJVUJLW[HUKHJVUJLW[
VM ,\YVWLHU VYPNPU -00(77 " :HUHO\QH · PZ JVUJLP]LK HZ HU PUZ[Y\TLU[
and methodology for promoting social policies directed enhance wellbeing and social 
development based on equity; it is therefore a concept which gives meaning and content 
to the economic and social aspects of democracy and the rights of citizens. In LAC, 
HS[OV\NOX\LZ[PVULKPUP[PHSS `[OPZJVUJLW[OHZILLUPUJVYWVYH[LKHUKYLKLÄULKIHZLKVU
the reality of the region and the prevailing claims for social inclusion (ECLAC 2007). There 
has been a rapprochement between the regions on the concept of social cohesion which 
OHZILLUHɈLJ[LKI`[OLKPɈLYLU[WLYZWLJ[P]LZVU[OLWVSPJPLZ[OH[Z\Z[HPU[OPZJVUJLW[
in the EU, which have been exacerbated by the crisis; beyond ECLAC conceptualisations 
in LAC no homogenous articulation of this concept for public policies exists. In this 
region, perspectives on social cohesion policies —that is, not only social but also labour 
HUK[H_H[PVUWVSPJPLZ·KPɈLYMYVTJV\U[Y`[VJV\U[Y `/V^L]LYPUYLJLU[`LHYZNYLH[LY
consensus has been generated regarding the need to perceive social policies in a 
comprehensive manner and to promote social and citizens’ pacts. Precisely with regard 
to this latter aspect institutional spaces have been created in order to address social 
development in various sub-regional bodies (Mercosur, Unasur, and SICA) as well as in 
disctinct forums held between Latin American Ministries of Social Development. 
The main bi-regional programme for promoting social cohesion is EUROSociAL, which 
aims to bring about changes in public policies for improving social cohesion through a 
more horizontal methodology of peer learning, the exchange of experiences between 
the two regions’ institutions, in particular those in charge of education, health, justice, 
tax policies and employment. The programme was successful and has led to increased 
networks and exchanges of experiences between the agencies involved, as well as to the 
initiation of innovative processes in social policies. Notwithstanding, the assessments 
of this programme yield three major conclusions: the countries which transferred 
most knowhow were those with the highest domestic levels of development in LAC; 
[OLWHY[PJPWH[PVUVMJV\U[YPLZ PZ SPURLK[VZWLJPÄJKLTHUKZVU[OLWHY[VM3(*HUK[V
implementing consortia on the part of the EU; and given that participation is focused 
on the central governments, the presence of sub-national governments and thus, their 
their capacity to involve other players from the local level, was given less weight. With 
YLNHYK[V[OLTH[PJÄLSKZHJ[PVUZMVJ\ZPUNVUHKTPUPZ[YH[P]LPTWYV]LTLU[HUKPUZ[P[\[PVUHS
quality were far better represented than actions directed at reforms of public policies 
and at the strengthening of citizenship. To the extent that the programme worked on the 
basis of sectors, the working mechanisms failed to adopt inter-sectorial perspectives 
(Zamora 2014). Nevertheless, one of the important achievements of the EUROsociAL 
WYVQLJ[^HZZLLUPU[OL¸WLLYSLHYUPUN¹TLJOHUPZTPUVYKLY[VPUÅ\LUJLW\ISPJWVSPJPLZH
cooperation which aims to “support endogenous policy processes through the exchange 
of experiences, actions of accompaniment, peer reviews and other similar modalities the 
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essential characteristic of which is collaboration between similar public institutions in 
KPɈLYLU[JV\U[YPLZ¹*OPVKP!28(Z-00(77PUKPJH[LZ!¸L_WLYPLUJLZOHYPUNPZWHY[
of a new set of cooperation instruments which emphasise the principle of ownership, one 
VM[OLWPSSHYZVM[OL7HYPZHUK(JJYH+LJSHYH[PVUZVU(PK,ɈLJ[P]LULZZ¹-00(77!
;O\ZP[PZHUPUZ[Y\TLU[[OH[LUHISLZ[OLPKLU[PÄJH[PVUVMYLX\PYLTLU[ZHUKZVS\[PVUZMYVT
the perspective of the very experts of public institutions. 
Another relevant programme in this sectorial agenda is URB-AL “Promoting local public 
policies for social cohesion in Latin America”. As a Euro-Latin American decentralised 
cooperation programme, it responds to the common interests of both regions. The last 
of the three phases of this programme incorporates the concept of local social cohesion 
and has generated networks of local governments and thematic networks for developing 
local public policies. Among the merits of this programme were the creation of strategies 
[VJHWP[HSPZLVUILZ[WYHJ[PJLZHUK [OLJYLH[PVUVMT\S[PSL]LSHYLHZVɈLYPUNZWHJL MVY
the participation of public and multi-sector authorities through regional dialogues which 
involved a total of over 600 people (Tassara 2014). These actions have contributed to 
improving the articulation toward a better design of public policies for social cohesion on 
the ground. As an approach and as methodology for decentralised cooperation, these 
L_WLYPLUJLZTH`VɈLY\ZLM\SSLZZVUZMVYV[OLYJVVWLYH[PVUPUP[PH[P]LZ
7.3. EU-LAC regionalism as a strategy to steer globalisation 
and provide regional public goods 
The promotion of regional integration has been one of the goal of the partnership between 
LAC and EU, with European institutions being one of the few players whose policy and 
actions for development cooperation were designed to promote regionalism and regional 
integration, and whose role was based on its own experience of regional integration 
which has been cemented in a peculiar and complex set of interests, values and identities 
(Sanahuja, 2013).
(S[OV\NO [OLYLHYLKPɈLYLUJLZIL[^LLU,\YVWLHU PU[LNYH[PVUHUK [OLKP]LYZL YLNPVUHS
and integration projects that categorise LAC, in all cases, regionalism is perceived as an 
instrument for steering globalisation and for strengthening the region’s external presence 
and the actions of member countries in international forums. Recently, a minimal consensus 
has been also notable among LAC countries to conceive of regionalism not only as a 
 
28 -VY TVYL PUMVYTH[PVU HIV\[ [OL *:: MVZ[LYLK I` ,<96:VJP(3 00 TLU[PVUPUN [OL WHY[PJPWH[PVU VM [OL [YHUZMLY 
 JV\U[YPLZHUKPUYLSH[PVU^P[O[OLL_JOHUNLL_WLYPLUJLZWSLHZL]PZP[!
 O[[W!^^ ^ZPHL\YVZVJPHSPPL\ÄSLZKVJZ0UMVYTLFZ\YFZ\YWKMHJJLZZLK4H`
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vehicle for economic integration but also as an instrument for the provision of regional 
public goods, a view which coincides with EU policy. This minimum consensus refers to 
the creation of high level forums for the exchange of experiences of national policies —
Z\JOHZ[OL4PUPZ[LYPHS-VY\TZVU:VJPHS+L]LSVWTLU[·HUKMVY[OLPTWSLTLU[H[PVUVM
YLNPVUHSWVSPJPLZHUK[OLJVTTP[TLU[[VZWLJPÄJKLJPZPVUZ·HZL_LTWSPÄLKI`<UHZ\Y
in the area of health, Mercosur in higher education and SICA in the realm of regional 
security. In short, both regions have attempted to provide regional public goods in areas 
such as social inclusion STI, HE and climate change.
;OLZL KPɈLYLUJLZ IL[^LLU [OL HWWYVHJOLZ ILJVTL HWWHYLU[ ^OLU HUHS`ZPUN [OL
capability of these regional projects to undertake development policies which have the 
WV[LU[PHS [VTP[PNH[L PU[YHYLNPVUHS PTIHSHUJLZ ;OL,< PZ [OL ÄYZ[ YLNPVUHS PU[LNYH[PVU
agreement wchich was designed to meet these goals and therefore —among other 
elements— it has managed to be perceived as and perceives itself to be, a model of 
“successful” regionalism. In fact, the EU has promoted its model of integration using both 
KPYLJ[HUK PUKPYLJ[TLJOHUPZTZVM PUÅ\LUJL)YaLSHUK9PZZLHUK PUWHY[PJ\SHY
it has attempted to promote integration and regionalism in LAC through the “incentive” 
VM[OL7HY[ULYZOPW(NYLLTLU[ZHUKPUZ[Y\TLU[ZVMYLNPVUHSJVVWLYH[PVU4VYHamUet al. 
2011; Sanahuja 2013b; Tassara 2013). Within the framework of its multi-annual indicative 
planning the EU has channelled cooperation through three sub-regional agreements: the 
CAN, MERCOSUR and Central America (SICA). LAC has taken some of these elements 
and adapted them to a greater or lesser degree to their own domestic contexts, and with 
]HYPLKYLZ\S[ZPU[LYTZVMLɈLJ[P]LULZZVM[OPZ¸ILZ[WYHJ[PJL¹
(UHUHS`ZPZVMULNV[PH[PVUZIL[^LLU[OL,<HUK[OLKPɈLYLU[Z\IYLNPVUHSNYV\WZHWWLHYZ
[VZOV^ÄYZ[S `[OH[[OLWVZZPIPSP[`VMZPNUPUN7HY[ULYZOPW(NYLLTLU[ZJVU[PU\LZ[VILH
powerful incentive for integration. This has occurred, for instance, during the negotiations 
between the EU and Central America. Logically, this “transformative power” of the EU is 
weaker if the probability that such an agreement will be signed is shriking, as well. This 
can be illustrated by the case of the EU-Mercosur negotiations, which were not only 
KPɉJ\S[LKI`ZVTLWVZP[PVUZVM4LYJVZ\YTLTILYZI\[HSZVI`ZVTLLSLTLU[ZVM,<»Z
trade and agriculture policies the abovementioned issue of incoherence of some of these 
policies, its development policy and the compromises that may have been assumed in 
the course of bi-regional dialogue.  
3VNPJHSS `[OLSPTP[ZVM[OL,<»ZWV^LYHZ¸L_[LYUHSMLKLYH[VY¹HYLHSZVKLÄULKI`[OLZJVWL
of commitment to integration in each sub-region, within the framework of their respective 
strategies for international integration, and the role that “South-North” agreements within 
these strategies play with external actors such as the USA and the EU itself. The integraton 
WYVJLZZLZVM*(5VU[OLVULOHUKHUK*LU[YHS(TLYPJHVU[OLV[OLYOHUKZLLT[VJVUÄYT
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[OPZ[LUKLUJ `0U[OLÄYZ[VM[OLZLNYV\WZ^OPJOPZSLZZJVTTP[[LK[VPU[LNYH[PVU[OLMYLL
trade agreements with the USA and the EU have been a factor for disintegration, whereas in 
HTVYLJVOLZP]L*LU[YHS(TLYPJH[OLZLHNYLLTLU[ZOH]LOHK[OLVWWVZP[LLɈLJ[:HUHO\QH
2013b). Not least, there have been contradictory proposals in respect of purposes, 
methodology, and the rationality of this inter-regional strategy, with bilateral agreements 
established with some countries (such as Mexico and Chile), regional negotiations with 
CAN, Mercosur and Central America and the possibility that these negotiations would be 
“bilateralised”, as occurred with CAN and the agreements with Peru and Colombia, and the 
subsequent negotiation with Ecuador, or the risk of separate negotiations, such as those 
conducted with Brazil, which would have weakened Mercosur.
The EU has constituted one of the few sources of regional cooperation, both on a regional 
level and with LAC in general, as well as at the sub-regional level with Central America, the 
CAN or Mercosur. Overall, the net annual payments for cooperation of EU institutions for 
Latin America represent some 1,000 Mio. US Dollar per annum, of which approximately 
20% have been regional actions. 
At the regional level, this cooperation has been asymmetric, as to date there is no 
body which groups together the whole LAC. Therefore the EU has opted for regional 
programmes based on “networks” of decentralised agents —local governments, 
universities, public institutions etc.— which promote dynamics of “regionalisation” rather 
than an institutionalised regionalism. Assessments of these programmes (which include 
AL-INVEST, UR-BAL, Alfa, @Lis and EUROSocial) highlight their contribution in creating 
thematic networks between both regions, and within each region, along with the transfer 
of knowledge and best practices. The emergence of Unasur for South America and of 
CELAC for the region as a whole have also generated new sectorial cooperation agendas 
in LAC which, at the same time, have opened up new possibilities of interregional 
cooperation; these recently opened channels could be strengthened to the extent that 
these bodies become consolidated and that they manage to enhance their capabilities to 
generate consensus and to provide instruments for a more intense regional cooperation 
and for the implementation of common policies. 
Sub-regional cooperation bodies, where integration groups do exist, have focused on 
economic integration —with greater emphasis on promoting customs unions—, on the 
strengthening of regional institutions and on the promotion of the participation of civil 
society in consultative bodies in each group, although these actions have had a relatively 
little weight in the overall cooperation of EU institutions in Latin America. Of the 2,569 
Mio. Euros allocated in the 2007-2013 planning budget, 71.5% were destined for bilateral 
and 28.5% for regional actions. Sub-regional actions represented 6.7%: 2.9% for Central 
America, 1.9% for Mercosur and 1.9% for the CAN. The assessments of these sub-
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YLNPVUHSWYVNYHTTLZYL]LHS[OH[[OLLɈLJ[P]LULZZVM[OLZLHJ[PVUZOHZKLWLUKLKSHYNLS`
on the degree of inter-group cohesion and the conditions of each integration process and 
those of its institutions, and for the latter, contrary to the original intention, in some cases 
the excessive weight of external funding may have weakened them (Sanahuja 2013b).
Taking the EU cooperation with Mercosur as an example, it has been observed that 
MYVTT  ·^OLU[OL0U[LYYLNPVUHS*VVWLYH[PVU-YHTL^VYR^HZZPNULK·\U[PS
most of the resources were directed to economic integration and the support for the 
implementation of the bi-regional agreement (70%), and the remaining resources to 
the strengthening of institutions and the participation of civil society. About 22% of the 
M\UKZ^LYLKPYLJ[LK[V[OLZWOLYLVMRUV^SLKNLZWLJPÄJHSS`[VYLZLHYJOWYVNYHTTLZPU
biotechnology, mobility in HE, and support for the Mercosur education sector. In some of 
[OLZLHYLHZHNLUJPLZMYVT,\YVWLHUJV\U[YPLZHSZVJVVWLYH[LKWHY[PJ\SHYS`PU[OLÄLSKZ
of environment and clean technologies, or in the labour and social aspects of integration. 
;OLYLKLÄUP[PVUPUVM[OLIPYLNPVUHS,<3(*WHY[ULYZOPWHZ,<*,3(*PZYLSL]HU[
as an expression of LAC’s willingness and need to coordinate its relations with the EU, 
now as a political reality rather than just a geographic region. CELAC has taken some 
ZPNUPÄJHU[Z[LWZHZHYLNPVUHSWSH`LYI`TLHUZVMMVY\TZVYNHUPZLK^P[O*OPUH9\ZZPH
India and ASEAN, and with the establishment of a Latin American and Caribbean agenda 
in key areas of development. This will allow for the advancement towards a clearer, more 
focused and consolidated bi-regional work agenda. It is clearer because it facilitates to 
extend beyond superimposed regional structures which do not always coincide; focused 
in that it is able to concentrate on some key issues for social inclusion; and consolidated 
because it provides the prospect of greater consensus—despite the continuation of 
PKLVSVNPJHS HUKV[OLYKPɈLYLUJLZ· YLNHYKPUN [OL YVSLVM YLNPVUHSPZT PU [OL ZLHYJO MVY
NYLH[LYWVSP[PJHSH\[VUVT`VM3(**SLHYS `[OPZYHPZLZ[^VJVUJVTP[HU[X\LZ[PVUZ-PYZ[S `
how will CELAC’s interaction adapt and develop in respect of other regional structures in 
progress, as so far CELAC’s only progress has been to collect proposals for promoting 
complementarity and convergence. Secondly, in a supposed scenario in which CELAC 
managed to include pre-existing regional agreements and to adopt regional policies, how 
would intra and inter-regional asymmetries be addressed? 
7.4. Euro-Latin American cooperation in higher education 
The setting up of the “Euro-Latin American area of knowledge and higher education”, 
which involves both promotion of HE and STI, is not an innovative agenda, but it is a 
relevant area of cooperation which supports the re-launching of the bi-regional agenda. It 
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JVUZ[P[\[LZHÄLSKPU^OPJO[OL,<JV\SKTHRLHZPUN\SHYJVU[YPI\[PVUHUK^OPJOYLÅLJ[Z
its values and interests with respect to the dissemination of its technologies and the 
PU[LYUH[PVUHSPZH[PVU VM P[Z \UP]LYZP[PLZ HUK YLZLHYJO JLU[YLZ -VY 3(* [OPZ JVVWLYH[PVU
can contribute to its development goals, and in particular, to its need to rise in the global 
value chain, advancing toward a more productive model which provided added value 
for its exports and which would therefore imply higher salaries and improved living 
conditions, corresponding thereby directly and indirectly to the bi-regional goal of greater 
ZVJPHS JVOLZPVU-YVTHULU]PYVUTLU[HSWLYZWLJ[P]L [OPZ^V\SK PU [\YUWYV]PKLTVYL
sustainable solutions as proposed by CELAC and considered in the SDG. This challenge 
is particularly important for emerging upper-middle income countries, and those with 
the largest populations in LAC, as the abovmentioned results of the taxonomy and the 
balance of compliance with MDG revealed. 
-YVT [OL ILNPUUPUN HJ[PVUZ HPTLK H[ [OL JYLH[PVU VM [OH[ JVTTVU NYV\UK ^LYL
designed to ensure greater understanding between the regions, based on mutual 
YLJVNUP[PVU [OLI\PSKPUNVM [Y\Z[ HUKJVUÄKLUJL HUK [OLZ[YLUN[OLUPUNJHWHJP[PLZ
of institutions of higher education (HEI) in the Latin American region and its actors, 
promoting organisational improvements in HEI, improving curricula and teaching 
TL[OVKZHUKZ[PT\SH[PUN[OLWVVSPUNHUKKPɈ\ZPVUVMJHWHJP[PLZHUKRUV^SLKNLHTVUN
students, professors and research personnel. At the same time, the reinforcement of 
research skills as part of EU cooperation with LAC sought to promote technology 
transfer and encourage innovation processes, such as a deepened participation of 
Latin American science and technology in the production and knowledge circles 
at the global level. Currently, through the science and technology agreements and 
PU[LYUH[PVUHSJVVWLYH[PVUPUZ[Y\TLU[ZVM[OL,<9+PMYHTL^VYRWYVNYHTTLZQVPU[
actions in key areas have been prioritised with which LAC partners with elevated 
capacities in STI receive material support.
;OLJVVWLYH[PVUWYVNYHTTLZ[VJYLH[L[OL*VTTVU(YLHVM2UV^SLKNLJVUJLU[YH[LVU
the strengthening of HEI and on bi-regional academic mobility. The two programmes that 
^LYLZWLJPÄJHSS`KL]LSVWLKMVY[OL3(*YLNPVUHUK^OPJOOH]LHSYLHK`ILLUJVTWSL[LK
^LYL[OL(3-(7YVNYHTTL3H[PU(TLYPJH¶(JHKLTPJ;YHPUPUN^OPJO\UKLY^LU[[OYLL
phases between 1994 to 2013, with a total investment of 162.9 Mio. Euros, and the 
ALBAN Programme (Latin America – High level grants), which was operative between 
2002 and 2010 with a budged of 109.8 Mio. Euros, out of which 75 millions were spent 
exclusively on grants. The mobility actions were channelled through the Erasmus Mundus 
7YVNYHTTL *\YYLU[S ` JVVWLYH[PVU HJ[PVUZ PU [OPZ ÄLSK VWLU [V 3(* HYL JVUK\J[LK
within more general EU instruments such as the 2020 Horizon Programme – successor 
[V[OLWYL]PV\Z9+PMYHTL^VYRWYVNYHTTLZ·HUKErasmus,\YVWLHU*VTTPZZPVU
2015d).
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,]HS\H[PVUZVM[OL(3-(HUK(3)(57YVNYHTTLZPKLU[PÄLKJVTTVUWYVISLTZHUKW\[
forward proposals for improving the subsequent phases of each programme. There were 
Ä]LTHPUPZZ\LZ-PYZ[VMHSSHJJLSLYH[PUN[OLTHUHNLTLU[VMWYVNYHTTLZPUVYKLY[VZPTWSPM`
them and to reach a wider spectrum of HEI. Secondly, strengthening the participation of 
actors and institutions in Central American countries which have had less of a presence, 
I`TLHUZVMZLSLJ[PVUTLJOHUPZTZLNZWLJPÄJNYHU[ZYLZLY]LKHUKZ[YLUN[OLUPUN[OL
capacities of the latter by means of intraregional cooperation mechanisms, in a South–
:V\[OSVNPJPU]VS]PUN3(*JV\U[YPLZ^P[OTVYLKL]LSVWLK/,:;0Z`Z[LTZ-\Y[OLYTVYL
PTWYV]PUNTVUP[VYPUNHUKPTWSLTLU[PUN[OLULJLZZHY`HKQ\Z[TLU[Z-V\Y[OS `KLZWP[L[OL
NYLH[LY ]PZPIPSP[` VM (3-( 000 PTWYV]PUN [OL KPɈ\ZPVU HUK RUV^SLKNL VM [OL7YVNYHTTL
HZ^LSS HZ [OL YLZ\S[Z HJOPL]LK I` [OPZ 7VYNHTTL (UK ÄUHSS ` PUJVYWVYH[PUN LSLTLU[Z
^OPJOHSSV^[OLILULÄJPHYPLZVMJVVWLYH[PVU[V[HRLHJ[PVUZPU[OLPYJV\U[YPLZVMVYPNPU[V
socialise and share the skills and knowledge acquired from the experience of exchange – a 
recommendation which particularly applies to the the grant programmes. 
Most of the subregional agreements of LAC, including CELAC, have adopted  regional 
HE policies, especially regarding mobility, acreditation and inter-institutional cooperation. 
These initiatives have also contributed to a greater convergence in these areas with the 
EU (Perrotta 2014). 
One of the latest initiatives to be considered in this discussion about the axes of birregional 
JVVWLYH[PVUPU[OPZÄLSKZPUJL[OLJYLH[PVUVM*,3(*OHZILLU[OL7LYTHULU[(JHKLTPJ
-VY\T 7(- HUK [OL ZL[[PUN \W VM IPYLNPVUHS HJHKLTPJ Z\TTP[Z ;OL ÄYZ[ 3(*,<
HJHKLTPJZ\TTP[^HZOLSK PU1HU\HY` PU*OPSLHUK P[Z YLZ\S[OHZJOHYHJ[LYPZLK
itself by its interest in issues such as social inclusion, the quality of education at all levels, 
HJJYLKP[H[PVUHUKYLJVNUP[PVUVMX\HSPÄJH[PVUZHUKKLNYLLZWYVMLZZPVUHSX\HSPÄJH[PVUZ
development of basic and applied research, innovation, the link with the environment 
HUK[OL\UP]LYZP[`I\ZPULZZYLSH[PVUZOPW;OL7(-OHZJVU[YPI\[LK[V[OLWYLWHYH[PVUVM
two academic summits. Although this forumhas been created only recently, it has the 
potential to channel a consensual cooperation and collaboration agenda agreed on by 
agents related to HE which may well help to strengthen governmental actions. Until this 
moment it has operated as a space for formulating declarations and ha encountered 
KPɉJ\S[PLZ [V MVYT\SH[LZWLJPÄJWYVWVZHSZ MVYWYVTV[PUNIPYLNPVUHSJVU]LYNLUJLHUK
Z[PT\SH[PUN PTWYV]LTLU[Z HUK Z`ULYNPLZ PU /, Z`Z[LTZ -\Y[OLYTVYL [OL WYVJLZZLZ
of the incorporation of participants in this forum have not been very transparent and 
it is unclear whether it will achieve a higher participation from relevant HE players and 
whether it will improve its capacity to formulate concrete initiatives for action.
Next to the activities organised by regional bodies directed towards the construction 
of a bi-regional HE area, the Ibero-American Conference has promoted the Ibero-
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American Higher Education Area, with the involvement of non-governmental actors 
(private foundations) such as of the Santander Group through the Universia platform. 
;OPZWSH[MVYTKLÄULZP[ZLSMHZVULVM[OLTVZ[L_[LUZP]L\UP]LYZP[`UL[^VYRZPU[OL0ILYV
(TLYPJHU YLNPVU HUK VɈLYZ ZLY]PJLZ VM [^V RPUKZ! HJHKLTPJ WYVQLJ[Z W\ISPJH[PVUZ
grants information for students, online courses and meetings with Chancellors); and 
university employment services, training and online marketing. Its agenda is aligned 
with the Santiago Declaration on university cooperation in HE and STI and with the EU-
CELAC area of knowledge. In particular, it aims to share information in respect of HE/
STI systems, to operate in the management of cooperation, to establish procedures for 
greater articulation between systems and institutions and to develop HE/STI in line with 
development needs. Precisely for this reason, Universia is attractive to institutions and 
actors using these services in a regional and bi-regional market of knowledge, without 
this necessarily being a response to the challenges of LAC in matters of social inclusion, 
economic development and/or improved productivity. 
This interaction of public and private actors should be considered from a broader 
perspective of the contradictory trends observed in the EULAC area of HE. On the one 
hand, the dynamics of internationalisation and globalisation place university systems and 
the generation of knowledge under strong competitive global pressures —international 
rankings and metrics for evaluation applied both to teachers and researchers and 
universities—, and lead to HE privatisation and commercialisation processes (Perrotta 
2014b). On the other hand, these dynamics also evoke strong social pressures and pave 
the way toward greater access and the democratisation of knowledge as a mechanism 
for sustainable development and social cohesion, and toward an enhanced regulatory 
capacity of governments and regional organisations to improve quality, promote 
convergence and regional and international cooperation. In this context, it could be 
questioned whether the agendas of private groups and foundations such as those 
mentioned above are not eventually going against the goals for cooperation between 
universities and research centres on either side of the Atlantic established by the bi-
regional partnership, namely, the building of bridges for mutual understanding based 
on solidarity and reciprocity, allowing for a socio-cultural rapprochement and, based on 
this, the search for strategies to strengthening both HE and STI with a view to resolving 
NSVIHSHUK SVJHSWYVISLTZ-VY [OPZ YLHZVUIPYLNPVUHSHJ[PVU PU [OPZÄLSKTH` SLHK [V
improvements in the multilateral governance of the area, but it will also be conditioned by 
[OLKL]LSVWTLU[ZPU[OPZÄLSK
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7.5. Euro-Latin American cooperation in science, 
technology and innovation 
The STI agenda has been placed on the agenda since the initiation of the bi-regional 
dialogue (including the framework of the meetings with the Rio Group), it has gained 
importance and today it is directed toward the achievement of sustainable development 
HUKZVJPHSPUJS\ZPVUI`TLHUZVM[OLZVJPHSHWWYVWYPH[PVUVMRUV^SLKNL-VY[OPZYLHZVU
the focus to promote cooperation between the EU and LAC, as well as with some of 
the countries with which it has bilateral agreements, is to prioritse key thematic areas. 
7VSP[PJHSKPHSVN\LVU[OPZHNLUKH^HZLZ[HISPZOLKL]LYZPUJL[OLÄYZ[IPYLNPVUHS:\TTP[
and cooperation has been implemented, as noted above, through bilateral agreements on 
ZJPLU[PÄJHUK[LJOUVSVNPJHSJVVWLYH[PVUHUK[OL-YHTL^VYR7YVNYHTTLZMVY9LZLHYJO
and Development through the mechanism of cooperation with third countries, including 
the LAC (INCO-NET projects).
Cooperation between the two regions has been implemented through various 
mechanisms: bilateral cooperation with a selected group of countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico); Agreements of Cooperation in Science and Technology (AST) signed by 
these countries with the EU; cooperation based on regionalisms; and bi-regional political 
dialogue. The future of these instruments is similar to that indicated for the HE agenda. 
Cooperation and dialogue is based on considerable intra and inter-regional asymmetries 
IL[^LLUZJPLU[PÄJHUK[LJOUVSVNPJHSPUZ[P[\[PVUZHUKZPT\S[HULV\ZS `VU[OL[OLNYV^PUN
ZPNUPÄJHUJLVM[OLJHWHJP[PLZPU[OPZHYLH[VZ\WWVY[[OLKL]LSVWTLU[WYVJLZZIV[OPU3(*
and the EU, in a globalised context in which new productive and technological poles are 
emerging, and which, as indicated, calls for policies which promote the transformation of 
WYVK\J[PVUHUKPTWYV]LTLU[ZPUWYVK\J[P]P[`I`TLHUZVMPU[LUZPÄLKRUV^SLKNLHJ[P]P[PLZ
and a greater emphasis on technological innovation. 
In this context, the EU can help to strengthen the research capabilities in LAC, to the 
same degree as the more developed countries of the latter region are able to support 
those countries with less developed capacities; in both cases this can be achieved by the 
establishment of consensual relations involving solidarity and the capacity to learn from 
the experience of various STI sectors. 
It seems worth mentioning that contrary to the experience of HE cooperation, regional 
STI actions in LAC have exclusively been carried out with resources from EU institutions 
and those of some of its member states, since regional LAC groups have not designated 
any funds for common actions or policies in this area; also bilateral cooperation schemes 
and SSC mechanisms have prevailed in the implementation of STI cooperation (Perrotta 
 "2LYU
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;OL ,<»Z HJ[PVU PU [OPZ ÄLSK YLZWVUKZ [V H NSVIHS YH[OLY [OHU H ZWLJPÄJHSS` IPYLNPVUHS
strategy.29 It aims to address the global challenges of research and innovation in sustainable 
development, which implies that the EU strengthens its cooperation with external partners. 
The commitments assumed by the EU in the context of its initiative Innovation in the Union 
and the European Research Area (ERA) and the recommendations of the intermediate 
analysis of the 7th -YHTL^VYR 7YVNYHTTL OH]L VYPLU[LK ,<»Z PU[LYUH[PVUHS JVVWLYH[PVU
in STI in the Horizon 2020 programme (2014-2020) with respect to the following goals: i) 
strengthening the excellence and attraction of the EU in areas of research and innovation, as 
well as its economic and industrial competitiveness through cooperation based on mutual 
ILULÄ[ZHJJLZZ[VL_[LYUHSZV\YJLZVMRUV^SLKNL[OLH[[YHJ[PVUVM[HSLU[ZHUKPU]LZ[TLU[Z
facilitating access to new and emerging markets and based on the agreement, access to 
common practices for developing research and the use of research results; ii) facing global 
ZVJPHSJOHSSLUNLZ"HUKPPPZ\WWVY[PUN,<»ZMVYLPNUWVSPJPLZI`JVVYKPUH[PUNLɈVY[Z
On this ground, there are two principles that guide the current phase of EU cooperation within 
[OLÄLSKVM:;0!HUVWLUHWWYVHJOJVTIPULK^P[OKPYLJ[LKVYMVJ\ZLKHJ[P]P[PLZKL]LSVWLK
VU[OLIHZPZVMJVTTVUPU[LYLZ[ZHUKT\[\HSILULÄ[ZVW[PTHSZJHSLHUKZJVWLWHY[ULYZOPW
and synergy. This open approach implies that instruments and EU programs (like Horizon 
2020) become opened to a large number of partners. The EU seeks to achieve a greater 
participation in this initiative (with its own resources) from certain countries, and the directed 
HJ[PVUZPU[LUK[VTH_PTPZL[OLZLLɈVY[Z6U[OLVULOHUK[OLHYLHZ^OLYLHWHY[ULYZOPW
with third countries is desired are actually those resulting from a coherent and systematic 
analysis of the combination of four elements: the capacities in research and innovation; the 
risks and opportunities of the markets and their impact on the competitiveness of the EU ; 
contribution to the international commitments of the EU (such as the post-2015 development 
agenda); and existing legal and administrative frameworks in each country. The innovation 
dimension seeks to generate a framework of conditions and the establishment of a level 
WSH`PUNÄLSK^OPJOZ[YP]LZ[VIHSHUJLIL[^LLU[OLULLK[V[HJRSLNSVIHSJOHSSLUNLZQVPU[S`
with other countries and EU’s own interests as well as those of its private sector. On the 
other hand, the EU has established multiannual work agendas to cooperate with some key 
countries and regions. In the case of the EU-CELAC partnership, the areas of bio-economy, 
renewable energies, ICT, health and biodiversity, climate change and research careers 
WYVMLZZPVUHSJVTWVULU[OH]LILLUPKLU[PÄLKHZWYPVYP[PLZ
Another aspect worth highlighting is EU’s willingnesss to promote common principles for 
international cooperation in STI: responsible innovation and research; research integrity; 
peer review; promotion of the role of women in science and the gender dimension in 
 
  :LL [OL Z[YH[LNPJ HWWYVHJO MVY PU[LYUH[PVUHS JVVWLYH[PVU PU YLZLHYJO HUK PUUV]H[PVU ,\YVWLHU *VTTPZZPVU 
  HUK Z\IZLX\LU[S ` [OL YLWVY[ VU PTWSLTLU[H[PVU VM [OL  Z[YH[LN` ,\YVWLHU *VTTPZZPVU L 
 HUKM
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research; research career; fair and equal treatment in intellectual property rights and open 
access to publications and results of research carried out with public funds. 
In addition, one of the central tenets of the 2015 Communication on a “Global Partnership 
for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015” indicates the need to 
incentivise STI as a way of stimulating transformative changes, based on the global 
partnership for development.  
;OPZ HWWYVHJO OHZ HSZV ILLU YLÅLJ[LK PU [OL (NLUKH MVY (J[PVU VM (KKPZ (IHIH VM
1\S`^OPJO PU YLZWLJ[ [V:;0OHZZ[YLZZLK [OL PTWVY[HUJLVMWYVTV[PUN 0+P PU
developing countries by means of the creation of a regulatory framework and suitable 
governance, the protection of intellectual property rights and an improved articulation 
between governments, businesses, the academia and civil society.
Based on this political-regulatory structure, the EU maintains bilateral agreements on 
cooperation in science and technology (AST) with only four LAC countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. These are countries with greater STI capacity, but not with 
greater income; for upper-middle income countries such as Uruguay or Costa Rica which 
are also “graduates” of the “classic” bilateral cooperation with DCI, are not considered 
PU [OPZ ZJOLTL -VY LHJO (:; ZPNULK H IPSH[LYHS (K]PZVY` *VTTPZZPVU PZ JYLH[LK
which is responsible for setting up multi-annual route maps, which, in turn, are based 
on the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIP) and the country strategic documents 
established for each cycle of planning. Support for agreements of this kind is provided by 
the BILAT projects. Within this framework, the following institutional spaces guiding STP 
JVVWLYH[PVUOH]LLTLYNLK!PU(YNLU[PUH[OLSPHPZVUVɉJL(),:;000"PU)YHaPS))0*,"PU
*OPSL*,:;0"HUKPU4L_PJV,<4,?0556=(
(YNLU[PUHOHZJVVWLYH[LK^P[O[OL,<PU[OLÄLSKVMYLZLHYJOZPUJL  PZOHZHJ[P]LS`
WHY[PJPWH[LKPU,<»ZIPYLNPVUHSWYVNYHTTLZPU[OPZHYLHHUKP[PZ[OLZLJVUKPU[OPZÄLSK
after Brazil. The most frequently addressed issues are food, agriculture, biotechnology, 
health, environment and transport. There appears to be a need for concentrating action 
on prioritised areas of mutual interest, with the ability to seek synergies, ranging from 
traditional themes (foods, agriculture, biotechnology, health, and environment) to 
other more innovative issues, in line with the goal of meeting global challenges. As a 
“graduate country” of DCI, within the framework of Horizon 2020, Argentina is required 
to cooperate by providing resources, although so far no actions have been developed 
in this context. However, Argentina has a notable role as an STP organiser in the region 
and has taken the lead in managing sub-regional projects, for instance in the case 
of BIOTECH in Mercosur and, especially, in bi-regional areas such as in the case of 
coordination ALCUENet project.
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The STP between the EU and Brazil was signed in 2004, entered into force in 2007, 
and was renewed in 2012. Its particularity resides in the fact that it is the only AST 
contemplated in the European Commission’s Working Document supporting the 
*VTT\UPJH[PVUVMIHZLKVU[OL¸YVHKTHW¹^OPJOPKLU[PÄLZ[OLTH[PJHYLHZ^OPJO
will be the subject of joint programmes —that is, with contributions from Brazil— in 
/VYPaVU^OLYLHZ[OPZPKLU[PÄJH[PVUVMWYPVYP[PLZPZZ[PSSWLUKPUNHZYLNHYKZ[OLV[OLY
countries. Acknowledging both the capacities and needs of Brazil, as well as the need of 
adressing global challenges, the four priorities are: i) marine research, bio-economy, food 
safety, and sustainable agriculture; ii) energy; iii) nanotechnology; and iv) information and 
communication technologies (ICT). 
The STP between Chile and the EU was signed in 2002, parallel to the Association 
Agreement between these two parties, and entered into force in 2007. Within the 
JVU[L_[VM[OLJ\YYLU[*,:;0WYVQLJ[[OLWVZZPIPSP[PLZVMZ[YLUN[OLUPUNJVVWLYH[PVU
were analysed, and as a result a 2013-2017 plan of action was designed with an 
updated list of priorities, improved information resources, new opportunities for 
setting up networks and new partnership mechanisms for uniting CONACyT with the 
JHSSZVMHWWSPJH[PVUVM/VYPaVU;OLWYPVYP[PZLKHYLHZVMT\[\HSPU[LYLZ[PKLU[PÄLK
HYL! PZHMLJSLHUHUKLɉJPLU[LULYN`" PPJSPTH[PJHJ[PVULU]PYVUTLU[LɉJPLU[\ZL
of resources and raw materials; and iii) food safety, sustainable agriculture and 
^H[LY-\Y[OLYTVYL*65(*`;PUJVYWVYH[LKHZHYLHZVM PU[LYLZ[MVY,<YLZLHYJOLYZ!
astronomy, Antarctic and glacier sciences, oceanography, biodiversity, organisms in 
extreme environments, anti-seismic engineering, mega cities, population studies and 
renewable energies. 
-PUHSS ` [OL,<4L_PJV(:;^HZHSZVKL]LSVWLKHSVUNZPKL [OL(ZZVJPH[PVU(NYLLTLU[
ZPNULKPU(KPZ[PUJ[P]LMLH[\YLPZ[OLLHYS`JYLH[PVUVMHU,<4L_PJV-\UKMVY*;
*VVWLYH[PVU-65*0*`;HZHUPUZ[Y\TLU[VMZ\WWVY[MVYQVPU[JHSSZ^P[OPU[OLMYHTL^VYR
VM[OL[O-7PU[OLHYLHZVMUHUV[LJOUVSVN`HUKUL^TH[LYPHSZ HUKLULYN`
;OL(:;^HZYLUL^LKMVY [OLWLYPVK;OLIPSH[LYHS,<4,?056=(WYVQLJ[
,<4,?IPSH[LYHS0UUV]H[PVUWYVQLJ[ZLLRZ[VZ[YLUN[OLUJVVWLYH[PVUPUVYKLY[VHKKYLZZ
social challenges and promote industrial technologies in areas of climate change, food 
safety, sustainable development, clean energies, health and transport. As in the case of 
Brazil and Chile, Mexico will provide resources for the participation of institutions and 
teams in Horizon 2020 through CONACyT.
One way of assessing these bilateral initiatives is to focus on the generation of synergies 
between policies and programmes, seeking cooperation from the initial moments of a 
policy cycle (design and fund raising) and proposing solutions for global challenges from 
the sector of knowledge. 
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As a link to these EU framework programmes, the INCO-NET programmes have provided 
platforms for coordination of political leaders, researchers and the private sector of the 
EU and third countries in order to identify cooperation priorities in STI, to implement 
H^HYLULZZYHPZPUNHUKKPɈ\ZPVUHJ[P]P[PLZ[VJHYY`PUNV\[Z[YH[LNPJHUHS`ZLZVM:;0[YLUKZ
to draw up an inventory of available research capacities, and to supervise and review 
cooperation activities. In LAC the INCO-NET projects conducted in the context of´´of 
[OL[O-YHTL^VYR7YVNYHTTL^LYL [OL MVSSV^PUN!,<*(905,; *HYPIILHU,53(*,
(Central America) and EULARINET (AL). There are currently two operative INCO-NET 
projects: the Latin America, Caribbean and European Union Innovation and Research 
Network (RedALCUE) and ERANet-LAC: Latin America, Caribbean and European Union. 
The latter promotes a cluster of research programmes focusing on innovation through 
government research funding agencies. 
Within the context of the summit process of the bi-regional strategic partnership, from 
2010 onwards (Madrid Action Plan, recovered by the Santiago Action Plan of 2013), STI 
OHZILLUWYPVYP[PZLKHUKWYV]PKLK^P[OJVUJYL[LPUZ[P[\[PVUHSHUKWYVNYHTTLKLÄUP[PVUZ
;O\Z/LHKZ VM :[H[L HUK.V]LYUTLU[ LZ[HISPZOLK H 1VPU[ 0UP[PH[P]L MVY 9LZLHYJO HUK
0UUV]H[PVU 1090 KLZPNULK [V PTWYV]L ZJPLU[PÄJJVVWLYH[PVUIL[^LLU [OL [^V YLNPVUZ
;OL1090PZJVVYKPUH[LKI`/LHKZVM:[H[LHUK.V]LYUTLU[HUKWVSPJ`Z\NNLZ[PVUZMVY
its implementation have been developed by national representatives of the two regions in 
[OLJVU[L_[VM[OL:LUPVY6ɉJPHSZ4LL[PUNZ,<*,3(*:64-VY[OPZW\YWVZL^VYRPUN
groups have been created for the established priorities: energy, ICT, bio-economy, 
biodiversity, climate change and health. The projects currently underway are: EU-LAC 
/LHS[O(3*<,2)),,5:6*063(HUK3,(+,9:/07
-YVT [OPZ NLULYHS HUHS`ZPZ VM ,<»Z JVVWLYH[PVU PU:;0 HUK [OLKLÄUP[PVUVM Z[YH[LNPJ
priorities in the context of the bilateral STP with Latin American countries —except 
for Argentina, as already mentioned— the situation could be summarised as follows: 
ÄYZ[[OLJLU[YHS[OLTLZHYL[OVZL^OPJOZLLR[OYV\NO:;0[VYLZVS]LWYVISLTZSPURLK
to the three dimensions of development, social issues, improvement of economic 
competitiveness, and promotion of environmental sustainability. The four main axes of 
[OLIPYLNPVUHSHNLUKH[O\ZYLÅLJ[HUKJYLH[LZ`ULYNPLZ^P[O[OLIPSH[LYHSWYVNYHTTLZ
already underway. 
Secondly, the system has been transformed from a mode of cooperation which destined 
funds to a counterpart, to one which, while maintaining European funding, aims to 
mobilising other resources, for example from other EU programmes or from partner 
countries. With a few exceptions of bilateral cooperation —such as the one between 
Argentina and Brazil in the nuclear sector— LAC has not managed to design regional 
policies in this area. This calls for the political leaders of the most advanced countries of 
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3(*[VVWLU[OPZÄLSKVMJVVWLYH[PVUHUK[VZOHYL[OLPYRUV^SLKNL^P[OV[OLYJV\U[YPLZ
contributing thereby to a reduction in the asymmetries of knowledge. One of the challenges 
MVY3(*PU[OPZYLNHYK^PSSJVUZPZ[PU[OLLZ[HISPZOTLU[VMHTLJOHUPZTMVYQVPU[ÄUHUJPUN
—South-South and /or triangular — which will help increasing the innovation capacities of 
the most relegated countries both in terms of governmental management of STI and HE 
Z`Z[LTZ-\Y[OLYTVYLWV[LU[PHSZ`ULYNPLZ^P[OPU[OL,\YV3H[PU(TLYPJHUMYHTL^VYRHUK
bilateral cooperation in STI and HE should be further explored; traditionally cooperation 
\ZLK[VILTVYLPU[LUZLHTVUNJV\U[YPLZ^P[OJ\S[\YHSHUKSPUN\PZ[PJHɉUP[PLZHZPZ[OL
JHZLVM[OL0ILYVHTLYPJHUZ[OLTLTILYZVM[OL*VTTVU^LHS[OVY[OL-YLUJOZWLHRPUN
community.   
This cooperation has arisen in a favourable economic context, which has enabled LAC 
JV\U[YPLZ [V L_[LUK [OLPY UH[PVUHS 9+P WVSPJPLZ JVU[YPI\[PUN TVYL YLZV\YJLZ HUK
reducing basic imbalances with respect to the EU. However, this has also widened the 
gaps in STI within LAC. In programmes where there is a situation of asymmetry, tensions 
VM[LUHYPZLPU[OLTVTLU[[OH[YLZLHYJOHNLUKHZHYLILPUNKLÄULK·^OH[ZOHSSIL[OL
priorities; how will these priorities respond to the demands and needs of the countries 
receiving cooperation, and not just to those of the donor; who will appropriate the 
results, and how; will intellectual property rights and the patents generated in LAC be 
publicly or privately owned, and will these remain in the region or will these be shifted 
to the resource provider. These questions need to be addressed in a serious manner by 
means of bi-regional dialogues which promote STI, if the main intention is to contribute 
to socio-economic development and the improvement of capacities in both regions, 
avoiding thereby the creation of “niche” areas of research. In case the cooperation would 
also involve the participation of actors from the private sector in the research process, 
frameworks would have to address the problem of incentives which will arise if the patent 
rights created are not guaranteed. 
-PUHSS ` P[ PZ PTWVY[HU[ [VHKVW[TVYLWYVNYLZZP]L M\UKPUNTLJOHUPZTZ MVY:;0WVSPJPLZ
HUK JVVWLYH[PVU [HRPUN PU[V HJJV\U[ MYVT [OL V\[ZL[ JVTTVU HUK KPɈLYLU[PH[LK
responsibilities and respective capacities, acknowledging the intra-regional asymmetries 
existing within LAC, and not just the asymmetry between EU and LAC. This would imply 
greater involvement of the relatively more developed LAC countries, similar to intra-EU 
practice, where progressive funding mechanisms are provided for all of its policies and 
HTVUN[OLTPUJS\KPUN9+P
Therefore, it will be a challenge for LAC to establish a joint funding mechanism 
based on solidarity which would help to strengthen the innovation potential in those 
countries which lag behind both in terms of governmental management of STI and 
HE systems.
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7.6. Climate change, environmental sustainability and development
(U LZZLU[PHS WYPVYP[` VM IPYLNPVUHS JVVWLYH[PVU PZ [OL ÄNO[ HNHPUZ[ LU]PYVUTLU[HS
degradation and the promotion of a more sustainable economic and social model. 
/V^L]LY HZ PU V[OLY PZZ\LZVM [OLKL]LSVWTLU[ HNLUKH KPɈLYLU[ JV\U[YPLZ HUKIV[O
regions have dissimilar points of departure with respect to the environmental challenges of 
sustainable development. In matters of climate change, the asymmetries are even greater 
in terms of visions, responsibilities and economic, technical and political capacities, as 
well as in terms of each region’s international role, based on a common policy and voice. 
In particular, Latin American and Caribbean groups have done little to design regional 
WVSPJPLZ PU [OPZ ÄLSK HUKUH[PVUHS WVSPJPLZ HYL KP]LYZL KPZWHYH[L HUKKPZWLYZLK HUK PU
many cases contradictory, especially in countries with a focus on extractive industries. 
The climate change agenda is particularly important for the EU, which is why it has promoted 
several initiatives, among them the emission rights trading scheme, regulations on the 
\ZLVMYLUL^HISLLULYNPLZTLHZ\YLZMVYPUJYLHZPUNLULYN`LɉJPLUJ`HUK[OL,\YVWLHU
Programme for Climate Change. The EU has taken an active role in international forums 
I`HWWS`PUN[OL<5-YHTL^VYR*VU]LU[PVUVU*SPTH[L*OHUNL<5-***HUK[OL2`V[V
Protocol. At the international level, it is expected that a new global climate agreement 
will be achieved in order to prevent the average global temperature from exceeding pre-
PUK\Z[YPHSLYH]HS\LZI`[^VKLNYLLZJLU[PNYHKL+\YPUN[OL;OPYK*VUMLYLUJLVU-PUHUJPUN
MVY+L]LSVWTLU[(KKPZ(IHIH1\S`HSSWHY[PLZL_WYLZZLK[OLPY^PSSPUNULZZ[VYLHJO
an agreement in Paris (December 2015), and commit themselves to the principle of 
JVTTVUI\[KPɈLYLU[PH[LKYLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZHUKYLZWLJ[P]LJHWHIPSP[PLZ[HRPUNPU[VHJJV\U[
the circumstances of each country. The EU is also a major donor for mitigation policies in 
developing countries through its Global Partnership for Climate Change. The Partnership 
WYV]PKLZ [LJOUPJHS HUK ÄUHUJPHS Z\WWVY[ [V [OLZL JV\U[YPLZ PTWSLTLU[Z WYVQLJ[Z HUK
provides a platform for dialogue and the exchange of shared experiences. 
LAC presents a contradiction with respect to climate change: it is a region with an extremely 
rich biodiversity and yet the main economic activities are extractive in kind and based on 
UH[\YHSYLZV\YJLZ-\Y[OLYTVYL[OL4+.MVJ\ZPUNVUZ\Z[HPUHIPSP[`PZVULVM[OL¸ SHNNHYKZ¹
in LAC (see above) and therefore, it poses one of the greatest challenges for meeting the 
upcoming SDG. Still, several LAC countries have put forward new ideas for alternative 
development approaches which are based on the concept of “living well” and which would 
involve a more harmonious relation with nature. The agricultural sector accounts, on the 
one hand, for an enormous population dedicated to family-based farming methods which 
are respectful of the environment; on the other hand, agribusiness generates enormous 
concentrations of sowing pools, and their owners, who are often of foreign origin, take 
HK]HU[HNLVM[OLSH_YLN\SH[PVUZVUSHUKHJX\PZP[PVUZ-\Y[OLYTVYLJVHSHUKMVZZPSM\LSZ
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are intensively used and in some countries these enjoy considerable public subsidies. 
(UKHZPUV[OLYÄLSKZ[OLYLHYLUVJVTTVU]PZPVUZVYPU[LYLZ[ZVYJVTWHYHISLJHWHJP[PLZ
^OPJOOHZ[YHKP[PVUHSS`THKLP[KPɉJ\S[[VHJOPL]LYLNPVUHSJVUZLUZ\ZPU[OPZÄLSK
The environmental agenda for climate change is extremely important to both regions 
in respect of the multilateral agenda, because the joint actions of EU and CELAC, 
accounting for a total of 61 states —constituting almost a third of the negotiating parties 
PU [OL <5-***·JV\SK IL KLJPZP]L 4VYLV]LY JV\U[YPLZ WLY[HPUPUN [V IV[O YLNPVUZ
have convened the COP in Warsaw (2013), Lima (2014) and Paris (2015) (Edwards and 
;PTTVUZ9VILY[Z(ZPTWSLTLU[LYZVMLU]PYVUTLU[HSHNYLLTLU[ZHUKZWLJPÄJHSS`
in respect of climate change, there are many possibilities for cooperation, particularly 
because on the European side there are actors who headed the environmental debate 
and who are therefore better equipped to address these issues —in terms of the 
establishment of policies, regulations, technology and production of knowledge— and, 
on the LAC side, this issue has becomea key element of its development strategy, in 
particular with respect to the reformulation of the traditional extractive economic model 
which is dependent on natural resources, in order to conserve its biodiversity.30 
Thus, the challenge for the strategic partnership resides in the contribution to the 
development of LAC capacities in order for the region to become an relevant player 
in the designing of the global agenda, which should also allow for the incorporation of 
its ancestral knowledge and wisdom in this process —for example, in respect to the 
conservation of the enormous genetic heritage of food crops such as maize or potatoes 
or the use of natural methods of pest control— which have been highlighted in several 
countries in the region. The main bi-regional initiative in this regard has been EUROCLIMA 
(Regional Programme for Cooperation on Climate Change 2010–2016). Moreover, as 
mentioned in the STI cooperation agenda, cooperation on climate change is carried out 
[OYV\NO[OL1090^P[OHZWLJPÄJ^VYRPUNNYV\W[OYV\NO,5:6*063(HJ[PVUHUK[OYV\NO
IPSH[LYHSJVVWLYH[PVUHJ[PVUZHZPZ[OLJHZLVM[OL))0*,ZPUJL)YHaPSPZVULVM[OLRL`
strategic partners in the LAC region in this area. 
 *VUZPKLYPUN [OH[ 3(* PZ YPJO PU YLZV\YJLZ [OL UH[\YLZVJPL[` YLSH[PVU WYV]PKLZ IV[O VWWVY[\UP[PLZ HUK 
 JOHSSLUNLZ PU HJOPL]PUN H TVYL Q\Z[ LX\P[HISL HUK Z\Z[HPUHISL KL]LSVWTLU[ 0[ HJJV\U[Z MVY HSTVZ[ OHSM VM 
 [OL ^VYSKZ [YVWPJHS MVYLZ[Z HSVUN ^P[O THU` V[OLY UH[\YHS IPVTLZ ^OPJO [VNL[OLY JVU[HPU H YPJO IPVKP]LYZP[ ` 
 0[ PZ OVTL [V H [OPYK VM MYLZO^H[LY YLZLY]LZ HUK H X\HY[LY VM [OL ^VYSKZ HYHISL SHUK WV[LU[PHS (UK KLZWP[L VM 
 Ä]L JLU[\YPLZ VM L_[YHJ[P]L PUK\Z[YPLZ Z\WWS`PUN [OL ^VYSK THYRL[ [OL YLNPVU Z[PSS OHZ SHYNL HTV\U[Z VM 
 PTWVY[HU[ TPULYHS YLZLY]LZ PUJS\KPUN VPS NHZ PYVU JVWWLY HUK NVSK" ZLL KL *HZ[YV /VNLUIVVT HUK )H\K 
 
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8.1. New global governance of development and post-2015 framework
;OLYPZLVMLTLYNPUNJV\U[YPLZ[OLNYV^PUNKPɈLYLUJLZIL[^LLUJV\U[YPLZHUKJOHUNLZ
PU[OLNLVNYHWO`VMKL]LSVWTLU[IV[OPU[OL5VY[OHUK[OL:V\[OOH]LSLK[VZPNUPÄJHU[
changes in the scenario within which the EU and LAC have operated and developed their 
bi-regional relationship. The important asymmetries in the levels of development in both 
regions cannot be ignored —not to mention the disparities that still exist in the domestic 
ZWOLYLVM [OLZLUH[PVUZ·UVY PZ P[WVZZPISL [V PNUVYL [OLKPɈLYLU[ YLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZHUK
capacities of each party; however, it is also essential to accept the increasing global and 
transnational nature of the contemporary development agenda, and the need for more 
LɈLJ[P]LHUKSLNP[PTH[LJVSSLJ[P]LHJ[PVU[VHKKYLZZ[OPZ
These changes have also altered the traditional balances and coalitions in the global 
governance of development and they give rise to new structures and constellations of 
power which require all those involved to readjust, and to carry out a critical appraisal of 
their policies and strategies. Until the nineties, governance of international cooperation 
and development aid largely depended on an integrated coalition, dominated, among 
other actors, by the EU and by institutions such as DAC and the World Bank, which 
promoted the consensus that prevailed during that ten year period —the Washington 
Consensus, on one hand, and a focus on reduction of extreme poverty by the North–
South cooperation and the MDG on the other hand— and it was in this context that the 
EU has developed and extended its presence and its role as a key player in cooperation 
for global development. More recently, new ventures have arisen such as the G20 and the 
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OPNOSL]LSMVY\TZ^OPJOOH]LJVUÄYTLK[OLHPKLɈLJ[P]LULZZHNLUKHHUKZ\IZLX\LU[S`
[OL.SVIHS7HY[ULYZOPWMVY,ɈLJ[P]L+L]LSVWTLU[*VVWLYH[PVU.7,+*MVSSV^PUN[OLth 
/PNO3L]LS-VY\TVU,ɈLJ[P]LULZZOLSKPU)\ZHU^P[OHUPUJYLHZLKWYLZLUJLVM
KL]LSVWPUNHUKLTLYNPUNJV\U[YPLZHUKUVUZ[H[LHJ[VYZHUKH^PSSPUNULZZ[VKLÄULH
new global governance of development.  
These processes may be seen in terms of risk and adversity, but they also provide 
opportunities for change and in particular for both the EU and LAC to take a leading role. 
Thus LAC, and particularly some countries within the region have left behind their traditional 
status of aid recipients and today they are better equipped to address development goals 
by themselves and to act as drivers of SSC in order to address development issues 
of the region and of a global nature. Globalisation processes in particular place them 
PUHKPɈLYLU[WVZP[PVU[V[OH[VM[OL[YHKP[PVUHS5VY[O:V\[OTVKLS^P[OHKL]LSVWTLU[
agenda in which transnational dynamics and interdependence and global risks carry 
more weight. This implies greater responsibilities and interests in the governance of 
global development, in which the traditional discourse of subordination and the defensive 
WVZP[PVUVM[OL¸.SVIHS:V\[O¹KVUVSVUNLYÄ[^LSS;OLZLK`UHTPJZHSZVJOHSSLUNL,<»Z
WLYJLW[PVUVMP[ZWV^LYPUÅ\LUJLSLNP[PTHJ `]HS\LZHUKPU[LYUH[PVUHSPKLU[P[ `^OPJOVU
some occasions were anchored in a traditional paradigm of North–South relations which 
likewise does no longer seem appropriate in light of the global changes and in respect 
to its relation with LAC which is today more balanced from both a material perspective 
and in terms of perceptions and discourse. Both the EU and LAC should avoid remaining 
entrenched in their discourses and narratives of self legitimisation which are often part 
of the traditional North–South narrative; and they should also take into account that 
these positions could be major obstacles to the dialogue and deliberations seeking to 
KLÄULSLNP[PTPZLHUKHWWS`WYPUJPWSLZY\SLZHUKWYVJLK\YLZMVYHJ[PVUYLX\PYLKMVY[OL
multilateral governance of global development. 
0U[OPZJVU[L_[[OLWLYMVYTHUJLVM3(*PU[OL4+.HNLUKHZOV\SKILOPNOSPNO[LKVɈLYPUN
a record of mixed results, positive in many of the targets, but with an unequal distribution 
of progress among countries in the region and within them. LAC appears to have achieved 
TVZ[ VM [OL NVHSZ HS[OV\NO PU ZVTLJHZLZ [OLYL OHZILLU PUZ\ɉJPLU[ WYVNYLZZ ;OPZ
WLYMVYTHUJLOHZILLU PUÅ\LUJLKI`ZVTLMH]V\YHISLLSLTLU[ZZ\JOHZHU PTWYV]LK
KLÄUP[PVUVMZVTLVM[OL4+.[HYNL[ZTHRPUN[OLTTVYLMLHZPISL·HUK[OLYLMVYLSLZZ
ambitious— for LAC, as well as the demographic dynamic of the region, which has been 
TVYLMH]V\YHISL[OHUPUV[OLYYLNPVUZ/V^L]LYZVTLMHJ[VYZOH]LHɈLJ[LKWLYMVYTHUJL
PU[OLVWWVZP[LZLUZLHTVUN[OLT[OLKL[YPTLU[HSLɈLJ[KLYP]PUNMYVT[OLZLYPV\ZT\S[P
dimensional inequalities existing within these countries and creating groups of people 
“excluded from development” on grounds of gender, ethnicity, age, disability and/or 
income. Other negative aspects refer to the unfavourable location of the region in terms 
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of receiving ODA which on a global scale has not reached the required levels; the lack 
of progress in multilateral and if appropriate, interregional trade negotiations; and the 
]VSH[PSP[`VM [OLLJVUVTPJJ`JSLZ [OH[ OH]LHɈLJ[LK [OL YLNPVU JVUKP[PVUPUN P[Z ZVJPV
economic situation and its capacity to mobilise resources for social investment. Despite 
[OLPY WHY[PHS Z\JJLZZ PU HJOPL]PUN4+. PU  3(*JV\U[YPLZ OH]L MHJLK ZPNUPÄJHU[
development challenges which include equality (in a multidimensional sense, including 
gender), security, respect for human rights and cultural diversity, health, the strengthening 
of institutions and democracy.  
(JLU[YHSJVTWVULU[VM[OLUL^NV]LYUHUJLVMNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[^PSSIL[OLKLÄUP[PVU
VM[OLWVZ[NVHSZVY:+.1\Z[HML^TVU[OZH^H`MYVT[OLZ\TTP[[VILOLSKPU
September 2015 in New York, the UN has – skillfully – managed to build a consensus 
HYV\UK [OL HS[LYUH[P]L VM KLÄUPUN HU HNLUKH^OPJO ^PSS W\YZ\L [OL [^VMVSK VIQLJ[P]L
of consolidating the MDG challenges which are still pending, and on the other hand 
advancing towards a more ambitious strategy for human development which takes into 
account the four dimensions of sustainability—economic development, social inclusion, 
environmental sustainability and good governance—, thus bringing together the human 
HUKZ\Z[HPUHISLKL]LSVWTLU[HNLUKHZ1\Z[SPRLP[ZWYLKLJLZZVY[OLUL^:+.HNLUKH
will have be universal in nature, and it moves towards a more cosmopolitan development 
strategy with goals which involve both developed and developing countries.
-VYIV[OYLNPVUZ[OLWVZ[MYHTL^VYRPZHSZVHUVWWVY[\UP[`MVYLZ[HISPZOPUNHUL^
“global partnership for development” with common responsibilities, however with the 
ULLKMVYKPɈLYPUNJVU[YPI\[PVUZNP]LU [OLKP]LYZLWVPU[ZVMKLWHY[\YLJHWHIPSP[PLZHUK
YLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZVM[OLJV\U[YPLZPU]VS]LK0[PZ^ P[OPU[OPZÄLSK^ OLYLZPNUPÄJHU[KPɈLYLUJLZ
between both regions can be found, not to mention those within them, and each region 
will also need address the shortcomings and contradictions of its internal policies and 
external action. Bi-regional dialogue and cooperation should permit both parties, in 
their relations of political dialogue and development cooperation, and in their position at 
PU[LYUH[PVUHSMVY\TZ[VJVU[YPI\[L[V[OH[¸NSVIHSWHY[ULYZOPW¹PUHJVOLYLU[HUKLɈLJ[P]L
THUULY)V[OYLNPVUZPUWHY[PJ\SHYJV\SKQVPU[S`JVU[YPI\[L[V[OH[NSVIHSLɈVY[I`TLHUZVM
new cooperation mechanisms, designed to provide global public goods and to work with 
other countries and regions in order to safeguard the achievement of SDG.
In this regard, the “Global Alliance for Development” could constitute one of the elements 
to revitalise bi-regional dialogue and cooperation and to contribute to a more strategic 
horizon, imbuing thereby the bi-regional strategic partnership with new impulses 
(Sanahuja 2015). In item 7 of the “Political Declaration” adopted at the II EU-CELAC 
:\TTP[)Y\ZZLSZ1\ULSLHKLYZMYVTIV[OYLNPVUZKLJPKLK[V[HZR[OLPY4PUPZ[LYZVM
-VYLPNU(ɈHPYZ[VLUNHNLPU¸HUJVTWYLOLUZP]LHUKPU[LNYH[P]LYLÅLJ[PVUHIV\[[OLM\[\YL
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of the bi-regional relationship” based on which the programmes and actions adopted 
during the Ssummits could be evaluated. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether in this 
forum the issue of development cooperation and the “global alliance” which both regions 
have indented to promote, will be considered.
The EU has elaborated a legislative framework and policies for the budgetary cycle and 
for programmes during 2014-2020, which are part of the Programme for Change and 
^OPJOOH]LILLUHJJVTWHUPLKI`HZLYPLZVMPUZ[Y\TLU[ZMVYÄUHUJPUN;O\ZILMVYL[OL
KLÄUP[PVUVM[OL:+.,<HJ[P]P[PLZ^ LYLKLZPNULK^ OPJOL]LUZV^ PSSULLK[VHKHW[[V[OL
new global targets of development. Between 2015 and 2010, the model of cooperation 
between the EU and developing countries will need to undergo a revision, in particular 
P[Z JVVWLYH[PVU WVSPJ ` MVY ]HYPV\Z YLHZVUZ! ÄYZ[S ` PU  HU PU[LYTLKPHY` L]HS\H[PVU
VM P[Z7S\YPHUU\HS-PUHUJPHS-YHTL^YR^PSSILJVUK\J[LK^OPJO^PSS PUJS\KL
L_[LYUHSHJ[PVUZ"ZLJVUKS ` [OLKLIH[LHUKKLÄUP[PVUVMWYPVYP[PLZHUKZ[YH[LNPLZVM [OL
,<PUP[ZL_[LYUHSHɈHPYZHUK^P[OYLNHYK[VNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[MVY[OL\WJVTPUNJ`JSL
of programming 2021-2027 will necessarily have to fully incorporate the committments 
adopted in the context of the SDG; thirdly, the expiration of the Cotonú Agreement in 
2020 which regulates its relationship with the ACP countries, and which will also imply 
HUPTWVY[HU[YLÅLJ[PVUVU[OLZPNUPÄJHUJLHUKYVSLVM[OLZLJV\U[YPLZPU,<»ZMVYLPNUHUK
development policies. 
LAC countries have been trying for years to reach a common position which would allow 
[OLT[V PUÅ\LUJL [OLKLÄUP[PVUVMHWVZ[HNLUKH^P[OTVYLZ\JJLZZ [OHU PU [OL
past. Once consensus on the SDGs is achieved, it will be necessary to jointly work on 
the implementation and monitoring of these goals at the global, regional and national 
level. The ECLAC contributions deriving from their “equality trilogy” have been especially 
constructive in this regard, along with the consensus reached during the most recent 
CELAC Summits, which have placed special emphasis on the resolution of the problems 
related to inequalities and environmental sustainability. 
In the light of the foregoing, the following recommendations and proposals are put 
forward: 
a) (Z[YH[LNPJKPHSVN\L MVYKLÄUPUNNV]LYUHUJLVMNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[! if, based 
on their European and Latin American values, visions, and principles both 
regions aspire to act as rulemakers in global development, they will need to 
address issues, within the framework of their bi-regional relation, through a 
strategic dialogue which will allow them to design a global vision. Thsis dialogue 
is will have to address their values, aspirations, capacities and responsibilities 
HZZPNUPÄJHU[HJ[VYZ PU[OLUL^NV]LYUHUJLVMNSVIHSKL]LSVWTLU[^OPJOOHZ
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ILLUZOHWLKI`[OL<5[OL.HUK[OLUL^.SVIHS7HY[ULYZOPWMVY,ɈLJ[P]L
Development Cooperation (GPEDC) established in Busan. 
b) A global partnership for sustainable development: through the aforementioned 
strategic dialogue, both the EU and LAC, in the triple dimension of “models”, 
“players” and “implementers”, need to continue debating the principles and rules 
MVYHJ[PVU^OPJOHYLILPUNKLÄULKPU[OLLTLYNPUNZ[Y\J[\YLZVMNV]LYUHUJLMVY
global development (G-20, GPEDC, UN), ensuring that they are inclusive and 
representative, as there are still varying positions with regard to their content 
and application. They are also required to contribute to their implementation, in 
particular in the GEPDC. “Placing people at the core of sustainable development”, 
as the OWG of the SDG claims, means that LAC and the EU should contribute to 
the forging of a “global partnership for sustainable development”. This implies to 
JVU[YPI\[PUN^P[OZ\IZ[HU[PHSJVU[LU[[V[OLWYPUJPWSLVMZOHYLKI\[KPɈLYLU[PH[LK
responsibilities at three levels: global, in the framework of UN negotiations; 
bi-regional between the EU and LAC; and in the LAC. This last will require an 
agreement —foreseeably within the CELAC— on the division of responsibilities 
HUKJPYJ\TZ[HUJLZWYLZLU[ PU [OL YLNPVUIHZLKVU3(*»ZKPɈLYLU[JHWHJP[PLZ
and opportunities for progress, taking account of the fact that some states —
[OL¸LTLYNPUNJV\U[YPLZ¹·OH]LILULÄ[[LK [VHJVUZPKLYHISLL_[LU[ MYVT[OL
NSVIHSPZLKLJVUVT`HUK[OL`OH]LHNYLH[LYPUÅ\LUJLVUPU[LYUH[PVUHSMVY\TZ
while at the same time, they have subjected the environment to increasing 
pressures; therefore they should assume greater responsibilities in the joint 
project for human sustainable development in the region. 
c) A more coordinated and coherent action in both regions in their respective 
cooperation policies: [OLULLK[VJVU[YPI\[L[VHSLNP[PTH[LHUKLɈLJ[P]LVMNSVIHS
KL]LSVWTLU[PZMHJLKI`IV[OYLNPVUZHUKOHZ[VILYLÅLJ[LKPU[OLPYJVVWLYH[PVU
strategies, which have their own limitations and shortcomings in respect of their 
aid and cooperation policies, either North-South or South–South, and countries 
have also respond to the principle of coherence of their development policies. 
Although this principle has only been formally assumed by the EU and its 
member states, it is crucial to achieving SDG and the post-2015 framework and 
therefore it calls for action from LAC in respect of its SSC and its external action. 
States have to analyse and discuss, not only on a bi-regional but also a global 
scale, about the impact of their economic, social and environmental policies and 
the joint external action of the EU and LAC on development, and this, in turn, 
will impy necessary reforms of these policies. However, it is not just a question 
of ensuring coherence between policies, buth rather that all of these policies 
are consistent with the SDG as well as and with the multilateral framework in 
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which these are inscribed. Insofar as they adapt to these norms and standards— 
that is by “regionalising” or “multilateralising” them—, national cooperation and 
development policies, whether NSC, SSC or TrC, could be placed in regional 
and global development frameworks which would promote their coherence and 
LɈLJ[P]LULZZ
d) Improving consensus on EU and LAC positions as key players in the design of 
the post-2015 framework and the SDG: both the EU and LAC, the latter through 
CELAC, have set out their respective positions for the post-2015 framework, and, 
in accordance with their traditional vision and action in respect of multilateralism, 
they largely coincide with the proposals of the OWG and the Secretary General, 
HUK PU [LYTZ VM JSPTH[L JOHUNL^P[O [OL <5-***>P[O  JV\U[YPLZ PU [OL
process of negotiation, the contributions of the EU and LAC may be decisive 
in promoting this agenda. In many aspects there is a shared global vision 
which promotes adoption of pressing and universal SDG, allowing for a certain 
KLNYLLVMÅL_PIPSP[`[VLUZ\YL[OH[LHJOJV\U[Y`JHUHKHW[[OLNVHSZHJJVYKPUN
to its particular context, priorities and national capacities; with operational and 
concrete goals which are both measurable and realistic; with a rights-based 
approach centred on human beings, and a broad and integral vision of SDG in 
which, in addition to economic development, social inclusion and environmental 
sustainability, also contains the dimensions of democratic governance, human 
rights, peace and security as conditions for development. It is true that there 
HYLKPɈLYLUJLZIL[^LLUIV[OYLNPVUZHZ[OLYLHYL^P[OPU[OLTHUKHZ^PSSIL
mentioned below, this demands from both parties to consolidate their conditions 
and capacities as actors in international development cooperation. 
e) Adapt the SDG and the post-2015 framework to the LAC development agendas: 
LAC should decide how to interpret and adapt an agenda that is initially universal 
in nature but which encourages governments to establish their own national 
goals. They may decide —as in the case of the MDG— to adopt and closely 
follow an agenda which is less ambitious for them than for other regions of the 
planet, therefore running a lower risk of failure. Or, alternatively, they may decide 
to make the most of the opportunities for cooperation facilitated by CELAC and 
other regional bodies (such as ECLAC and the sub-regional integration bodies) 
PU VYKLY MVYNL H JVUZLUZ\Z HYV\UK [OL KLÄUP[PVU VM H ¸T\S[PSL]LS¹ HNLUKH VM
goals, creating positive incentives for promoting the dynamics of progress. This 
last alternative is consistent with the “Integral action plan for cooperation with 
middle-income countries” that CELAC is promoting at the UN, and which could 
ILZPNUPÄJHU[PUWYL]LU[PUN[OLUL^:+.HNLUKHMYVT¸THYNPUHSPZPUN¹40*HZ
occurred with the MDG, which focused on the lower income countries. 
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f) LAC: a “multilevel” transformative agenda in three geographic areas: in 
accordance with the previous aspect, an ambitious and thorough agenda of 
sustainable human development in LAC needs to cover three geographic areas: 
HUPUP[PHSSL]LSVMNSVIHSZJVWLHUK\UP]LYZHSJV]LYHNLKLÄULKI`:+.(ZLJVUK
level of regional scope which improves and adapts SDG to the LAC context, in 
line with the CELAC 2015 Action Plan”, and a third national level which adapts 
[OLYLNPVUHSHNLUKH[V[OLZWLJPÄJP[PLZHUKWV[LU[PHSP[PLZVMLHJOJV\U[Y `^OPJO
would make the SDG strategy more precise and realistic and help to mitigate the 
“problem of attribution” of the development agendas —facilitating the evaluation 
and accountability of all the partner countries— which in turn would stimulate 
shared experiences and cooperation between Latin American and Caribbean 
JV\U[YPLZ>P[O[OPZT\S[PSH[LYHSKLÄUP[PVU3(*JV\SKNVHZ[LWM\Y[OLY[OHU[OL
SDG, adopting a more transformative agenda which takes into account other 
relevant areas of development which are not included in the universal agenda.
8.2. SDG Taxonomies: a greater comprehension
of development challenges in LAC  
The SDG agenda is not just a strategy for reducing economic poverty, but a multidimensional 
Z[YH[LN` MVY ¸Z\Z[HPUHISLO\THUKL]LSVWTLU[¹^OPJOKLÄULZH JVTWSL_^VYSKTHWVM
priorities requiring a multidimensional comprehension of the “new geography of sustainable 
development”. In order to achieve that greater comprehension of development, and in 
WHY[PJ\SHY[OLJOHSSLUNLZMHJLKI`3(*[OL[YHKP[PVUHSJSHZZPÄJH[PVUVMPUJVTLWLYJHWP[HPZ
not the most appropriate one. Its simplicity is the main reason why, despite its limitations, it 
continues to be used in the planning and management of aid policies of DAC donors, and 
consequently of the EU. Thus, the decision on eligibility for receiving ODA is largely based 
VU [OPZJSHZZPÄJH[PVU;VNL[OLY^P[O ZVTL¸ULPNOIV\YOVVK¹JYP[LYPH YLSH[PUN [VWYPVYP[PLZ
of stability and security, it is income level which to a considerable extent determines EU 
development policy. In fact, the current “Agenda for Change” establishes an ODA allocation 
JYP[LYPVUIHZLKVUH]HN\L PKLU[PÄJH[PVUVM¸JV\U[Y`ULLKZ¹^OPJOKVUV[X\LZ[PVU[OL
\UKLYS`PUNJYP[LYPVUVMLSPNPIPSP[ ` 0U [OLJVU[L_[VM3(* [OPZOHZHU PTTLKPH[LLɈLJ[VU
Chile and Uruguay, countries which reached a high income level and which therefore, by 
2017, will no longer be receiving ODA, in line with DAC criteria. In the near future three 
other middle to high income countries are about to “graduate” as high income countries: 
Panama, Brazil and Venezuela, despite their existing development challenges. 
0U[OLÄUHSPUZ[HUJLJSHZZPÄJH[PVUZZOV\SKIL\ZLM\SMVY[OLW\YWVZLMVY^OPJO[OL`^LYL
created: facilitating the comprehension of a complex world and guiding the design of 
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development policies. In the LAC context, the changes —and complexities— of the 
geography of sustainable development are such that a better comprehension —and 
THUHNLTLU[·VM[OLNVHSZVMWYVNYLZZ^V\SKJHSSMVY[OLTVKPÄJH[PVUVM[OLHUHS`[PJHS
perspectives with which we view the region, beginning with the way these countries are 
JSHZZPÄLK ;OL IPYLNPVUHS WHY[ULYZOPW IL[^LLU ,<3(* ZOV\SK IL H^HYL VM [OPZ UL^
scenario in order to address universal and shared challenges raised by the SDG agenda 
PUHZ[YH[LNPJTHUULY(SSVM[OLZLYLÅLJ[PVUZSLHK[V[OLMVSSV^PUNWYVWVZHSZ!
a) )L`VUKPU[LYUH[PVUHSJSHZZPÄJH[PVUVMPUJVTLZ![OLULLKMVYUL^[H_VUVTPLZVM
development consistent with SDG: it is important to move towards the creation 
of multi-dimensional taxonomies capable of identifying the disparate challenges 
which Latin American and Caribbean countries are facing, and which could 
contribute to guide international cooperation policies in the post-2015 context. 
The taxonomy proposed in this study includes the four dimensions of sustainable 
development included in the SDG, and by means of an analysis of clusters, we 
OH]LPKLU[PÄLKHTVYLJVTWSL_[H_VUVT `KLÄUPUNZP_NYV\WZVMJV\U[YPLZ^P[O
PTWVY[HU[KPɈLYLUJLZPU[LYTZVM[OLJOHSSLUNLZ[OL`MHJL;OPZL_LYJPZLJHUUV[
be considered as a concluded, as other SDG goals or even other dimensions of 
sustainable human development, might be incorporated and approved by the 
UN General Assembly in 2015. 
b) SDG-taxonomies as tools for planning, management and assessment of 
progress achieved: taxonomies as the one proposed here aim to stage demands 
toward the EU and the LAC in the moment of strategic decision-making about 
[OLLSPNPIPSP[`HUKWYPVYP[PLZVMJV\U[YPLZHZ^LSSHZ [OLÄLSKZVMHJ[PVUVM [OLPY
development cooperation policies, including NSC and SSC. This analysis may 
provide a useful contribution in guiding strategic management of development 
policies in the region, which will enable states who aim at achieving the SDG to 
adapt these goals to the realities of each country, as the post-2015 framework 
proposes. The EU will need to adapt its new planning cycle for 2021-2027 
and the policies replacing the Programme for Change to the SDG. Identifying 
relatively homogenous groups of countries helps to create “opportunities” for 
JVVWLYH[PVUMVYLHJOVM[OLKPɈLYLU[JS\Z[LYZ0UWHY[PJ\SHYJSHZZPÄJH[PVUZVM[OPZ
type allow for the evaluation among peers – that is, between countries in the 
same group— of their collective progress and setbacks, and moving forward in 
[LYTZVMPKLU[PM`PUNZWLJPÄJKL]LSVWTLU[Z[YH[LNPLZMVYLHJONYV\W^OPJO^PSS
L_[LUKHUKYLÄUL[OLNLULYHSPZ[UH[\YLVM\UP]LYZHSKL]LSVWTLU[HNLUKHZ
c) The SDG-taxonomies as instruments of SSC and TrC: SDG-taxonomies may 
also be useful in guiding SSC initiatives in LAC, insofar as they allow for the 
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PKLU[PÄJH[PVUVMIV[O[OLWV[LU[PHSP[PLZVMLHJONYV\W^OPJO[OLJV\U[YPLZJHU
exploit in their role as regional donors) and their weaknesses and challenges 
in terms of development (which should be addressed by the actions of other 
JV\U[YPLZ PU [OL YLNPVU 0U [OPZ YLNHYK JV\U[YPLZVɈLYPUN::*HYLKPZ[YPI\[LK
among all the development clusters and these “diagonal” cooperation relations 
(neither vertical nor horizontal in terms of levels of donor development) highlight 
the existing synergies in a diverse region. 
8.3. LAC and the EU as promoters of global development: 
the “Agenda for Change”, SSC and the TrC 
Given the weight of the EU in trade, funding, aid, climate and other dimensions of 
development, its commitment and action will depend, to a considerable extent, on the 
viability and results of the post-2015 goals. As indicated, the EU is expected to maintain 
a leadership role in global development as a model, as a player, and as an implementer. 
(Z PU V[OLY ÄLSKZ VM L_[LYUHS ,< HJ[PVU [OLYL HYL HSZV V[OLY PU[LYLZ[Z PU]VS]LK PU P[Z
development policy, such as the values and identity of the EU, and its relevance in 
international relations, which to a considerable extent are based on its singular nature as 
a “normative actor”.
This study has attempted to show that, next to external challenges, there are endogenous 
WYVISLTZ^OPJOHɈLJ[[OLPUÅ\LUJLPKLU[P[`HUKUVYTH[P]P[`VM[OL,<;OLZLWYVISLTZ
are related to the EU’s institutional construction, to the pending coordination and 
complimentarity between policies, instruments and actions of EU institutions and those of 
the member states, to the contradictions between their interests, identity and their values, 
HUK[V[OLPUJVOLYLUJLVMWVSPJPLZPUÄLSKZZ\JOHZ[YHKLHUKKL]LSVWTLU[M\UKPUN
The positioning of the EU in respect of the post-2015 agenda highlights some of these 
shortcomings: the EU has held a leading position and has contributed to a very ambitious, 
universal, and focused UN proposal. There are areas in which the EU proposals go beyond 
the consensus reached at the UN such as peace, security, democratic governance, a 
rights-based approach or the means of implementation, with very advanced proposals on 
ODA and international taxation. However, the EU proposal can also be questioned when 
JVTWHYLKHNHPUZ[ P[Z [YHKLHUKKL]LSVWTLU[WVSPJLZ^P[OKLJPZPVUZ [HRLU PUKPɈLYLU[
contexts and prior to that of post-2015 goals and policies which are not well adjusted to 
the EU’s own positionin, for instance the issue of “graduation” considered in the Agenda 
for Change,or in some of its trade initiatives such as the proposal for mega regional 
agreements which undermine the multilateral framework of the WTO.
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As has been the case in other issues of the international agenda, the EU is both part of the 
problem and also part of the solution. In fact, the EU faces a two-pronged challenge in the 
post-2015 framework: on the one hand, its leadership and action in UN negotiations will 
ILKLJPZP]L[VLUZ\YL[OH[[OLTLHZ\YLZÄUHSS`HNYLLK\WVU^PSSILJVUJPZLHUKZWLJPÄJ
[OH[[OLZL^ PSSHSSV^MVY[OLLɈLJ[P]LTVUP[VYPUNVMWYVNYLZZHUKPU[LYUH[PVUHSJVTWHYPZVU
without having to renounce the ambitious and integral nature and the universality which 
Z\WWVY[ [OL ULNV[PH[PUNTHUKH[L VM IV[O [OL ,< HUK [OL <5 -\Y[OLYTVYL P[ ^PSS IL
ULJLZZHY`[VLUZ\YL[OH[P[ZKL]LSVWTLU[WVSPJ`JVU[YPI\[LZLɈLJ[P]LS`[V[OLHJOPL]LTLU[
VM [OL NVHSZ ^OPJO ^PSS PTW` [OL HKKYLZZPUN VM [OL PUZ\ɉJPLUJPLZ HUK WYVISLTZ VM
JVOLYLUJLHUKHTVYLJVVYKPUH[LKHUKLɈLJ[P]LHJ[PVUVM[OLTLTILYZ[H[LZHUK,<
institutions. In particular the following aspects should be taken into account: 
a) Beyond “graduation”: new forms of partnership adapted to the realities of LAC 
development and the global challenges of SDG: the “graduation” of bilateral 
aid should not imply the end of development cooperation with these countries, 
but instead should give rise to new, more advanced forms of partnership, 
which include: a) EU actions and programmes, both at the bilateral and regiona 
SSL]LS ^OPJO HYL IL[[LY HKQ\Z[LK [V [OL ZWLJPÄJP[PLZ HUK IHZLK VU PTWYV]LK
comprehension of the development agendas of these countries, for which the 
SDG-taxonomy proposed in the previous section could serve as a reference, as 
well as cooperation in areas such as social cohesion, public policies, environment 
and education, and science and technology (see below); b) joint TrC actions with 
other less developed countries in the region, actions of a sub-regional nature; 
and c) joint initiatives at a global scale, in less developed countries in other 
regions or countries, with a TrC logic and supporting the provision of global 
public assets.   
b) Trade and development - improving policy coherences: the opportunities for LAC 
development in its relations with the EU are largely conditioned by the access to 
the European market, or by the framework of multilateral regulations or bilateral 
VY PU[LYYLNPVUHS HNYLLTLU[Z 0U [OPZ JVU[L_[ ZPNUPÄJHU[ HK]HUJLZ ^LYL UV[
registered during the MDG period and these will thus depend from advances in 
the post-2015 framework. Improved coherence in the trade-development axis 
YLX\PYLZZPNUPÄJHU[JOHUNLZH[]HYPV\ZSL]LSZHUKPU]HYPV\ZÄLSKZVMHJ[PVU!H
WTO multilateral negotiations, which are currently stagnant, but which continue 
to provide the appropriate framework for establishing an open, balanced, rule-
based trade system, which is aware of the needs of less developed countries; b) 
partnership agreements currently in place and in the process of negotiation, with 
greater recognition of asymmetries and competitiveness polices, including “aid 
for trade” and c) the foreseeable impact of mega-regional negotiations (TTIP and 
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TPP), in terms of the opportunities and risks involved for both parties as well as 
the means by which these could be addressed, should be subject of intensive 
debate. 
c) Development funding and coherent policies: this is also a crucial issue for 
development and SDG, in which both regions are required to advance within a 
global “multilevel”, inter-regional and national framework consistent with SDG. 
;OPZHSZVPTWSPLZHJ[PVUPU]HYPV\ZHYLHZ!PU[LYUH[PVUHSÄUHUJPHSHYJOP[LJ[\YL0,+
YLTP[[HUJLZVɉJPHSÅV^ZHUK6+( PUUV]H[P]LTLJOHUPZTZHUKTVIPSPZH[PVU
VM UH[PVUHS YLZV\YJLZ ^P[O [H_ HUK ÄUHUJPHS YLMVYTZ (J[PVU PZ HSZV YLX\PYLK
on various levels: consensus building of positions in respect of the 3rd UN 
+L]LSVWTLU[-\UKPUN:\TTP[VM^P[OTVYLHTIP[PV\ZNVHSZ[OHU[OVZL
considered in the modest “Monterrey Consensus” of 2002; the incentives 
and rules for investment in social and environmental quality, in line with the 
agreements set up in the I EU-CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile; and the use 
of new instruments such as  blending as catalysts. 
d) Improving impact of development of blending: It is necessary to ensure that there 
are resources in place and that the operations funded with this instrument are 
JVUZPZ[LU[^ P[O[OLWYPVYP[PLZKLÄULKPU[OLKL]LSVWTLU[WVSPJPLZVMLHJOJV\U[Y `
through their respective Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIP). This can be 
implemented, as appropriate, within the agreed programming frameworks and/
or through operations of multilateral or regional development banks operating 
PU3(*(ZUV[LKI`[OLÄUHSKVJ\TLU[VM[OL;OPYK<UP[LK5H[PVUZ*VUMLYLUJL
VU-PUHUJPUNMVY+L]LSVWTLU[PU(KKPZ(IHIHP[LTPUVYKLY[VPTWYV]L[OL
potential of blending projects with mixed funding, including partnerships between 
the public and private sectors, should share risks and provide appropriate 
compensations, incluning clear mechanisms for accountability and complying 
with social and environmental standards. Therefore, it is also necessary for the 
WYVQLJ[ZÄUHUJLK^P[O[OPZ PUZ[Y\TLU[[VOH]LPUWSHJLTLJOHUPZTZMVYW\ISPJ
consultation and regulations for safeguarding social and environmental issues, 
similar to the most rigorous norms in the EU and the multilateral banks active in 
[OLYLNPVU;OLHJ[PVUVM[OL3(0-HUK[OH[VM[OL*00ZOV\SKILM\SS`PU[LNYH[LK
in the multilateral and regional strategies for combating climate change and 
contribute to the mobilisation of resources for funding. 
e) *VVYKPUH[PVUHUKJVTWSLTLU[HYP[` LɈLJ[P]LULZZ YLX\PYLTLU[Z MVY [OL,<! in 
accordance with   the Busan commitments and those adopted by the EU itself, 
it will be necessary to continue improving coordination and complimentarity of 
EU institutions and those of its member states through joint planning and, if 
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appropriate, delegated cooperation. Together with greater Europeanisation of the 
member state policies within the context of division of work, more coordinated 
action from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and from the services 
of the Commission in charge of external action (development, trade, extension 
etc.) is needed; the political vision of some, and the development approach of 
others, on issues such as cooperation, planning and negotiations with developing 
countries, should be adecuately combined. In this context, the reorganisation of 
these varying visions under the supervision of the High Representative and Vice 
7YLZPKLU[VM [OL*VTTPZZPVU MVY,_[LYUHS9LSH[PVUZ-LKLYPJH4VNOLYPUPTH`
well contribute to achieving this.
Not less relevant in this regard are the emerging SSC and the TrC impulsed by LAC, which 
TH`WSH`HZPNUPÄJHU[YVSLPU[OLWVZ[JVU[L_[HUKPUWHY[PJ\SHYPUZL[[PUN\WUL^
forms of partnership in the cooperation with the EU and its member states. However, to 
make this possible the following aspects would be required: 
f) Strengthening of the institutional nature of SSC and TrC in LAC: the political 
intentions of the SSC and the TrC require rules and structures which will make 
it possible to manage their practices. The region is undergoing a transitional 
process moving towards new institutional structures, requiring endogenous 
and innovative modalities which would allow for the development of a twofold 
role in the context of change towards an agenda that transcends ODA. In this 
regard, the post-2015 development agenda represents an opportunity for 
YLKLÄUPUN[OLSVNPJZHUKHWWYVHJOLZVMJVVWLYH[PVUVU[OLIHZPZVMZOHYLK`L[
JSLHYS`KPɈLYLU[PH[LKYLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZ(ZWLJPÄJHUKKPɈLYLU[PHSHZWLJ[MVY3(*
countries would be to have institutions that address the need for coordination 
IL[^LLUKPɈLYLU[ Z[H[L HNLUJPLZ PU]VS]LK PU JVVWLYH[PVU HJ[P]P[PLZ IHZLKVU
KPɈLYLU[SVNPJZHUKPUZ[P[\[PVUHSPU[LYLZ[Z^ OPJOHSZVPUJS\KLYLSH[PVUZ^ P[ONSVIHS
ZLJ[VYPHSHNLUKHZ-\Y[OLYTVYL[OLNYV^PUNYLSL]HUJLVM[OPZHJ[P]P[`TH`PU[OL
midterm imply the increased involvement of social agents which can contribute 
—or question— policies, which would imply the consideration of permeable 
institutional frameworks, transparent and accessible information systems and 
communications channels adapted to social organisations and the citizenry. 
g) Greater European comprehension and recognition of LAC SSC and TrC: in terms 
of political dialogue, it is important that the EU understands SSC and TrC from 
[OLWLYZWLJ[P]LVMP[ZWVSP[PJHSM\UJ[PVUHSP[`HUKJOHYHJ[LYPZ[PJZ^ OPJOKPɈLYLU[PH[L
these mechanisms from the concept and traditional practices of NSC, in order to 
establish the basis for discussion on a new concept of development cooperation 
which will transcend ODA. In order to enable this discussion, the institutions of 
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IV[OYLNPVUZ^ PSSULLK[VHJRUV^SLKNL[OLWVSP[PJHSKPTLUZPVUVM[OLZLKLÄUP[PVUZ
LZJOL^PUN LU[YLUJOTLU[ PU YPNPK HUK L_JS\ZP]L KLÄUP[PVUZ HUK ILJVTPUN
H[[LU[P]L[VHUKÅL_PISLPUYLZWLJ[VMHJOHUNPUNJVU[L_[([HIPYLNPVUHSSL]LS
this requires to consider the issue in EU’s planning of its multiannual indicative 
programme and in the conceptual framework of cooperation of CELAC, by 
means of an open and continued political dialogue between EU -CELAC, which 
will also need to address the evolution of this issue in the global development 
agenda. Although CELAC initially intended to promote cooperation within the 
region, the regional component of the EU indicative programme could be an 
important support in prioritised sector issues. The broader SSC vision proposed 
by CELAC as a contribution to regional integration will provide a common ground 
for discussion. Within this context, the EU would be able to add value based on 
its experience in addressing community problems. 
   
h) Incorporate TrC in regional cooperation: cooperation between LAC and EU has 
implied various experiences in SSC and TrC which allow for the construction 
of a new framework for dialogue and bi-regional practices. Some member 
states of the EU, such as Germany and Spain, have been particularly active in 
incorporating TrC in their relations with LAC, developing valuable lessons for 
regional cooperation. Opportunities for bi-regional cooperation have also been 
opened by SSC experiences which have provided appropriate solutions for 
ZWLJPÄJKL]LSVWTLU[WYVISLTZHUK^ OPJOOH]LILLUL_[LUKLK[OYV\NO;Y*^ P[O
European countries. Those experiences can contribute to developing the bi-
YLNPVUHSJVVWLYH[PVU;OLUL^ÄUHUJPUNMHJPSP[`[VIVVZ[PUUV]H[P]L;Y*PUP[PH[P]LZ
within the region with the help of national cooperation agencies launched at the II 
EU-CELAC Summit 2015, can constitute a useful instrument for such purposes. 
Regarding its implementation, the previous lessons regarding TrC should be 
taken into account, as well as the already developed relations between the two 
regions and third parties.
i) The potential of EU regional programmes for TrC: while the lack of recognition of 
SSC and TrC by EU institutions has been already pointed out (see above), some 
of the EU’s regional programmes actually constitute areas which help to make 
the most of both modes of cooperation and these could be adjust in their design 
[VWYPVYP[PaLZ\WWVY[MVY*::HUKKL]LSVWTLU[WYPVYP[PLZVM[OL(3*-VYL_HTWSL
EUROSociAL and URB-AL are dispose of mechanisms which have facilitated 
exchange of of experiences and knowledge in a horizontal manner in prioritised 
sectors. An inventory of the participation of LAC countries as transferees 
indicates that although those with the greatest number of regional SSC actions 
are the most active transferees, the sectorial dimension of the programme 
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facilitates action from countries less active in SSC yet with important experience 
PUV[OLYZWLJPÄJHYLHZ;OPZYLNPVUHSJVVWLYH[PVU^V\SKM\UJ[PVUPUH^H`ZPTPSHY
to that promoted by some UN organisations, which have generated platforms 
for the dissemination of knowledge and experience to resolve sectorial problems 
^OPJOHYLJVSSLJ[P]LS` PKLU[PÄLKHUKWYPVYP[PZLKI` [OL YLZWLJ[P]LWHY[PJPWHU[Z
The sectorial approach of these programmes facilitates to conduct this process 
H[[OLSL]LSVMZWLJPÄJHYLHZOLHS[OLK\JH[PVU[H_H[PVUQ\Z[PJLLTWSV`TLU[
science and technology, environment, etc.) and it also has the advantage of 
allowing those directly involved, both central governments and decentralised 
agents, to intervene. Given that these sector agendas contain national issues 
which are also touching upon global dimensions, the dynamics of cooperation 
could be adjusted to the concept of development as a global problem. 
j) Other modes of SSC as opportunities for bi-regional cooperation: regional 
JVVWLYH[PVUWYHJ[PJLZOH]LILLUPKLU[PÄLK^OPJO^OPSL[OL`HYLKPZ[HUJLKMYVT
a SSC concept restricted to technical cooperation, also open up new options 
for EU-LAC cooperation. They arise in the context of the regionalisms present in 
LAC such as Mercosur, Unasur and SICA. The potential of regional institutions 
Z\JO HZ *(- +L]LSVWTLU[ )HUR VM 3H[PU (TLYPJH HUK UH[PVUHS PUZ[P[\[PVUZ
with regional activity such as BNDS (National Bank of Economic and Social 
Development of Brazil) should also be taken into account, as these mobilise 
YLZV\YJLZMVYKL]LSVWTLU[IHZLKVUZWLJPÄJTVKLZHUKJYP[LYPH^OPJOJV\SKIL
aligned, in the context of a broader development strategy, with the EU’s blending 
strategy.
k) Promoting joint learning and synergies with already existing platforms: in terms 
of management and practices, some lessons can be extracted from SSC and 
TrC experiences, but these cannot be automatically reproduced, as these need 
to take into accountthe particularities of involved agents and their political 
and social contexts. In order to capitalise on these experiences in LAC, one 
possibilitywould be to commission studies and joint EU–LAC missions based on 
an inductive approach, which would encourage mutual learning and contribute 
to a more proactive cooperation agenda in order to address the new SDG 
agenda. Within the bi-regional EU-CELAC framework, it would be appropriate 
to analyse the way in which the work already developed by IAPSSC has been 
capitalised on and extended in order to increase knowledge, establish technical 
NYV\WZHUKKPZZLTPUH[LL_WLYPLUJLZ PU [LJOUPJHSJVVWLYH[PVU-\Y[OLYTVYL P[
PZ PTWVY[HU[ [VRLLW PUTPUK[OLUL^WVZPIPSP[PLZ MVYHUL^ÄUHUJPHS MHJPSP[` [V
dinamize innovative initiatives of TrC launched during the II EU-CELAC Summit 
in 2015.
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8.4. Bi-regional cooperation in the post-2015 scenario  
;OL,<3(*IPYLNPVUHSZ[YH[LNPJWHY[ULYZOPWJHUWYV]PKLZWLJPÄJJVU[YPI\[PVUZ[V [OL
post-2015 global development agenda based on the identity and singular values of its 
participants, and on a sectorial cooperation which has been built upon a political dialogue 
without precedent in other regions.  
This partnership is paradoxical: there are still considerable asymmetries in terms of 
conditions, policies and regulatory frameworks as well as cultures and identities, and 
TVYLV]LY P[ PZHKPHSVN\LIL[^LLUYLNPVUZ^OPJOKPɈLY PU [OLPY PU[LYUH[PVUHS YVSLZ;OL
EU is represented by a single voice with its own policies, and to a considerable extent, 
it has “europeanised” the voices and policies of its member states although, its action 
has been hampered by serious problems in terms of coherence. In LAC, the emergence 
of CELAC would appear to indicate a desire to give the region that same common voice, 
along with greater political autonomy, at least in some policy areas. However CELAC still 
has no capacity to design and implement regional policies, and/or coordinate those of 
its members within a coherent frame— in particular, in terms of development agendas—, 
considering the region as a whole, while at the same time recognising its diversity. 
-\Y[OLYTVYL[OLLYVZPVUVM,<»Z¸UVYTH[P]LWV^LY¹HUK[OLJOHUNPUNJVUZ[LSSH[PVUMVM
power in the international system are transforming the nature and the balances of the bi-
regional relation, and this relationship is increasingly becoming one among equals which 
can no longer be understood in the traditional North-South frame, with a EU which at 
times viewed the region from a position of power, convinced of the correctness of its 
model, with paternalistic and at times arrogant attitudes; and a LAC which previously 
had adopted a defensive position, and with self-legitimising discourses of subordination. 
;OLLTLYNLUJLVM*,3(*·HUKP[ZJVU[YPI\[PVU[VKLÄUPUN[OL\UP]LYZHSHNLUKHVM[OL
SDG— is an example of the region’s willingness to strengthen its role as an international 
agent, to increase its autonomy and to framing the relation with external partners in a new 
multipolar narrative.
0[PZPU[OPZJVU[YHKPJ[VY`HUKJVTWSL_JVU[L_[[OH[IV[OYLNPVUZULLK[VYLKLÄUL[OLPY
ZLJ[VYPHS JVVWLYH[PVU ;OLWVZ[ MYHTL^VYR VɈLYZ IV[O YLNPVUZ [OL VWWVY[\UP[`
to re-locate this cooperation in a set of global targets and assume their common, yet 
KPɈLYLU[PH[LK YLZWVUZPIPSP[PLZ;OLYLHYL PTWVY[HU[KPɈLYLUJLZIL[^LLUIV[O YLNPVUZ
not to mention their internal disparities, which at times can be deeper than those 
existing on either side of the Atlantic. However, this does not prevent considerable 
JVU]LYNLUJL PU ÄLSKZ Z\JO HZ KLTVJYHJ` HUK P[Z Z\IZ[HU[P]L JVU[LU[ VM JVOLZPVU
and social inclusion, and the role of regionalism as a mechanism for improving the 
governance of globalisation. 
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Bi-regional cooperation in HE, STI and climate change —three sectors highlighted in 
[OPZ Z[\K`·\S[PTH[LS` YLWYLZLU[ HU VWWVY[\UP[` [V HɉYTH IPYLNPVUHS KPɈLYLU[PH[LK
contribution to the post-2015 goals addressing particular conditions, needs and 
[YHQLJ[VYPLZVM3(*HUK[OL,<HUK[VYLKLÄULJVVWLYH[PVUPUHOVYPaVU[HSWLYZWLJ[P]L
constructing new associations based on regionalism which aim to overcome the 
traditional NSC system. 
In the light of the foregoing, the following recommendations and proposals are put 
forward:  
a) Consolidate CELAC as a mechanism for consensus and coordination of policies: 
development agendas such as those for social cohesion, HE, STI and climate 
change may be the path by which CELAC can be transformed from a forum for 
political dialogue to a mechanism for providing regional and global public goods. 
In order to achieve this, CELAC needs to strengthen its institutional capacity 
MVYWYVTV[PUNYLNPVUHSWVSPJPLZ PU3(*HUKIHZLKVU[OLZL YLKLÄULKPHSVN\L
and cooperation with the EU. In this way it will be possible to promote a more 
horizontal and balanced bi-regional relation which will continue to contribute 
to regionalism and integration on both sides, addressing any obstacles arising 
from bilateral or sub-regional action of both the EU and LAC.
b) Establish specialised mechanisms for EU-CELAC dialogue and sector 
cooperation in the areas of social cohesion, HE, STI and climate change: an 
integral approach and the creation of synergies should be ensured, in order for 
the EU programmes to contribute to shaping regional agendas in these areas 
and to take part TrC developed in these areas.   
c) 7SHJLJVVWLYH[PVUPUZWLJPÄJHYLHZ^ P[OPU[OLWVZ[MYHTL^VYR: thematic EU-
CELAC cooperation could well constitute the institutionalised area for adapting 
the post-2015 agenda to the regional and national agenda, setting goals, 
resources, schedules and mechanisms for promoting consensus, joint learning 
and joint assessment. The post-2015 agenda may contribute to overcoming the 
current fragmentation of sector agendas. The discussion based on sustainable 
development requires concerted dialogue, however, at the same it should also 
be integrated to the agendas discussed previously. It is not possible to consider 
the environmental agenda separately from the STI and HE agenda, because if a 
model of environmentally sustainable development is the ultimate goal, it will be 
necessary to promote technologies and alternative uses of natural resources. 
(UK[OLZLHYLHYLHZVMJVVWLYH[PVUPU^OPJOP[PZWVZZPISL[VTHRLHKPɈLYLUJLPU
joint action in the agenda of development debate and in the strategic partnership. 
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d) Incorporate the many sub-regional experiences to bi-regional cooperation in HE: 
the HE agenda is a promising scenario for regional policies within the CELAC 
framework based on the accumulated knowledge of the groups which integrate 
[OPZÄLSK;OLYLHYL[OLYLMVYLUL[^VYRZVMUVUNV]LYUTLU[HSHNLU[ZWYVTV[PUN
regional action, while at the same time involving EU players. Also a common 
agenda on mobility, improvement of quality and accreditation and strengthening 
of cooperation networks is already in place. 
e) Promote joint learning practices such as those of “capitalising experiences” in 
sectorial /thematic programmes: joint learning based on successful experiences 
of regional cooperation developed in thematic programmes —URB-AL, 
,<96:VJP(3 (3-( 000· HYL L_HTWSLZ MVY [OPZ WYHJ[PJL HUK [OL` TH` IL
extended to other cross-cutting issues. 
f) Improve coordination and convergence of bilateral and multilateral initiatives: 
CELAC actions within the framework of the Euro-Latin American area of HE 
and the action of ACRULAC and ELACES may contribute to the convergence 
and coordination of regional and bilateral policies with common goals and 
methodologies. In particular, it is important to ensure coordination and 
convergence of the Ibero-American, Latin America and Caribbean and the Euro-
Latin American spaces. In this context it is also necessary to ensure a framework 
of action for private initiatives such as Universia, ensuring that these contribute 
to the bi-regional goals and post-2015 targets through social cohesion. Regional 
cooperation will also need to contribute to the reduction of asymmetries within 
LAC, including SSC and TrC.
g) Promote regional STI policies: the promotion of STI in LAC regionalism is in a less 
MH]V\YHISLZP[\H[PVUK\L[V[OLHIZLUJLVMYLNPVUHSWVSPJPLZPU[OPZÄLSK·L_JLW[
for those who counted with the EU as a donor— and the lack of political will to 
establish such policies, which consolidates the situation of asymmetry in the bi-
regional relation and within the region itself. The EU may support the adoption 
of an agenda of regional STI polices and SSC and TrC may be instruments for 
addressing them, and for creating greater endogenous capacities required to 
address the challenges of development faced by the region.
h) Improve intra-regional coordination in LAC and within the framework of EU 
CELAC:[OLYLPZHTVYLMH]V\YHISLJVU[L_[·HMHJ[^ OPJOQ\Z[PÄLZ[OL¸ NYHK\H[PVU¹
of a good number of LAC countries —with greater institutional capacity and 
H]HPSHISLYLZV\YJLZMVYKLWSV`PUNZLJ[VYWVSPJPLZPUÄLSKZZ\JOHZ/,:;0HUK
social cohesion at a domestic level and also through Ibero-American bodies 
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(OEI, CyTED, etc.). Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen dialogue, exchange 
and coordination, and seek synergies between policies and sources of funding. 
The strategy of joint calls within the context of Horizon 2020 is an interesting 
L_HTWSLVM[OLX\LZ[MVYLɈLJ[P]L\ZLVMYLZV\YJLZIHZLKVUWYPVYP[PZLKHYLHZ
Given that many LAC countries dispose of resources for bilateral partnerships, 
it would be viable to organise joint presentations of sector agendas—united for 
L_HTWSL[OYV\NO*,3(*·HUKH]VPKKPZWLYZPVUVMLɈVY[Z
i) 9L]PL^YLN\SH[VY`MYHTL^VYRZMVYPU[LSSLJ[\HSWYVWLY[`YPNO[ZL_JLSSLUJLPUZJPLU[PÄJ
research and promoting open access publications: these three axes have already 
been incorporated in the EU’s STI policies and need to be taken seriously and 
addressed jointly in order to prevent asymmetries in the production of knowledge. 
LAC needs to make progress in regulating intellectual property rights and the EU 
needs to incorporate a Latin American approach when publishing the results of 
research carried out with public resources which allow for an open access. Both 
regions, particularly those EU countries which hold more peripheral positions in 
[OLJPYJSLZVMPU[LYUH[PVUHSRUV^SLKNLWYVK\J[PVU^ PSSULLK[VPUÅ\LUJL[OLKLIH[L
for regulating practices and protocols for excellence in STI research activity. 
j) Seek more balanced and symmetrical formulas for distributing the costs and 
ILULÄ[Z VM /, HUK :;0 YLNPVUHS WYVNYHTTLZ KLZPNULK [V YLK\JL PU[YH3(*
asymmetries and, should they exist, within the EU: participation in mobility 
and cooperation in HE and STI projects tend to reinforce asymmetries of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. This trend could be reversed by setting up 
requirements for participation of prioritised countries, namely those with less HE 
and STI capacity. 
k) Provide the PAF with political content and action in order to identify the priorities 
of HE cooperation and promote the EU-LAC HE area: create transparency 
of the instrument’s incorporation of actors in the discussion forum and of its 
working methodology; determine operational goals for work; developing actions 
designed to create policies for convergence of HE —respecting thereby diversity 
and autonomy of each region —, within the framework of internationalisation 
processes. Some themes to be addressed might be: comparability and 
YLJVNUP[PVUVMX\HSPÄJH[PVUZHUK[OLPKLU[PÄJH[PVUVMZ`ULYNPLZHTVUNZWLJPÄJ
grants programmes (such as ALBAN).
l) Complete STI “road maps” in countries with which the EU has signed an AST and 
in the sub-regional schemes:, in which resources are provided following a work 
methodology established by the new international STI cooperation guidelines.
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m) Extend the ACT “network” to “graduate” countries with relatively high levels of 
development in the region such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, Colombia or Peru, with 
which in some cases there Association Agreements already exist, in order to 
promote development of capacities and policies in HE and STI and the related 
agendas of competitiveness, sustainability and social cohesion.  
106
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alonso, J.A., Aguirre, P. and Santander, G. (2011) La cooperación triangular española 
en América Latina: un análisis de dos experiencias de interés.-\UKHJP}U*HYVSPUH
CeALCI- ICEI, Working Document no. 51.
Barbé, E. (2010) ‘Multilateralism: adapting to a world of emerging powers’, Revista 
Española de Derecho Internacional,3?00!
Barbé, E., Herranz, A. and Natorski, M. (2012) Disentangling multilateralism: Contending 
discourses of the EU as global actor, paper for the workshop “Speaking Europe 
Abroad: Institutional Cooperation and the Making of the EU’s Discourse”, Brussels.
Bilal, S. and Krätke, F. (2014) ‘Blending Loans and Grants for Development: An 
,ɈLJ[P]L4P_MVY[OL,<&»LU:OLYYPɈ(LKThe European Union’s International 
Cooperation. Recent Developments and Future Challenges. Maastricht: ECDPM, 
p. 8-24. 
Börzel, T, and Risse, T. (2011)º>OLU,\YVWLHUPZH[PVU4LL[Z+PɈ\ZPVU!,_WSVYPUN5L^
Territory’, West European Politics, 35 (1): 192-207.
BRICS Policy Center (2011) BRICS, Cooperation for Development and the Busan 4th 
/3-VU(PK,ɈLJ[P]LULZZ9PVKL1HULPYV!)90*:7VSPJ`*LU[LY
Cabral, L. (2014) ;OL ,<)YHaPS 7HY[ULYZOPW VU +L]LSVWTLU[! ( 3\RL^HYT (ɈHPY, 
,\YVWLHU7HY[ULYZOPWZ6IZLY]H[VY`IYPLÄUNU¢-90+,,NTVU[
Chiodi, F. M. (2013) º*VVWLYHJP}U L\YVWLH LU HWV`V H SHZ WVSx[PJHZ WISPJHZ WHYH SH
JVOLZP}U ZVJPHS LU (TtYPJH 3H[PUH! HJPLY[VZ KPÄJ\S[HKLZ ` WLYZWLJ[P]HZ»
Investigación & Desarrollo,]VSU+VZZPLY¸ +PmSVNVJVVWLYHJP}U` YLSHJPVULZ
euro-latinoamericanas”, enero-junio 2013, pp. 185-208.
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2014a) Marco conceptual de la 
cooperación internacional para el desarrollo en la CELAC, Document adopted in 
the 2nd Meeting of the Working Group on International Cooperation of CELAC held 
VU HUK1\S`
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2014b) Special Declaration 
on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2nd*,3(*:\TTP[HUK 1HU\HY`
2014, Havana, available  at O[[W!JLSHJJ\IHTPUYL_J\ZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZÄJOLYVZ
doc_3.6_agenda_post_2015_ingles.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
107
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (2015b) Political Declaration 
of Belen, Costa Rica III Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
*VTT\UP[`VM3H[PU(TLYPJHUHUK*HYPIILHU:[H[LZ*,3(*1HU\HY`[OHUK
29th 2015, Costa Rica available at http://www.foreign.gov.tt/site_media/media/
attachments/2015/02/04/BELEN_POLITICAL_DECLARATION_2015_EN.pdf 
(accessed 14 August 2015).
Council of the European Union (2011) EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level 
-VY\TVU(PK,ɈLJ[P]LULZZ)\ZHU 5V]LTILY¶+LJLTILY*V\UJPS
Conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2011.
Council of the European Union (2014) Council Conclusions on the EU common position 
MVY[OL-PYZ[/PNO3L]LS4LL[PUNVM[OL.SVIHS7HY[ULYZOPWMVY,ɈLJ[P]L+L]LSVWTLU[
*VVWLYH[PVU4L_PJV*P[`VU(WYPSBrussels, 17 March.
Costafreda, A. (2011) ‘Nueva arquitectura para tiempos diferentes. Los resultados del 
/3-KL)\ZHU»Opinión CIDOB U¢
de Castro, F., Hogenboom, B. and Baud, M. (coords.) (2015) Gobernanza ambiental 
en América Latina, Buenos Aires: CLACSO, avaiable at http://www.clacso.org.
ar/libreria-latinoamericana/libro_detalle.php?id_libro=941&orden=&pageNum_rs_
libros=0&totalRows_rs_libros=935 (accessed 14 August 2015).
Development Aid Committee (2014)+(*3PZ[VM6+(9LJPWPLU[Z, available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA 
9LJPWPLU[ZÄUHSWKM (accessed 14 August 2015).
Development Aid Committee (2015) 0U[LYUH[PVUHS+L]LSVWTLU[:[H[PZ[PJZ 0+:VUSPUL
databases, OECD.Stat, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/(accessed 14 
August 2015).
Economic Commission for Latin America (2007) Cohesión Social. Inclusión y sentido de 
pertenencia en América Latina y el Caribe, Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, available at http://
www.ECLAC.org/es/publicaciones/2812-cohesion-social-inclusion-y-sentido 
-de-pertenencia-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe (accessed 14 August 2015).
Economic Commission for Latin America (2010) Time for equality: closing gaps, 
opening trails. Thirty-third session of ECLAC, available at http://www.cepal.org/
en/publications/time-equality-closing-gaps-opening-trails-thirty-third-session-
eclac (accessed 14 August 2015).
Economic Commission for Latin America (2012) Cambio estructural para la igualdad. 
Un enfoque integrado del desarrollo, Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/pses34/noticias/documentosdetrabajo/4/47424/2012-ses-
34-cambio_estructural.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
Economic Commission for Latin America (2014a) Compacts for Equality: Towards 
H:\Z[HPHISL-\[\YL :HU[PHNVKL*OPSL!,*3(*H]HPSHISLH[http://www.cepal.
VYNLUW\ISPJH[PVUZJVTWHJ[ZLX\HSP[`[V^HYKZZ\Z[HPUHISLM\[\YL[OPY[`ÄM[O
session-eclac (accessed 14 August 2015).
108
Economic Commission for Latin America (2014b) 7YLSPTPUHY` YLÅLJ[PVUZ VU 3H[PU
America and the Caribbean in the post-2015 development agenda based on the 
trilogy of equality, Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, available at http://www.cepal.org/
LUW\ISPJH[PVUZWYLSPTPUHY`YLÅLJ[PVUZSH[PUHTLYPJHHUKJHYPIILHUWVZ[
2015-development-agenda (accessed 14 August 2015).
Economic Commission for Latin America (2014c) Social Panorama of Latin America 2014, 
Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, available at http://www.cepal.org/en/publications/37626-
social-panorama-latin-america-2014 (accessed 14 August 2015).
Economic Commission for Latin America (2015) CEPALSTAT. Databases and 
Statistical Publications, available at http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_
CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i (accessed 14 August 2015).
European Commission (2006) 1VPU[KLJSHYH[PVUI`[OL*V\UJPSHUK[OLYLWYLZLU[H[P]LZVM
the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union 
entitled “The European Consensus” 6ɉJPHS1V\YUHSVM[OL,\YVWLHU<UPVU C/46 
 VM-LIY\HY `
European Commission (2007) EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division 
of Labour in Development Policy, )Y\ZZLSZ*64ÄUHS-LIY\HY `
European Commission (2011a) Increasing the Impact of the Development Policy: 
an Agenda for Change Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee of the Regions. 
Brussels, COM(2011)637 end, 13 October.
European Commission (2011b) .SVIHS ,\YVWL! ( 5L^ (WWYVHJO [V ÄUHUJPUN ,<
L_[LYUHSHJ[PVU1VPU[*VTT\UPJH[PVU[V[OL,\YVWLHU7HYSPHTLU[HUK[OL*V\UJPS. 
Brussels, COM(2011) 865 end, 7 December.
European Commission (2011c) The Multiannual Financing Framework: The Proposals 
on External Action Instruments. Brussels, European Commission memo/11/878, 
7 December.
European Commission (2012a) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee; Trade, Growth 
and Development; Tailoring Trade and Investment Policy for those Countries Most 
PU5LLK)Y\ZZLSZ*64LUK1HU\HY `
European Commission (2012b) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions. Enhancing and focusing EU international cooperation in 
research and innovation: A strategic approach)Y\ZZLSZ*64 ÄUHS
European Commission (2013a) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and  Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions . A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the 
world a sustainable future)Y\ZZLSZ*64 LUK-LIY\HY `
109
European Commission (2013b) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and  Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. Beyond 2015: towards a comprehensive and integrated 
HWWYVHJO[VÄUHUJPUNWV]LY[`LYHKPJH[PVUHUKZ\Z[HPUHISLKL]LSVWTLU[Brussels, 
*64ÄUHS
European Commission (2014a) The Busan Commitments: An Analysis of EU Progress 
and Performance, Brussels, European Commission.
European Commission (2014b) Blending. European Union aid to catalyse investments, 
Brussels, European Commission.
European Commission (2014c) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and  Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. Una vida digna para todos: de la visión a la acción 
colectiva, )Y\ZZLSZ*64ÄUHSKLQ\UPV
European Commission (2014d) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committe, and the 
Committee of the Regions. A stronger role of the private sector in achieving 
inclusive and sustainable growth in developing countries, Brussels, (COM(2014) 
ÄUHSKLTH`V
European Commission (2014e) Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of Regions. Report on the implementation of the strategy for 
international cooperation in research and innovation. Brussels, COM (2014) 
567 end.
European Commission (2014f) *VTTPZZPVU :[HɈ >VYRPUN +VJ\TLU[ 9VHKTHWZ
for international cooperation. Accompanying the document Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions. Report on the implementation of 
[OLZ[YH[LN`MVYPU[LYUH[PVUHSJVVWLYH[PVUPUYLZLHYJOHUKPUUV]H[PVUb*64
ÄUHSd)Y\ZZLSZ:>+ÄUHS
European Commission (2015a) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of Regions. A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and 
Sustainable Development after 2015. Brussels, COM (2015) 44 end.
European Commission (2015b) Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of Regions. A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and 
Sustainable Development after 2015. Brussels, COM (2015) 44 end.
European Parliament (2012a) Report of the Development Commission of the European 
7HYSPHTLU[VU[OLKLÄUP[PVUVMHUL^KL]LSVWTLU[JVVWLYH[PVUWVSPJ`^P[O3H[PU
America (2011/2286(INI)), of 4 May 2012.  Rapporteur: Ricardo Cortés Lastra.
110
European Parliament (2012b) Report of the Development Commission of the European 
Parliament on the future of the EU development policy 050VM1\S`
2012. Rapporteur: Charles Goerens.
European Parliament (2014c) Report of the Development Commission of the European 
Parliament on the EU and the global development framework after 2015 
(2014/2143(INI)), 17 November 2014. Rapporteur: Davor Ivo Stier.
European Parliament (2014b) Financing For Development Post-2015: Improving 
The Contribution Of Private Finance, Brussels, European Parliament, General 
Directorate of External Policy, April.
Edwards, G. and Timmons Roberts, J. (2013) The EU and Latin America and the 
*HYPIILHU!7H]PUN[OL9VHK;V^HYKZH5L^.SVIHS*SPTH[L*OHUNL(NYLLTLU[
in 2015?,/HTI\YN!,<3(*-V\UKH[PVUH]HPSHISLH[!http://eulacfoundation.org/
LUZ`Z[LTÄSLZ,K^HYKZ9VILY[Z,<3(**SPTH[L
Change.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
EEAS (2015) The European Union in a Changing Global Environment. A more connected, 
contested and complex world. Bruselas, European External Action Service.
Eurodad (2013) A dangerous blend? The EU’s agenda to ‘blend’ public development 
ÄUHUJL^P[OWYP]H[LÄUHUJL. Bruselas, Eurodad.
EUROSociAL (2015) Cooperación Sur-Sur en EUROSociAL. Informe sobre el intercambio 
de experiencias Sur-Sur en el Programa. Avaiable at: http://www.sia.eurosocial-ii.
L\ÄSLZKVJZ0UMVYTLFZ\YFZ\YWKM (accessed 14 August 2015).
Fejerskov, A. M. (2013) European Union Development Cooperation in a Changing Global 
Context, Copenhague, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).
Ferbelmayr, G., Heyd, B. and Lehwald, S. (2013) Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
7HY[ULYZOPW;;07!>OVILULÄ[ZMYVTHMYLL[YHKLKLHS&Vol. I. The Macroeconomic 
,ɈLJ[Z.[LYZSVO)LY[LSZTHUU:[PM[\UN.SVIHS,JVUVTPJZ+`UHTPJZ.,+7YVQLJ[
FIIAPP (2010) Iniciativa para la Cohesión Social en América Latina y el Caribe. Documento 
base4HKYPK!-\UKHJP}U0U[LYUHJPVUHS`WHYH0ILYVHTtYPJHKL(KTPUPZ[YHJP}U`
7VSx[PJHZ7ISPJHZ
Furness, M. and Negre, M. (2012) *HU[OL,<OLSWKL]LSVWPUNJV\U[YPLZÄNO[PULX\HSP[`&. 
Bonn: German Development Institute (DIE).
Guerrero, F. (2014) ‘Las relaciones de la UE con el mundo en desarrollo’ en Barbé, E. (dir.) 
La Unión Europea en las relaciones internacionales. Madrid: Tecnos, pp. 219-238.
Helwig, N. (2015) º-PUL;\UPUN,<-VYLPNU7VSPJ ` ( QVPU[ HWWYVHJOIL[^LLU [OL UL^
*VTTPZZPVU HUK [OL ,\YVWLHU (J[PVU ,_[LYUHS :LY]PJL&» /LSZPURP ;OL -PUPZO
0UZ[P[\[LVM0U[LYUH[PVUHS(ɈHPYZ-00()YPLÄUN7HWLYU¢LULYV
Hernández, G., and Sandell, T. (2013) El diseño de la Facilidad de Inversión en América 
Latina de la Unión Europea, 4t_PJV (ZVJPHJP}U 3H[PUVHTLYPJHUH KL6YNHUPaHJPVULZ
KL7YVTVJP}UHS+LZHYYVSSV (367:LYPLKLKVJ\TLU[VZKL[YHIHQVU¢http://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/970&Lang=S (accessed 14 August 2015).
111
Ibero-American Programme for strengthening Sout-South cooperation (2013) 
Sistematizar la cooperación sur-sur para construir conocimiento desde la 
práctica. Working document no. 3, available at http://www.cooperacionsursur.org/
images/2013/documentos/sistematizar_SSC.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
Jons, H. and Hoyler, M. (2013) ‘Global geographies of higher education: the perspective 
of world university rankings’, Geoforum, 36: 45-59.
Kern, A. (2014) º3H HNLUKH JPLU[xÄJH ` [LJUVS}NPJH LU SVZ YLNPVUHSPZTVZ KL (TtYPJH
Latina’, in -3(*:60:( 1VPU[ 0U[LYUH[PVUHS *VUMLYLUJL .SVIHS HUK 9LNPVUHS
Powers in a Changing World, available at http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/
-3(*:60:()\LUVZ(PYLZ(YJOP]L KMLL ML
f46fc48f5992.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
Kern, A. and Weisstaub, L. (2011b)  ‘South- South Cooperation Case Studies’, Latin 
America and Caribbean Regional Summary, TTSSC.
Kharas, H. (2011) ‘Coming together: How a new global partnership on development 
JVVWLYH[PVU^HZ MVYNLK H[ [OL)\ZHU/PNO 3L]LS -VY\TVU(PK ,ɈLJ[P]LULZZ»
Análisis del  Real Instituto Elcano (ARI) 164/2012.
Krätke, F. (2014) º-YVT7\YZL[V7VSPJ`[V7YHJ[PJL:P_ 0UP[PH[P]LZ[V-\[\YLWYVVM,<
+L]LSVWTLU[*VVWLYH[PVUMVYHUK)L`VUK&»PU:OLYYPɈ(LKThe 
European Union’s International Cooperation. Recent Developments and Future 
Challenges. Maastricht, ECDPM, febrero, pp. 55-68.
Lazarou, E. (2013) The Sixth EU-Brazil Summit: business beyond the usual? Madrid. 
-90+,,NTVU[,\YVWLHU7HY[ULYZOPWZ6IZLY]H[VY`IYPLÄUNU¢THYaV
Malamud, A. (2010) ‘Latin American Regionalism and EU Studies’, 1V\YUHSVM,\YVWLHU
Integration, 32(6): 637-657.
Martinigui, A. and Youngs, R. (2012) Desafíos para la política exterior europea en 2012. 
Una Europa geoeconómica4HKYPK-90+,
Milanovic, B. (2012) Los que tienen y los que no tienen: breve y particular historia de la 
desigualdad global. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Morazán, P. (Coord.); Ayllón, B.; FIAPP, Sanahuja, J. A. (2011) Una nueva política 
de cooperación al desarrollo de la Unión Europea con América Latina: énfasis 
en cohesión social, integración regional y cooperación Sur-Sur. Brussels, 
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. European Parliamen, PE 
433.775(ES).
Naidorf, J. and Perrotta, D. (2014) La ciencia social politizada y móvil de una nueva 
agenda latinoamericana orientada a prioridades, mimeo.
Nielsen, L. (2012) How to classify countries based on their level of development, Social 
Indicators Research, 14 (3): 1.087-1.107.
Nolte, D. (2014) 3H[PU(TLYPJH»Z5L^9LNPVUHS(YJOP[LJ[\YL!(*VVWLYH[P]LVY:LNTLU[LK
Regional Governance Complex?,-SVYLUJL,\YVWLHU<UP]LYZP[`0UZ[P[\[L9VILY[
Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS) working paper 2014/89.
112
Ocampo, J. A. and Stiglitz, J. (2012)-YVT[OL.[VH.SVIHS,JVUVTPJ*VVYKPUH[PVU
Council, 1V\YUHSVM.SVIHSPaH[PVUHUK+L]LSVWTLU[, 2 (2): 1-16.
Perrotta, D. (2009) º3HJVVWLYHJP}ULUTH[LYPHKLLK\JHJP}UZ\WLYPVY `LUJPLUJPH `
[LJUVSVNxHLULS4,9*6:<9!IHSHUJLZ`KLZHMxVZ» th 5H[PVUHS*VUMLYLUJLVU
Political Science of the Argentine Society of Political Analysis, available at http://
www.conicet.gov.ar/new_scp/detalle.php?keywords=&id=33254&congresos=yes
&detalles=yes&congr_id=1099366 (accessed 14 August 2015).
Perrotta, D. (2014a) ‘Regulatory Regionalism and higher education in MERCOSUR: 
fostering development or enhancing marketization’, in Lara Cortés, Claudio 
HUK:PS]H -SVYLZ*VUZ\LSV LK+LTVJYH[PJ YLUL^HS ]Z5LVSPILYHSPZT! [V^HYKZ
empowerment and inclusion, Buenos Aires: CLACSO, pp. 161-179.
Perrotta, D. (2014b) La internacionalización de la universidad: debates globales, 
acciones regionales, IEC –CONADU, Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional General 
Sarmiento.
Quadir, F. (2013) ‘Rising Donors in the New Narrative of ´South-South´ Cooperation: 
What Prospects for Changing the Landscape of Development Assistance 
Programs?’, Third World Quarterly, 34(2): 321-338.
Riggirozzi, P. and Tussie, D. (2012) The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case 
of Latin America (Vol. 4). Dordrecht: Springer.
Rosales, O. Herreros, S. Frohmann, A. and García-Millán, T. (2013) Las 
negociaciones megarregionales: hacia una nueva gobernanza del comercio 
mundialZLYPLJVTLYJPV0U[LYUHJPVUHSU¢3*3+LJLTILY:HU[PHNV
de Chile: ECLAC.
Sustainable Development Solutions Network (2013) An Action Agenda for 
Sustainable Development Report for the Secretary General of the United 
5H[PVUZ available at http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Una-
Agenda-de-Acci%C3%B3n-para-el-Desarrollo-Sostenible.pdf (accessed 14 
August 2015).
Sanahuja (2013b) º3H<UP}U,\YVWLH ` LS YLNPVUHSPZTV SH[PUVHTLYPJHUV! \U IHSHUJL»
Investigación & Desarrollo]VSU¢1HU\HY`1\ULWW
Sanahuja, J. A. (2007)¦»4mZ`TLQVYH`\KH&3H+LJSHYHJP}UKL7HYxZ`SHZ[LUKLUJPHZ
LUSHJVVWLYHJP}UHSKLZHYYVSSV»LU4LZH4*VVYK.\LYYH`JVUÅPJ[VZLULS
:PNSV??0! ;LUKLUJPHZ NSVIHSLZ(U\HYPV KLS*LU[YVKL,K\JHJP}U L
0U]LZ[PNHJP}UWHYHSH7Ha*,07(A, Madrid: CEIPAZ, pp. 71-101.
Sanahuja, J.A. (2012a) º3HZJ\H[YVJYPZPZKL SH<UP}U,\YVWLH» PU4LZH4 JVVYK
Cambio de ciclo: crisis, resistencias y respuestas globales. Anuario 2012-2013, 
Madrid: CEIPAZ.
Sanahuja, J.A. (2012b) 7VZ[SPILYHS9LNPVUHSPZTPU:V\[O(TLYPJH!;OL*HZLVM<5(:<9. 
-SVYLUJL ,\YVWLHU <UP]LYZP[` 0UZ[P[\[L 9VILY[ :JO\THU *LU[YL VM (K]HUJLK
Studies (RSCAS) working paper 2012/05.
113
Sanahuja, J.A. (2013a) º3HZ U\L]HZ NLVNYHMxHZ KL SH WVIYLaH ` SH KLZPN\HSKHK ` SHZ
metas de desarrollo global post-2015’, in Mesa, M. (ed.), El reto de la democracia 
LU\UT\UKVLUJHTIPV!YLZW\LZ[HZWVSx[PJHZ`ZVJPHSLZ(U\HYPV*,07(A
14, CEIPAZ, Madrid, pages 61-100, available at http://www.ceipaz.org/images/
contenido/4.Sanahuja.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
Sanahuja, J.A. (2014a) ‘Enfoques diferenciados y marcos comunes en el regionalismo 
latinoamericano: alcance y perspectivas de UNASUR y CELAC’, Pensamiento 
PropioU¢ 1HU\HY`1\ULWW
Sanahuja, J.A. (2014b) º3H<UP}U ,\YVWLH LU SHZ ÄUHUaHZ NSVIHSLZ . ` -40» LU
Barbé, E. (dir.),  La Unión Europea en las relaciones internacionales, Madrid: 
Tecnos, pp. 314-335.
Sanahuja, J.A. (2014c)º+LZHYYVSSVNSVIHS`JV\U[YPLZLTLYNLU[LZ!YL[VZWHYHSHWVSx[PJH
KLJVVWLYHJP}UKLSH<,»LURevista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 108: 67-93.
Sanahuja, J.A. (2015) La UE y CELAC: revitalización de una relación estratégica, 
/HTI\YN!,<3(*-V\UKH[PVU
Sebesta, L. (2006) º3VZTV[P]VZKL SHJYPZPZL\YVWLH!\UHOPW}[LZPZ PU[LYWYL[H[P]H»LU
Morales Vega, Gustavo (ed.), 0UJLU[P]VZ` KPÄJ\S[HKLZWHYHSHPU[LNYHJP}ULULSZPNSV
XXI. Región andina, Unión Europea y acuerdos de libre comercio*HSP!7VU[PÄJPH
<UP]LYZPKHK1H]LYPHUHKL*HSP
Secretaría General Iberoamericana (2014) Informe sobre la Cooperación Sur-Sur 
en Iberoamérica 2013-2014, Madrid: SEGIB, available at http://www.segib.org/
ZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZ0UMVYTLKLSH*VVWLYHJPVU:\Y:\YLU
Iberoamerica%202013-2014.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
SEGIB (2012): Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur en Iberoamerica 2012. Madrid: SEGIB, 
H]HPSHISLH[!O[[W!ZLNPIVYNJVVWLYHJPVUÄSLZ0UMVYTL:\Y:\YWKM
SEGIB (2014): Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur en Iberoamerica 2013-2014, available at: 
O[[W!^^ ^ZLNPIVYNZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZ0UMVYTLKLSH*VVWLYHJPVU
Sur-Sur%20en%20Iberoamerica%202013-2014.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
Stevens, C. (2012) ‘The proposed new GSP: turning away from multilateralism’, in: VV.AA. 
;OL5L_[+LJHKLVM,<;YHKL7VSPJ`!*VUMYVU[PUN.SVIHS*OHSSLUNLZ&, Londres, 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), pp. 22-23.
Stuenkel, O. (2013) 0UZ[P[\[PVUHSPaPUN :V\[O:V\[O *VVWLYH[PVU! ;V^HYKZ H 5L^
Paradigm? Background Paper submitted to the High Level Panel of the Post-2015 
Development Agenda. Mayo.
Sumner, A. (2012) Where do the poor live?, World Development, 40(5): 865–877.
Sumner, A. and Tezanos, S. (2014) ‘How has the developing world changed since the late 
  Z&(K`UHTPJHUKT\S[PKPTLUZPVUHSJSHZZPÄJH[PVUVMKL]LSVWPUNJV\U[YPLZ»
Center for Global Development Working Paper, 375, available athttp://www.cgdev.
org/publication/how-has-developing-world-changed-late-1990s-dynamic-and-
multidimensional-taxonomy (accessed 14 August 2015).
114
Telò, M. (2006) Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World 
Order, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
Tezanos, S. (2011) º4mZHSSmKL!6IQL[P]VZKL+LZHYYVSSVKLS4PSLUPV `KLZHMxVZ
para la nueva agenda internacional de desarrollo’, SISTEMA, Revista de Ciencias 
Sociales, 220: 33-58.
Tezanos, S. (Dir.) (2010) América Latina y el Caribe. Mapa estratégico para la cooperación 
del siglo XXI, Civitas – Thomson Reuters: Madrid.
Tezanos, S. and Quiñones, A. (2012) º¦*V\U[YPLZ KL YLU[H TLKPH& <UH [H_VUVTxH
alternativa del desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe’, Revista Iberoamericana 
de Estudios de Desarrollo, 2: 4-27, available at http://ried.unizar.es/index.php/
YL]PZ[HHY[PJSL]PL^-PSLHJJLZZLK(\N\Z[
Tezanos, S. and Sumner, A. (2013) ‘Revisiting the Meaning of Development: A 
Multidimensional Taxonomy of Developing Countries’, 1V\YUHS VM +L]LSVWTLU[
Studies, 49 (12): 1.728-1.745.
Tokatlian, J. G. (2014) Westphalia to Southfalia, Open Democracy, 5 de noviembre, 
available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/juan-gabriel-tokatlian/westphalia-
to-southphalia (accessed 14 August 2015).
Tovar, C., Hernández, G., Sandell, T., and Palomo, L. (eds.) (2013) 5\L]HZLZ[YH[LNPHZ
de Cooperación al Desarrollo de la Unión Europea en América Latina:̸La facilidad 
de inversión LAIF, Bruselas, ALOP.
United Nations (2010) Development Cooperation: Maximizing Results for the MDGs. 
International Development Cooperation Report, New York: UN, DESA ST/ESA/326.
United Nations Global Compact (2013) *VYWVYH[L:\Z[HPUHIPSP[`HUK[OL<UP[LK5H[PVUZ
7VZ[+L]LSVWTLU[(NLUKH9LWVY[[V[OL<UP[LK5H[PVUZ:LJYL[HY`.LULYHS, 
New York: UN, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_
events/9.1_news_archives/2013_06_18/UNGC_Post2015_Report.pdf (accessed 
14 August 2015).
United Nations (2012a) The future we want. Report for the Secretary General of the 
<UP[LK5H[PVUZUnited Nations Working Group on the Post 2015 Development 
Agenda, New York:UN, available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
policy/untaskteam_undf/unttreport_sp.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
United Nations (2013a) A life of dignity for all: accelerating progress towards the 
4PSSLUUP\T+L]LSVWTLU[.VHSZHUKHK]HUJPUN [OL<UP[LK5H[PVUZKL]LSVWTLU[
agenda beyond 2015, UN Secretary General’s Report, New York: UN, available 
at http://www.un.org/en/comun/docs/?symbol=A/68/202 (accessed 14 August 
2015).
United Nations (2013b) A new global partnership: eradicate poverty and transform 
economies through sustainable  development, New York: UN, available at http://
www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf (accessed 14 August 
2015).
115
United Nations (2013c) President of the General Assembly’s Special Event towards 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Outcome document, New York: UN, 
available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Outcome%20documentMDG.
pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
United Nations (2014a) Millenium Development Goals. 2014 Report, New York: UN, 
available at http://www.un.org/es/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg-report-2014-spanish.
pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
United Nations (2014b) The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All 
Lives and Protecting the Planet Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Post-2015 Agenda, New York: UN, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&referer=http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
index.html&Lang=S (accessed 14 August 2015).
United Nations (2014c) Report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on 
Sustainable Development Goals Letter of transmittal dated 1 August 2014 from the 
7LYTHULU[9LWYLZLU[H[P]LZVM/\UNHY`HUK2LU`H[V[OL<UP[LK5H[PVUZHKKYLZZLK
to the President of  the General Assembly  available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/970&Lang=S (accessed 14 August 2015).
European Commission (2006) 1VPU[KLJSHYH[PVUI`[OL*V\UJPSHUK[OLYLWYLZLU[H[P]LZVM
the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union 
entitled “The European Consensus” 6ɉJPHS1V\YUHSVM[OL,\YVWLHU<UPVU C/46 
 VM-LIY\HY `
United Nations Development Programme (2009) Enhancing South-South And Triangular 
Cooperation, Study of the Current Situation and Existing Good Practices in Policy, 
Institutions, and Operation of South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Special 
Unit for South-South Cooperation, New York: UNDP.
United Nations Development Programme (2013) El ascenso del Sur. Progreso 
humano en un mundo diverso. Informe sobre desarrollo humano 2013. New York: 
UNDP.
United Nations Development Programme (2013) A million voices: the world we want, 
New York: UNDP, available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/
librarypage/mdg/a-million-voices--the-world-we-want/ (accessed 14 August 
2015).
United Nations Development Programme (2014) The 2014 Human Development Report 
- Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience 
Madrid: Ediciones Mundi-Prensa, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/
informe-sobre-desarrollo-humano-2014 (accessed 14 August 2015).
UN Regional Commissions (2013) (9LNPVUHS 7LYZWLJ[P]L VU [OL 7VZ[ɫ <UP[LK
5H[PVUZ+L]LSVWTLU[(NLUKH, available at http://www.regionalcommissions.org/
post2015regionalreport.pdf (accessed 14 August 2015).
116
World Bank (2015a) How we classify countries: a short history, available http://data.
worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups (accessed 14 August 2015).
World Bank (2015b) 7V]JHS5L[! HU VUSPUL WV]LY[` HUHS`ZPZ [VVS, available in http://
iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0,0 (accessed 12 August 2015).
World Health Organisation (2015) World Health Statistics, Ginebra: OMS, available at 
http://www.who.int/research/en/ (accessed 14 August 2015).
Van Rompaey, K. (2012) +L SHLÄJHJPHKL SHH`\KHH SHLÄJHJPHKL SHJVVWLYHJP}UHS
KLZHYYVSSV (UHSPaHUKV SVZ YLZ\S[HKVZ KLS *\HY[V -VYV KL (S[V 5P]LS KL )\ZHU, 
4VU[L]PKLV(NLUJPH<Y\N\H`HKL*VVWLYHJP}U0U[LYUHJPVUHSTHYaV
Vazquez, K. (2013) Enhancing management practices in south-south and triangular 
cooperation study on country-led practices6ÄJPUHKLSHZ<UP[LK5H[PVUZWHYHSH
*VVWLYHJP}U:\Y:\Y`(NLUJPH1HWVULZHKL*VVWLYHJP}U0U[LYUHJPVUHS
Zamora, I. (Coord.) (2014) La cohesión social en América Latina*VSLJJP}U,Z[\KPVZ
UV 4HKYPK!,<96ZVJP(37YVNYHTHWHYHSHJVOLZP}UZVJPHSLU(TtYPJH3H[PUH
117
118
Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1a Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than 
one dollar a day
1.1 Proportion of population below  
$1.25 (PPP) per day*
12.45 4.63 (2011) 3
Extremely impoverished population  
(according to national poverty rates)
48.3 28.8 3
1.2 Poverty gap ratio  
(according to $1.25 per day)
9.8 2.89 3
1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 3.2 3.5 (2008) =
Target 1b Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women 
and young people
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 0.3 (1992-1997) 2.2 (2003-
2008)
3
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio 47 62.1 (2012) 3
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1.25 
(PPP) per day
17.8 11.3 (2008) 3
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family 
workers in total employment
32 31.1 (2008) =
Target 1c Halve, between 1990 and 2015,  
the proportion of people who su!er from hunger
1.8 Prevalence of underweight children  
under-five years of age
8.6 3.2 (2012) 3
Goal 2 Achieve universal primary education
Target 2b Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to  
complete a full course of primary schooling
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education 86.4 93.8 (2012) 3
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1  
who reach last grade of primary
83.9 93.1 (2008) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
ANNEX 1
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1a Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than 
one dollar a day
1.1 Proportion of population below  
$1.25 (PPP) per day*
12.45 4.63 (2011) 3
Extremely impoverished population  
(according to national poverty rates)
48.3 28.8 3
1.2 Poverty gap ratio  
(according to $1.25 per day)
9.8 2.89 3
1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 3.2 3.5 (2008) =
Target 1b Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women 
and young people
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 0.3 (1992-1997) 2.2 (2003-
2008)
3
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio 47 62.1 (2012) 3
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1.25 
(PPP) per day
17.8 11.3 (2008) 3
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family 
workers in total employment
32 31.1 (2008) =
Target 1c Halve, between 1990 and 2015,  
the proportion of people who su!er from hunger
1.8 Prevalence of underweight children  
under-five years of age
8.6 3.2 (2012) 3
Goal 2 Achieve universal primary education
Target 2b Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to  
complete a full course of primary schooling
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education 86.4 93.8 (2012) 3
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1  
who reach last grade of primary
83.9 93.1 (2008) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 3 Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 3a Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, 
and in all levels of education no later than 2015
3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and 
tertiary education
Primary 0.987  0.973 (2012) x
Secondary 1.06 (1991) 1.071 (2012) =
Tertiary 0.943 1.276 (2012) 3
3.2 Share of women in wage employment in  
the non-agricultural sector
37.8 41.8 (2012) 3
3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliament
11.9 26.4 3
Goal 4 Reduce child mortality (of children below the age of 5)
Target 4a Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 4.1 Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000) 54 19 (2012) 3
4.2 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000) 42 16 (2012) 3
4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised 
against measles
76 95 (2012) 3
4.2 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000) 42 16 (2012) 3
Goal 5 Improve maternal health
Target 5a Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio 5.1 Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 births) 140 85 3
5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel
74 91 (2012) 3
Target 5b Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health 5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate 59.2 73.2 (2012) 3
5.4 Adolescent birth rate 85.8 75.9 (2011) 3
5.5 Antenatal care coverage (%) 81 96 (2012) 3
5.6 Unmet need for family planning 12 10.6 (2012) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 3 Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 3a Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, 
and in all levels of education no later than 2015
3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and 
tertiary education
Primary 0.987  0.973 (2012) x
Secondary 1.06 (1991) 1.071 (2012) =
Tertiary 0.943 1.276 (2012) 3
3.2 Share of women in wage employment in  
the non-agricultural sector
37.8 41.8 (2012) 3
3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliament
11.9 26.4 3
Goal 4 Reduce child mortality (of children below the age of 5)
Target 4a Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 4.1 Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000) 54 19 (2012) 3
4.2 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000) 42 16 (2012) 3
4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised 
against measles
76 95 (2012) 3
4.2 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000) 42 16 (2012) 3
Goal 5 Improve maternal health
Target 5a Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio 5.1 Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 births) 140 85 3
5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel
74 91 (2012) 3
Target 5b Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health 5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate 59.2 73.2 (2012) 3
5.4 Adolescent birth rate 85.8 75.9 (2011) 3
5.5 Antenatal care coverage (%) 81 96 (2012) 3
5.6 Unmet need for family planning 12 10.6 (2012) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 6a Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged  
15-24 years (%)
0.3 0.57 (2013) x
6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex 18.6 29.2 (2008) 3
6.3.a Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with 
comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (male)
27.4 38.1 (2008) 3
6.3.b Proportion of population aged 15-24 years 
with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
(female)
25.3 36.8 (2008) 3
6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school 
attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years
0.9 0.8 x
Target 6b Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV 
infection with access to antiretroviral drugs
57 75 (2011) 3
Target 6c Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases
6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria n.d. 12; 1 ?
6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under 
insecticide-treated bednets
n.d. n.d. ?
6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are 
treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs
n.d. n.d. ?
6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated 
with tuberculosis (per 100.000 persons)
89; 159; 9.1 43; 61; 3.0 3
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and 
cured under directly observed treatment short course**
50 76 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 6a Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged  
15-24 years (%)
0.3 0.57 (2013) x
6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex 18.6 29.2 (2008) 3
6.3.a Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with 
comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (male)
27.4 38.1 (2008) 3
6.3.b Proportion of population aged 15-24 years 
with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
(female)
25.3 36.8 (2008) 3
6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school 
attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years
0.9 0.8 x
Target 6b Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV 
infection with access to antiretroviral drugs
57 75 (2011) 3
Target 6c Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases
6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria n.d. 12; 1 ?
6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under 
insecticide-treated bednets
n.d. n.d. ?
6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are 
treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs
n.d. n.d. ?
6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated 
with tuberculosis (per 100.000 persons)
89; 159; 9.1 43; 61; 3.0 3
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and 
cured under directly observed treatment short course**
50 76 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability
Target 7a Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and  
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest 51.9 47.2 (2010) x
7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP 
(PPP)
2.2 2.8 (2010) x
7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 74.652 5.166 (2012) 3
7.4  Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological 
limits
n.d. n.d. ?
7.5 Proportion of total water resources used 3.1 5.2 (2000) x
Target 7b Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss 7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected 8.8 20.3 (2010) 3
7.7a Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
(animals)
n.d. 0.93 (2010) ?
7.7b Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
(plants)
n.d. 0.7 (2010) ?
Target 7c Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation
7.8 Proportion of population using an improved 
drinking water source:
85 94 (2012) 3
Urban 94 97(2012) 3
Rural 63 83 (2012) 3
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved 
sanitation facility:
67 82 (2012) 3
Urban 80 87 (2012) 3
Rural 37 63 (2012) 3
Target 7d By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums 33.7 23.5 (2009) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
125
Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability
Target 7a Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and  
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest 51.9 47.2 (2010) x
7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP 
(PPP)
2.2 2.8 (2010) x
7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 74.652 5.166 (2012) 3
7.4  Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological 
limits
n.d. n.d. ?
7.5 Proportion of total water resources used 3.1 5.2 (2000) x
Target 7b Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss 7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected 8.8 20.3 (2010) 3
7.7a Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
(animals)
n.d. 0.93 (2010) ?
7.7b Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
(plants)
n.d. 0.7 (2010) ?
Target 7c Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation
7.8 Proportion of population using an improved 
drinking water source:
85 94 (2012) 3
Urban 94 97(2012) 3
Rural 63 83 (2012) 3
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved 
sanitation facility:
67 82 (2012) 3
Urban 80 87 (2012) 3
Rural 37 63 (2012) 3
Target 7d By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums 33.7 23.5 (2009) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
Re-
sults
Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability
Target 7c Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved 
sanitation facility:
67 82 (2012) 3
Urban 80 87 (2012) 3
Rural 37 63 (2012) 3
Target 7d By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100  
million slum dwellers
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums 33.7 23.5 (2009) 3
Goal 8 Develop a global partnership for development (only indicators available for LAC are displayed here)
Target 8b Address the special needs of the least developed countries 8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA 
of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic 
education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water 
and sanitation) in LAC***
7.62 (2002) 6.29 (2012) x
Target 8c Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island  
developing States
8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries in 
LAC as a proportion of their gross national incomes***
4.5 (1991) 0.76 x
8.5 ODA received in small island developing States in 
LAC as a proportion of their gross national incomes***
2.3 0.63 x
Target 8d Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through  
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services in LAC countries
16.2 7.7 ¥
Target 8d Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through  
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services in LAC countries
16.2 7.7 3
Target 8e In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to a!ordable  
essential drugs in developing countries
8.13 Proportion of population with access to a!ordable 
essential drugs on a sustainable basis
n.d. n.d. ?
Target 8f In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new  
technologies, especially information and communications
8.14 Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 6.2 18 (2012) 3
8.15 Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 12.1 (2000) 109.1 (2012) 3
8.16 Internet users per 100 inhabitants 3.9 (2000) 43.4 (2012) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Aggregate Balance for MDG in LAC
Millennium Development Goals and Targets Indicators for Monitoring Process 1990 2013 (or last 
available year)
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sults
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water and basic sanitation
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved 
sanitation facility:
67 82 (2012) 3
Urban 80 87 (2012) 3
Rural 37 63 (2012) 3
Target 7d By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100  
million slum dwellers
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums 33.7 23.5 (2009) 3
Goal 8 Develop a global partnership for development (only indicators available for LAC are displayed here)
Target 8b Address the special needs of the least developed countries 8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA 
of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic 
education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water 
and sanitation) in LAC***
7.62 (2002) 6.29 (2012) x
Target 8c Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island  
developing States
8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries in 
LAC as a proportion of their gross national incomes***
4.5 (1991) 0.76 x
8.5 ODA received in small island developing States in 
LAC as a proportion of their gross national incomes***
2.3 0.63 x
Target 8d Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through  
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services in LAC countries
16.2 7.7 ¥
Target 8d Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through  
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services in LAC countries
16.2 7.7 3
Target 8e In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to a!ordable  
essential drugs in developing countries
8.13 Proportion of population with access to a!ordable 
essential drugs on a sustainable basis
n.d. n.d. ?
Target 8f In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new  
technologies, especially information and communications
8.14 Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 6.2 18 (2012) 3
8.15 Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 12.1 (2000) 109.1 (2012) 3
8.16 Internet users per 100 inhabitants 3.9 (2000) 43.4 (2012) 3
KEY: Advance 3     Regression x     Stagnation =     Unknown ?
Main source: ECLAC 2014c
Complementary sources: * World Bank 2015     ** OMS 2015     *** Authors’ calculations based on DAC figures (2015).  
Indicators 8.4 and 8.5 are calculated using net ODA disbursements financed by DAC donor countries.  
The indicator 8.2 has been calculated on the basis of the gross ODAdisbursements (which is the only information  
facilitated by DAC at sectorial level).
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Diverse classifications of LAC countries
World Bank UNDP DAc
1 Antigua and Barbuda* High income High level of human 
development
Developing country
2 Argentina Middle to high income Very high level of 
human development
Developing country
3 Aruba High income n.d. Developed country
4 Bahamas High income High level of human 
development
Developed country
5 Barbados High income High level of human 
development
Developed country
6 Belize Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
7 Bolivia Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
8. Brazil Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
9. Chile* High income Very high level of 
human development
Developing country
10. Colombia Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
11. Costa Rica Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
12. Cuba Middle to high income Very high level of 
human development
Developing country
13. Curaçao High income n.d. Developed country
14. Dominica Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
15. Ecuador Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
16. El Salvador Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
17. Granada Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
18. Guatemala Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
19. Guyana Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
20. Haiti Ingreso bajo Desarrollo humano 
bajo
Developing country
21. Honduras Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
22. Cayman Islands High income n.d. Developed country
23. Turks and Caicos 
islands
High income n.d. Developed country
24. Virgin Islands (US) High income n.d. Developed country
Source: authors’ elaboration, based on sources indicated in Table 6. 
ANNEX 2
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Diverse classifications of LAC countries
World Bank UNDP DAc
25. Jamaica Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
26. Mexico Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
27. Nicaragua Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
28. Panama Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
29. Paraguay Middle to low income Average level of 
human development
Developing country
30. Peru Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
31. Puerto Rico High income n.d. Developed country
32. Dominican  Rep. Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
33. St. Vincente and the  
Grenadines
Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
34. Saint Kitts and Nevis High income High level of human 
development
Developed country
35. Saint Martin (French) High income n.d. Developed country
36. Saint Martin (Dutch) High income n.d. Developed country
37. Saint Lucia Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
38. Surinam Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
39. Trinidad and Tobago* High income High level of human 
development
Developed country
40. Uruguay* High income High level of human 
development
Developing country
41. Venezuela, RB Middle to high income High level of human 
development
Developing country
* Antigua and Barbuda, Chile and Uruguay exceeded the high income threshold between 2012 and 2013. 
In accordance with DAC regulations, these three countries will no longer receive ODA after 2017 if by then 
they continue to be high income countries.
Source: author’s own compilation using World Bank data(2015a), UNDP (2014) and DAC (2014). 
130
ANNEX 3
Seminar to discuss a preliminary versión of the study (Madrid, April 2015)
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Researcher COIBA
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,<3(*-V\UKH[PVU
Fernandes Teixeira, Antonio  Senior Economist, DG DEVCO Europe 
Aid, Policy and Coherence Unit
Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 7YLZPKLU[,<3(*-V\UKH[PVU
Litvine, Marc  Senior Advisor, DG DEVCO Europe Aid, 
Regional Programmes Latin America and 
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